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The American administrative state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is defined 
by deference by federal courts to administrative agencies. The political science and (especially) 
legal literatures have long discussed how federal courts defer to agencies, but little attention has 
been dedicated to how to identify deference and why courts defer. This dissertation redefines 
deference, a term that has been topic of extensive discussion in the last forty years but that was 
missing a key feature: the intent of the deferrers. Using administrative courts as the proxy for 
agencies at large, this dissertation suggests three reasons why judges may defer. First, an Article 
III court might defer to an administrative court by the advice of Chevron v. National Resource 
Defense Council (1984), a case that provided an explicit declaration in favor of deferring to 
agencies on the subject matters of which they are an expert. Second, an Article III court might 
defer to an administrative court when the courts are staffed by co-partisans (i.e. when the 
partisanship of the Article III court panel and the administrative court panel match). Third, an 
Article III court might defer to an administrative court when the Article III court would like to 
communicate instructions on good judicial practice to administrative law judges.  
To test these theories, this dissertation utilizes a new approach to identifying deference. 
Using the universe of precedent decisions at the Board of Immigration Appeals, I identified each 
decision where there was a companion case in the various courts of appeals. This created dyads 
of cases (n = 116) that provide the opportunity to trace a dispute through two different judicial 






Upon explicating the research design and case selection featured in this dissertation, I 
introduce the four forms of deference. If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is evidence 
in the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “active deference.” If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is no evidence in 
the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “passive deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is no evidence in the 
text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “passive non-deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is evidence in 
the text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “active non-deference.” In this deference scheme, even non-deference has theoretical 
significance. When a court provides rationales directly related to the actions of the agency, it is 
the rationale rather than the outcome that matters. When we combine an agency’s outcome in 
court with active language either for or against the agency’s actions, we can confidently make 
conclusions about judicial intent regarding administrative behavior in a way that is impossible 
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spent remembering Michelle Glenn, a mentor and friend who left us far too soon. I will continue 
to do my part to support students and the college in her memory.  
The move to Flint meant a return home to Michigan and doing so brought me back to my 
family after a decade away. Joseph, my favorite creator, consistently reminds me that finding a 
passion makes life fulfilling and that time spent together is time well spent, even if it’s just 
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long meandering phone calls and walks by the lake. Sarah, my favorite caretaker, is always there 
with a hug and a smile, advocating for the healing power of both medicine and a life well lived 
(usually in the form of falafel). Dr. Don MacMaster, my favorite educator, has taught me that the 
path to pursuing one’s dreams is rarely direct, and that the road to that dream is paved with 
afternoons spent among the trees, with Tigers baseball, and with a good book. And Dr. Tina 
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potential inspire me daily. I love all these people deeply, and I certainly would not be here if it 
were not for them.  
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Mr. Wong surely regretted his trip to Mexico. 
After living in California from the age of fifteen, he decided to take a day trip to see the 
sights south of the border; he was away from the United States for only two hours before 
returning home. His last entrance to the United States was by illegal means: he arrived from 
China through falsely claiming his father was a United States citizen. After his trip abroad he 
voluntarily surrendered himself to the local Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office, 
conceding his illegal entry and asking for a stay of deportation. The special inquiry officer in 
charge of adjudicating his claim denied his request on the grounds that he was not continuously 
present in the United States for seven years because of his two-hour sightseeing jaunt to Mexico. 
His one avenue of relief (a stint in the U.S. military that ended with an honorable discharge) was 
insufficient since to be granted a stay of deportation the immigrant must have served in the 
armed forces for at least twenty-four months; Mr. Wong was discharged after twenty-three 
months and twenty-three days. 
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Wong was denied relief. The 





was continuously present until a brief trip to Mexico; Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 499 (1963)), 
declared Wong ineligible for relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) since he 
never entered the United States legally like Fleuti did (Rosenberg). Since he was not technically 
present for at least seven years before his application for an adjustment of status (filed in 1961, 
four years prior to this decision), he was not eligible for relief and his appeal was dismissed 
(Matter of Wong, Dec. A-13128473 (BIA, 1965)).  
Like many immigrants faced with this outcome from the BIA, Wong appealed to the 
closest court of appeals (in this case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals). Fortunately for Mr. 
Wong, the Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion regarding Fleuti. Where the Board 
argued that the trip to Mexico constituted a meaningful disruption in his presence in the United 
States, the 9th Circuit concluded that nothing in the record showed that Wong intended to break 
up his residence in the United States by briefly traveling to Mexico.  The court, in reference to 
the BIA’s interpretation of Fleuti, stated: “’The Service seeks to distinguish Fleuti on the ground 
that there the [C]ourt was dealing with an entry and that here we are faced with a concept of 
continuous physical precedent.1 We do not regard this distinction as at all significant’” (Git Foo 
Wong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 358 F.2d 151 (1966), 153; citing Waldman v. 
INS, 329 F.2d 812 (1964), 815-816). They provide explicit instructions for the Board to rectify 
their mistake in this case: “In deciding whether to permit an application for suspension of 
deportation when the issue is physical presence ‘in the United States for a continuous period of 
not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application,’ the Board must 
                                                            
1 Throughout immigration case law, the INS (and its successor, the EOIR) is used 





determine the significance of an absence from the United States during that time under the 
[s]tandard set down in Fleuti” (Git Foo Wong supra.).  
Though Mr. Wong’s two-hour trip to Mexico did not ultimately lead to his removal from 
the United States, it did make four years of his life extraordinarily difficult. 
<><><><><> 
The Wong cases are one dyad of hundreds that provide insight into the relationship 
between courts and the administrative immigration apparatus. Through tracing the movement of 
disputes from administrative courts to federal courts, patterns of deference by courts to agencies 
appear. This dissertation offers a new approach to defining deference and explains why 
deference occurs. By the end of this dissertation, I will provide answers to two questions. First, 
how can we better ascertain whether judicial deference to administrative agencies has occurred? 
Second, why does deference (or non-deference) occur? To answer these questions, I appeal to 
dyads like Wong’s, where a dispute over immigration status moves from the immigration court 
system to the federal courts. As I explain in Chapter 1, using this set of data provides an exciting 
opportunity to consider this relationship without interference from confounding variables. 
 
Administrative Courts in the Administrative State 
 
Scholars of the bureaucracy and administrative law generally divide the day-to-day 
functions of agencies into two activities: rulemaking and adjudication. Rules, according to 
Section 551(4) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “means the whole or a part of an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 





requirements of an agency (Administrative Procedure Act of 1946); rulemaking, then, is the 
process of “formulating, amending, or repealing” rules. In plain English, rules are interpretations 
of and changes to statutes that occur in the process of interpreting and implementing statutory 
law on the ground. The bureaucracy literature in political science has generally focused on 
rulemaking as a political act that has implications for how those interacting with the bureaucracy 
change their behavior, particularly as policy making activity for political actors who are 
otherwise restricted from acting politically (Croley 2003; Mashaw 1994; O’Connell 2008, 2011; 
Pierce 2011; Potter 2017).  
Conversely, the political science literature has not often focused on the adjudicatory side 
of bureaucratic activity, even though, as I will argue, it is as politically important as rulemaking.2 
Section 551(7) of the APA defines adjudication as the “agency process for the formulation of an 
order,” where Section 551(6) defines an order as “the whole or a part of a final disposition, 
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form of an agency in a matter other 
than rulemaking…(Administrative Procedure Act of 1946).” This is vague, and administrative 
law scholars have not reached consensus on what this section of the APA means except by the 
exclusion of rules; for the purposes of this study, orders are defined as the end result of 
adjudication, which is the process undertaken by administrative courts (Pierce et al 2013). 
Administrative adjudication occurs throughout the bureaucracy, typically through the use 
of administrative courts, or agency offices that are staffed by judges who adjudicate disputes in 
                                                            
2 The literature on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is a notable exception to this 
rule, though a sizable portion of this literature focuses on the politics of NLRB decisions rather 






an adversarial way not unlike courts in the judiciary (Kagan 2001).3 As of 2020, there were 
sixty-three administrative courts scattered across the bureaucracy.4 Like federal courts, 
administrative courts operate under a combination of legal and institutional constraints: they are 
required to determine how the facts of a case relate to relevant jurisprudence in light of appellate 
possibilities, and they must consider how the case at hand fits into the institutional structure of 
the agency much in the same way that a federal court must make decisions with an eye towards 
both past and future precedent (Coate and Kleit 1998). The APA defines administrative courts 
through describing the prerogatives of administrative law judges, the bureaucrats who staff 
administrative courts and are responsible for adjudicating disputes and, in turn, produce written 
opinions that explicate statutory interpretations that carry precedential force (Administrative 
Procedure Act, § 554-556). 
 
Administrative Law in Action 
 
Administrative courts and federal courts have a reciprocal, cyclical relationship 
consisting of several steps.5 The process begins with a dispute brought to an administrative court 
under delineated statutory boundaries (as expressed by Congress in the language of the statute 
                                                            
3 The other primary method of adjudication for dispute resolution in the bureaucracy is the use of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation. For example, the 
Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education, tasked with enforcing Title IX of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, addresses Title IX violations by using binding arbitration. Similar 
mechanisms are present throughout agencies, though these offices are typically very small and 
only resolve a handful of disputes each year. 
4 A list of all administrative courts with their mission statements is provided in Appendix A. 
5 This dissertation uses administrative courts as its focus due to the institutional structures that 
administrative courts and federal courts share. Following the case study advice provided by 






and the agency as it has interpreted the statute over time). The form disputes take in these cases 
depends on the statute the administrative court is tasked with implementing. In some cases, a 
claimant is competing against the agency itself; for example, in removal proceedings before the 
BIA within the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), complainants bring a suit 
against the Department of Justice. In other situations, the claimant brings a suit against another 
non-state actor; for example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) hears disputes 
between employees alleging discriminatory labor practices against their employer, neither of 
whom are agents of the federal government. The administrative court, at the end of the 
adjudication process, will reach either a pro-claimant (perhaps pro-immigrant or pro-employee) 
or anti-claimant (perhaps anti-immigrant or pro-employer) decision. The process can end here 
with no further adjudicatory action. If, however, the losing party is dissatisfied with the outcome 
for either factual or procedural reasons, they are entitled to appeal to the federal court indicated 
by the governing statute. Since these appeals are typically directed toward a non-Supreme Court 
federal court, the court is compelled to hear the appeal and make a determination.6 The federal 
court, then, will decide either in favor of the original claimant, in favor of the original defendant, 
or a mixture of the two. If the disputants are satisfied, then the process ends. If one or both 
disputants are not satisfied, then the case can be appealed to the next highest court in the federal 
judicial hierarchy until there are no courts left to appeal to. At each stage (assuming an opinion is 
published),7 the court will provide a written opinion on the merits of each dispute (Hume 2009). 
                                                            
6 That said, not all determinations need be published. This is especially the case when the statute 
requires initial appeal to the geographically appropriate district court rather than the 
geographically appropriate court of appeals. The Social Security Administration’s disability 
adjudicatory apparatus uses this approach: decisions are not transcribed until a case is appealed 
to an Article III court. 





In the context of the administrative court-federal court relationship, previous decisions 
made by federal courts in reference to an administrative court case affect future outcomes in 
administrative adjudication. This is not unique, since stare decisis dictates that courts are 
restrained, at least formally, by the strictures of precedent. But in the administrative court-federal 
court relationship, these strictures are imposed upon one institution by another rather than 
imposed by an earlier iteration of the same institution. An anti-administrative court opinion by a 
federal court has the potential to change the behavior of the administrative adjudicators, and 
these changes in behavior as a result of federal court actions are compounded over time to help 
define how bureaucratic institutions function.  
The conjunction of two legal orders, one judicial and one bureaucratic, fosters plenty of 
opportunities for interactions between the two actors. In cases that arrive at the federal courts that 
begin in administrative agencies, the agency is the prevailing party more often than not. Figures 
vary depending on the types of cases examined and the research design employed, but agencies 
win anywhere between 55% and 80% of cases where they are a party (Barnett and Walker 2017, 
Kerr 1998, Miles and Sunstein 2006, Raso and Eskridge 2010, Richards et al 2006, Schuck and 
Elliott 1990, Watry 2000). Since agency-originating cases make up one of the largest proportions 
of appeals to the federal judiciary, it behooves us to understand why agencies are so successful in 
court.8  
The extant literature defines this phenomenon, where a court rules in favor of an agency 
with greater frequency than other types of litigants, as deference. Political scientists and 
                                                            
8 In 2017, appeals from administrative agencies comprised 20.4% of all appeals pending with the 
courts of appeals at the end of the year. Only appeals from the district courts comprised larger 





(especially) legal scholars have explored deference for years, generally concluding that deference 
occurs but stopping short of providing answers as to why. Deference, introduced by Farina 
(1989) and expanded upon in this dissertation, is “a style of review in which the Court adopts the 
agency’s judgment at the expense of its own (Farina 1989, 454)” through the abdication of 
political power pursuant to the adoption of another branch’s judgment; this occurs by allowing 
another political actor to exercise a power that the initial actor would typically enjoy. Deference, 
then, can be diagrammed in a two-by-two table, with an agency win or loss in the columns and 
active or passive deference in the rows. The rows identify evidence of actual deference in the 
text of judicial opinions: if the opinion includes language that lauds or criticizes the judicial 
actions of the administrative court, then the deference or non-deference is considered active; if 
the opinion does not include language that lauds or criticizes the judicial actions of the 
administrative court, then the deference or non-deference is considered passive.  
This dissertation is divided into two parts, both of which serve to enrich the existing 
literature on deference. First, this dissertation redefines deference, focusing on the intent of the 
deferential judge rather than relying exclusively on the outcome of the case vis-á-vis the agency. 
It is impossible to ascertain deference by courts when we rely solely on the outcome; instead, we 
must appeal to judge’s intent as communicated in the text of decisions. Upon explicating this and 
providing new evidence of deference rates, the dissertation turns to why courts defer. It offers 
three possibilities: copartisanship across institutions, adherence to deference doctrine, and a 
commitment to instruct other institutions as an expert in judicial procedure.  
The first two theories (copartisanship and doctrine) have been explicated in the extant 
literature, and they will be considered in depth in Chapter 1. But the third theory, an institutional 





position they occupy in the greater administrative state: courts model what they consider to be 
good judicial behavior and often actively point out inadequate judicial behavior. When courts 
defer, they are making decisions on the basis of their relative expertise in dispute resolution and 
statutory interpretation; by asserting this expertise through praising good administrative behavior 
and correcting bad administrative behavior, the courts signal their intent as to how the 
administrative state should exist and develop. Deference, then, is incidental to a larger goal of a 
well-functioning administrative state. This explanation ties together the two pre-existing theories, 
but it goes beyond simple legal or political explanations: it asserts a politico-legal landscape 
where courts and agencies are in conversation and where the administrative state develops as a 
result of these interactions, rather than through the individual actions of siloed institutions.  
What follows, then, is an exploration of deference that plays out in five chapters. Chapter 
1 provides the theoretical approaches (both old and new) to understanding deferential behavior 
by courts to administrative courts. My arguments are two-fold: first, that to truly understand 
deference we must redefine deference through no longer relying solely on agency win rates; and 
second, that deference exists at the intersection of copartisanship, adherence to doctrine, and a 
cooperative commitment to interbranch politics. To introduce the theories, I consider case 
selection in detail.9 Chapter 2 explains the new approach to studying deference: through 
examining dyads of federal and administrative court opinions. There I explain the new method 
for defining deference. An extensive explication of the coding instrument used to identify 
deferential intent is included in Appendices C and D. Chapter 3 tests two explanations for 
deference that are drawn from the existing literature on deference: copartisanship across 
                                                            
9 As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, there are potential generalizability concerns based 





institutions and doctrinal commitments that compel judicial deference to an administrative 
court’s statutory interpretation. These two theories garner fascinating results wherein Chevron 
deference appears to provide an opportunity for judges to mask their political motives for 
decision making. Chapter 4 appeals to the text of the dyadic opinions to suggest that deference 
serves to foster interbranch cooperation. I use content analysis to argue that courts use their 
opinions to model good judicial behavior and to provide instructions in the case of inadequate 
governance by administrative courts. Chapter 5 briefly concludes and discusses future avenues 










A Theory of Deference 
 
 
Fifty years before this dissertation was written, Martin Shapiro confidently asserted that 
“courts typically let the agency do what it pleases” (Shapiro 1968). Twenty years later, Peter 
Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, in the first extended examination of judicial review of agency-
originating decisions and the new deference doctrine explicated by Chevron, did not disagree 
with Shapiro’s prescription, though their reasons for doing so reflected new insights into the 
relationship between the two institutions when an agency finds themselves in court: “...two 
trends that move in opposite directions are at work simultaneously. The total body of 
administrative law is increasing rapidly, but administrative law appeals constitute a very small 
and ever-shrinking portion of the workload of individual circuit judges. The combination of these 
two factors raises serious questions about the opportunity for appellate judges to develop 
substantial experience in handling administrative law cases” (Schuck and Elliott 1990, 998). 
At the time Schuck and Elliott published their essay, this statement was accurate: in 1987 
(the last year they present data), there were 2,723 appeals from administrative agencies in the 
circuit courts out of 35,176 total appeals to the circuit courts; only 8% of cases heard by the 





States, 1987 Annual Report). This is stark when, as Schuck and Elliott note, 16% of circuit court 
cases were administrative appeals in 1965 (Schuck and Elliott 1990, 998). There has been 
remarkable variability over time as to the number of appealed cases to the federal courts with its 
peak in the early 2000s.  
That said, in any given year since the mid-twentieth century administrative appeals 
comprise at least 5% of the courts of appeals’ dockets. If Shapiro is correct and courts generally 
give agencies carte blanche when sued, that means that at least 5% of the cases the courts of 
appeals hear are, in essence, already decided without knowing anything else about the case.  
Is Shapiro right? Do agencies win in court most of the time? If so, do the wins constitute 
deference? A literature exists that answers the first question, but the second question has 
remained elusive. This dissertation gives an extensive treatment to both questions. It argues that 
the literature on identifying deference does not adequately measure what it purports to analyze, 
and that once deference is identified the second question can be answered.  
In this chapter I describe a new theoretical approach to understanding deference in the 
twentieth and twenty-first century administrative state. I begin with defining administrative law 
and deference. I give special treatment to administrative law courts, the sui generis characteristic 
of administrative law. After defining deference, I explain the existing approaches to measuring 
deference and note that those strategies are deficient. I provide a new approach to identifying 
deference wherein the intent of the judges is ascertained from the text of opinions. But it is 
inadequate to simply identify whether an agency has won or lost; I must also provide an 
explanation as to whether the win or loss exemplifies (non-)deference. I offer two theories from 
the extant literature (doctrinal restrictions on courts and copartisanship across institutions) and 





promoting good interpretive and dispute resolution practice across institutions). Later in the 
dissertation it will become clear that all theories have limited explanatory power. However, I will 
argue that the new approach is a promising avenue methodologically and theoretically. It is here 
that I argue for the strength of using dyadic data.  
 
Administrative Law Introduced 
 
Administrative law has existed in one form or another since the inception of the 
American state (Stewart 1975) but its modern form traces back to the passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and, arguably, Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council (1984)10.  There have been many attempts to define administrative law with each 
definition homing in on its constituent parts. Breyer and his co-authors, in their textbook on 
administrative law and regulatory policy, defines it as “those legal principles that define the 
authority and structure of administrative agencies, specify the procedural formalities that 
agencies use, determine the validity of administrative decisions, and outline the role of reviewing 
courts and other organs of government in their relation to administrative agencies (Breyer et al 
2017, 2-3).’” Simeone suggests that administrative law is a law for modern problems: the 
development of substantive rights and procedural remedies already well-established. 
Administrative legal processes, then, are means of redress in the face of an inaccessible judiciary 
concurrent with heightened pressures on the Article III judiciary (Simeone 1992).  
At its most essential level, administrative law refers to the policies and procedures that 
govern how bureaucratic agencies function in the day-to-day in context with external political 
                                                            





forces. Stewart finds that administrative law is schizophrenic in the tension between procedural 
formality and political control (Stewart 1975).  And Moe argues that “bureaucracy [arises] out of 
politics, and its design reflect[s] the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise 
political power” (Moe 1989, 267).  
Administrative procedures, according to McCubbins et al, serve two main purposes: 
addressing informational asymmetries (Eskridge and Frickey 1994, Ferejohn and Shipan 1990, 
de Figueroida et al 1999, Huber and Shipan 2002, Lupia and McCubbins 1994) and tilting 
agency decision making toward the preferences of important constituents (Balla 1998, de 
Figueroida et al 1999, McCubbins et al 1987, Spence 1999). Strauss differentiates between three 
methods of separating prerogatives across the administrative state. The first, separation of 
powers, “supposes that what government does can be characterized in terms of the kind of act 
performed...and that for the safety of the citizenry from tyrannous government [the functions of 
the three branches of government] must be kept in distinct places” (Strauss 1984, 577). 
Separation of functions, in comparison, “admits that for agencies...the same body often does 
exercise all three of the characteristic governmental powers, albeit in a web of other controls--
judicial review and legislative and executive oversight….The powers are not kept separate, at 
least in general, but certain procedural protections...may be afforded” (ibid, 577). Checks and 
balances bridges the two separations through “focus[ing] on relationships and interconnections, 
on maintaining the conditions in which the intended struggle at the apex may continue. From this 
perspective...it is not important how powers below the apex are treated; the important question is 
whether the relationship of each of the three named actors of the Constitution to the exercise of 
those powers is such as to promise a continuation of their effective independence and 





governing principle of the administrative state is misguided; separation of functions and checks 
and balances more fully embrace the reality that governance does not fit into the tripartite 
structure defined by the first three articles of the Constitution.  
 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) embraces this. §706 explicates the 
separation of functions inherent in the relationship between the reviewing courts and the 
reviewed agency: “To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court 
shall – (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be: (a) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (d) without observance of procedure required 
by law; (e) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to §556 and §557 of this title or 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (f) unwarranted by 
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making 
the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by 
a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error” (Administrative Procedure 
Act §706: Scope of Review).  
This introduces tension in how the rule of law is exercised. Agencies implement 
administrative systems that leverage experience and expertise to provide consistent and informed 
decisions that accomplish statutory objectives; at the same time, the rule of law justifies 










The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide a new and more thorough approach to 
understanding the concept of deference, for deference (or a lack thereof) defines the activities of 
courts in the twentieth and twenty-first century administrative state. Farina, in her essay on 
deference and the balance of power across branches in administrative law, defines deference as 
“a style of review in which the Court adopts the agency’s judgment at the expense of its own” 
(Farina 1989, 454). I accept her definition and further strengthen it by adding an action to the 
interpretation: deference refers to the abdication of political power pursuant to the adoption of 
another branch’s judgment through allowing another political actor to exercise a power that the 
initial actor would typically enjoy. To simplify this phenomenon, we can say that deference 
occurs when Actor A, who usually enjoys Power X, allows Actor B to exercise Power X in 
certain circumstances. For the purposes of deference, it is not enough for Actor B to exercise 
Power X; key to deference is Actor A’s motivations. When Actor A defers to Actor B, there is an 
assumption made, either implicitly or explicitly, that Actor A has faith that Actor B can perform 
Power X to a comparable or better end than Actor A can perform Power X. Deference, in 
American politics, can take several forms: from Congress delegating powers to bureaucratic 
agencies (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) and the President to the President enlisting the help of 






Of particular interest here is the deference provided by courts to agencies generally and 
administrative courts specifically. The differences between courts and the bureaucracy are not as 
distinct as they may appear at first glance. Aagaard implores us to consider how the rule of law is 
exemplified across both institutions. The commitment to the rule of law that judges employ is a 
foregone conclusion in the vast legal literature. But if we break down the features of the rule of 
law that agencies exemplify, we can point to some of the same features that Weber argued 
typified bureaucracies: the rule of law promotes predictability, consistency, and efficiency. In 
fact, agencies are often better arbiters of these principles than courts: agencies are composed of 
experts who are adept at reaching consistent decisions through creating processes that, through 
specialization and routinization, make decisions with greater speed and at lower cost than courts 
do (Aagaard 2018, Andreski (ed) 1983).  
Deference by courts to administrative courts states that courts are likely to abdicate some 
of their interpretive and dispute resolution power to administrative courts through making 
decisions that provide those powers to the Article II courts. When an agency is party to a federal 
lawsuit, the court will often make decisions that defer to the expertise of bureaucrats and their 
interpretations of the agency’s governing statutes. In practice, this means that agencies prevail in 
federal court more often than average (if by “average” we mean 50% of the time). Scholars have, 
since the advent of the modern administrative state, explicated the nature of judicial deference to 
administrative statutory interpretation, generally extolling the various deference doctrines that 
control courts (Eskridge and Baer 2008, Raso and Eskridge 2010). A spectrum of deference 





only (in order of strength of deference, Curtiss-Wright,11 Seminole Rock,12 Auer,13 Beth Israel,14 
Skidmore;15 Raso and Eskridge 2010).  
But there is no doctrine that is more widely cited and applied than Chevron.16 This 
doctrine calls for near exclusive deference by courts to agencies when questions arise as to the 
interpretation of the agency’s governing statutes in circumstances where Congress was 
ambiguous as to how a statute should be interpreted. In practice, this deference is neither 
absolute nor well-defined and measured by the existing literature. Before I can test explanations 
of deferential behavior I must first define deference (both Chevron and otherwise) in such a way 
as to ensure that deference is identified and measured without accidentally including false 
positives.  
The existing literature on deference uses a simple binary approach to code for deference 
by a court to an administrative court: if a court rules in favor of an administrative court’s 
interpretation of their governing statute, then the decision is coded “1” for deference; if a court 
rules against an administrative court’s interpretation of their governing statute, then the decision 
is coded “0” for no deference. Using agency win rates is a fine place to start to understand 
deferential behavior by courts (for deferring necessarily requires ruling in an agency’s favor)17, 
but it is inadequate in the long term. By distilling deference down to whether an agency wins or 
                                                            
11 United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
12 Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
13 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1996). 
14 Beth Israel Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board, 437 U.S. 483 (1978). 
15 Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
16 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
17 A case could be made that deference can occur without a court ruling in favor of an agency. I 





loses, the context within which the decision is made and the rationale for why a decision is made 
is scrubbed away. As such, the evidence for deference is left unexamined.  
Relying on win rates alone can obscure the true reason for ruling in an agency’s favor; 
there are many circumstances where an agency could be successful in court that are unrelated to 
deference. As an example, consider the use of procedural rationales for judicial decisions. Bickel 
famously argued that courts can use procedural means to avoid making a decision in 
controversial cases, such as declaring a dispute moot or asserting a lack of jurisdiction (Bickel 
1962, Sunstein 1999). In courts that do not enjoy a discretionary docket, these powers can be 
useful tools. To be sure, a court may rule on procedural grounds instead of actively deferring to 
an agency; however, there is no way to know if this might be the case without looking deeper. 
Further, there is a more likely explanation for the use of these procedural decisions in courts that 
have no control over their docket’s composition or size: declaring an outstanding dispute moot 
clears up space for a dispute that remains active and would benefit from the dispute resolution 
expertise of the judges on the bench. In the last thirty years where docket sizes have expanded in 
conjunction with increasing litigation rates, this explanation becomes all the more likely.  
In short, if we are to simply state that in a case where an agency is successful in court 
there is deferential intent by a judge or a court, then we are very likely to inadvertently lump 
together actual cases of deference with a significant number of false positives. This, in turn, 
inflates the deference rate. The solution to this problem is to appeal to the text of opinions. In 
order to truly identify deference, we must look to the text of the opinion to find evidence of 
deference or non-deference. Only then can we be sure that deference has or has not occurred. I 






Deference in Action: Why Do Courts Defer? 
 
The central challenge in administrative law is how decision-making authority is delegated 
across the administrative state. The APA as passed in 1946 delegated decision-making authority 
to administrative law judges but that authority was approximate and rough-hewn. By the 
Chevron era the interpretive authority was passed to agencies more conclusively (Gersen 2006).   
Even given the extensive literature on Chevron and its contemporaries, no clear answer 
has been provided. Two primary explanations, alluded to by the literature but rarely explicitly 
tested, can be described as “doctrinal” and “partisan.” Doctrinally, courts have been (at least 
nominally) restrained by deference doctrines since the nineteenth century, though the modern 
deference framework is defined by Chevron (Bamzai 2017). This doctrinal explanation states 
that variable deference rates can be discerned through (1) identifying the governing deference 
regime at the time a judicial decision is made, and (2) determining whether the court applies that 
deference schema. Since most of the literature on deference comes from law scholars rather than 
political scientists, most of the existing scholarship falls under this umbrella and as such is 
typically interpretive and rarely empirical.  
  A “partisan” explanation, in contrast, asserts that courts will defer when they are faced 
with an agency that they consider to be a copartisan. This explanation is consistent with the 
attitudinal and strategic strands of the judicial decision making literature which, generally, state 
that judges will more often than not vote in line with their policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth 
1998), and that judges are strategic actors who realize that the ability to achieve their goals 
depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the 
institutional context that they occupy (Epstein and Knight 1998). Both strands suggest that 





contrary to the preferences of the institution they occupy. The canonical works in judicial 
decision making seek to explain the behavior of Supreme Court justices and their decision 
making; though undoubtedly illustrative in this case, the more recent literature on courts of 
appeals judges and their decision making calculus is more relevant since the forces that motivate 
Supreme Court judges are tempered in lower courts due to the unique institutional characteristics 
of non-Supreme Court federal courts (Kaheny and Haire 2008, Kastellec 2007, Songer and Haire 
1992, Songer et al 2000).  Even given this caveat, we can expect that if partisan pressures explain 
deferential behavior there will be a relationship between copartisanship across institutions and 
the existence of deference.  
In examining the data I collected and analyzed for this dissertation (to be explained in 
Chapter 2), I have reason to suspect that these two existing explanations do not explain all of the 
observed variation. Chapter 3 tests the two extant theories, while Chapter 4 introduces a new 
explanation: that courts, in an effort to foster interbranch cooperation and good governance 
across the political apparatus, defer to administrative courts in an attempt to signal adequate or 
inadequate interpretive behavior. We can expect, then, that if this theory has explanatory power 
that courts are purposefully communicating their preferences regarding how other judicial actors 
should perform their duties. Below I explicate the three theories and the observable implications 




The first possible reason for judicial deference to administrative agencies is a 
commitment to extant and evolving doctrine that requires deference. Under this theory, doctrine 





decision making through limiting judicial discretion in cases involving an administrative court’s 
statutory interpretations. This is the predominant explanation in the extensive legal literature on 
deference.  
In Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, the Supreme Court clarified the 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the courts, entrenching deferential behavior that had 
already existed for decades (as I will argue in Chapters 3 and 4). The opinion heralded near-
exclusive judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes. The opinion provided a two-step 
test for judges to apply when faced with a statutory interpretation case. First, the court must ask 
whether Congress has explicitly spoken to the issue in question in the statute. If it has, then there 
is no issue to be resolved. If, however, Congress has been ambiguous or silent, then the court 
must determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable given the text of 
the statute provided by Congress. This standard gives great latitude for agencies in their statutory 
interpretation processes since their interpretation need only be reasonable to pass the Chevron 
test.  
The Court’s rationale in Chevron, provided by Justice Stevens in his majority opinion, 
states that Congress, in writing an ambiguous statute, “provided an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation” (Chevron v. 
Natural Resource Defense Council, 884-5). Further, the Court recognized that bureaucrats are 
specialists and judges are not.18 Therefore, judges, recognizing this reality, should defer to the 
way agencies engage in their business as usual with the assumption that they (the bureaucrats) 
                                                            
18 This feature of the opinion offers an interesting dichotomy. In Chevron, the distinction is made 
between generalist courts and specialist agencies. However, in the case of administrative courts 
and federal courts, the courts are the experts on acting judicially and thus the courts are the 





know the best way to fulfill their statutory duties; when the courts try to instruct the bureaucrat to 
act in a certain way, they are more likely to misunderstand agency functions than the bureaucrats 
who are actively working within the agency. The Chevron decision has been referred to as “the 
anti-Marbury”: where Marbury v. Madison self-empowered the Court to act as a check on the 
other branches of government through the exercise of judicial review, Chevron voluntarily gave 
some of its interpretive power to another branch (Marbury v. Madison (1803), Sunstein 1990, 
Sunstein 2006a). 
 According to Pierce and Weiss, there are three grounds upon which judicial deference to 
agency interpretations of agency rules can rely. The first is that deference might be supported by 
the belief that the agency is more likely than a court to know what it intended when it issued the 
rule. But at the same time, it is very unlikely that the people who made the rule are the ones who 
are doing the interpreting or that the priorities of the agency at the time the rule is evaluated are 
the same as when the rule was initially implemented. This is a helpful reminder that agencies are 
the sum of many parts, not a monolith promoting one set of policies exclusively. The second 
ground states that deference is justified because the agency understands better than a court which 
interpretation will allow the agency to further its statutorily-defined mission. This provides a 
solution to the conundrum introduced when considering agencies as conglomerations of different 
ideas rather than one monolith of policy: even though the personnel and policies change in 
bureaucracies over time, the day-to-day activities of agencies rarely change significantly over 
time per Weber’s ideal of a bureaucracy through the institution of a hierarchical structure, career 
employees hired apolitically, and a commitment to formal rules of procedure. Third, the 
jurisdictional reach of agency interpretations and judicial interpretations vary: since an agency’s 





deference to agency interpretation of agency rules furthers the goal of maximizing national 
uniformity in implementing national statutes (Pierce and Weiss 2011).  
Given this, we can consider Chevron as a doctrine of hard cases. Dworkin defined hard 
cases as cases where “the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent;” simply put, hard 
cases are those where the law runs out. Dworkin’s process of deciding hard cases has two 
dimensions. The first step is fit, or the extent to which the novel legal theory crafted in the 
process of deciding the hard case is consistent with the existing legal landscape. If there is more 
than one novel legal theory that fits, then the second step, or justification, must occur: the judge 
must implement the theory that provides the best justification for the law at large (Dworkin 
1975).  Liu argues that the Chevron two-step tracks with Dworkin’s theory of hard cases. Step 
one is prior to the hard case determination; this is the law-applying stage in statutory 
interpretation cases. But when the Chevron analysis moves to step two, then the theory of hard 
cases applies, for step two is the law-making stage. If Congress has not explicitly spoken on the 
issue, then there is no law that applies to the present dispute and the law, thus, has run out. The 
court, in that situation, is responsible for considering Dworkin’s fit and justification to come to a 
decision that applies deference or non-deference (Liu 2014). 
 But this application of Dworkin’s theory excludes the preferences and expertise of 
agencies in the process, and it is in this exclusion that a theory of deference emerges. As Liu 
notes, “the presence of an agency construction, however, means that the court itself need not 
make law to fill that gap; instead, it may defer to the law-making of the agency--which, unlike 
the court, is accountable to the political branches. Viewed this way, deference emerges as an act 
of judicial self-restraint, grounded in the recognition that the law carries greater legitimacy when 





This positivist account of Chevron breaks judicial reliance on interpretation of 
Congressional intent (Hart 2012, Raz 1979).  Farina summarizes it well: “Chevron offers no 
evidence to support its conclusion that silence or unclarity in a regulatory statute typically 
represents Congress’ deliberate delegation of meaning-elaboration power to the agency” (Farina 
1989, 470). In fact, as Liu argues, there is little to suggest that Congress ever consciously left 
ambiguities such that the courts would be required to use Chevron to fill in the gaps (Liu 2014).  
 Chevron, as Merrill notes, was a strange candidate to become a landmark decision in 
administrative law: only six justices took part in the decision, and the decision to provide greater 
latitude to agencies took place as the early Reagan administration was engaging in a larger goal 
of deregulation and ceding power away from the bureaucracy (Merrill 1992, 975). But even so 
its tenets took hold and the legal profession, both in court and in the academy, took notice. In the 
years that followed the Chevron decision, scholarship on the new doctrine proliferated with 
extraordinary speed. A Nexis keyword search for Chevron in the text of law review articles from 
the top twenty-five law journals since 1986 yielded nearly 3500 articles comprising 
approximately 8% of all articles published in that time frame.19  
Shapiro and Levy, speaking on the burgeoning Chevron literature ten years after the 
opinion was handed down, argued that “administrative law scholars, whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the Court’s standards, assumed that Chevron…[was a landmark decision] that 
signaled a turning point in the substantive review of agency decisions” (Shapiro and Levy 1995, 
1051). Their prescription, that Chevron was perceived as important regardless of whether 
scholars thought it was good law, was shared by numerous legal scholars and it led to an 
                                                            





extensive and varied literature on the subject. Some scholars have argued that judicial deference 
to agencies did not occur as swiftly and unilaterally as the popular accounts suggest (Lawson and 
Kam 2013, Liu 2014). Other accounts add Congress into the fray: since Congress passes the 
legislation that creates appropriates funds for agencies, their preferences are not irrelevant 
(Garrett 2003, Liu 2014, Mantel 2009). Some question the extent to which the Court offered 
direct instructions for other federal courts in adjudicating agency deference cases, imploring the 
Court to clarify its position and pushing the legal community to investigate Chevron further 
(Bressman 2009, Chabot 2015, Foote 2007, Foy 2010, Merrill 1992, Stephenson and Vermeule 
2009, Sunstein 2006b). Yet other scholars expand the scope beyond just the actions of the Court 
regarding Chevron by examining agency deference at all levels of the federal court system 
(Hubbard 2013, Note 2007).  
The defense of deference to agencies by courts is not universal. For example, Manning 
argues that widespread deference may lead agencies to exploit the ambiguities in the rules that 
the agency itself is creating in order to maximize their power. An agency could issue a broadly 
worded rule that can be interpreted in multiple ways unilaterally instead of creating a more 
narrowly applicable rule through the time- and effort-intensive notice and comment process 
(Manning 1996).  But the overwhelming rate with which the courts bless agency interpretations 
of their statutes (Pierce and Weiss cite a 90+% deference rate by the Supreme Court of agency 
interpretation of agency rules) suggests that the courts do not share this same concern (Pierce and 
Weiss 2011, citing Eskridge and Baer 2008). 
 But even though the Chevron literature is rich with interpretive guidance and 
jurisprudential insight, there is comparatively little empirical work on the effect of Chevron on 





exceptions in both the legal and political science literatures.20 The foundational study of Chevron 
that appears in bibliographies in nearly every Chevron essay is a 1990 Duke Law Journal essay 
by Schuck and Elliott. They sought to understand the effect of Chevron on agency decision 
making, noting the dearth of large-n studies of the phenomenon. Their analyses indicate a steady 
rise in administrative filings in federal courts, beginning in 1965 and peaking just after Chevron 
(Schuck and Elliott 1990). 
Shortly after the Schuck and Elliott essay was published, Kerr offered an empirical test of 
the traditional explanations of judicial deference to agencies. This is the first essay that suggests 
that partisanship might explain judicial decision making in these cases better than, or at least 
comparable to, Chevron (Kerr 1998). Miles and Sunstein took up the mantle of politically-
motivated decision making in full, testing judicial decision making in cases involving the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the NLRB. They found that Republican-appointed 
justices were more likely to rule against Democrat-appointed agencies than Democrats were 
(Miles and Sunstein 2006, further examined in Miles and Sunstein 2008). Most recently, Barnett 
and Walker tested the strength of Chevron deference in 1571 courts of appeals cases between 
2003 and 2013. They found, generally, that the circuit courts upheld agency rulings 71% of the 
time and applied Chevron deference 75% of the time. This provides further by limited evidence 
that the courts defer to agencies more often than not (Barnett and Walker 2017).21 
                                                            
20 Pierce (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of ten articles that identify agency win rates. 
However, one of the articles (Zaring 2010) is a meta-analysis itself. The four studies discussed 
here are the foundational studies as well as one recent study that has proved itself to be a 
significant contribution to the literature (cited by 139 others in the three years since publication). 
21 A fifth study (Eskridge and Baer 2008) places all Supreme Court agency interpretation cases 
between Chevron and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2004) (n=1014) on a deference continuum. The 





I also identified three political science treatments of Chevron. The first was a dissertation 
drafted by Ruth Watry pursuant to her doctoral studies at the University of Delaware. She 
examines what she calls “contested agency interpretations of statutes” cases at the Supreme 
Court twelve years before and after the Chevron decision. In particular, she is testing the power 
of Chevron as an independent variable against conventional attitudinal accounts of judicial 
decision making via their ideological leanings (Segal and Cover 1989, Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
She finds that “attitude is an extremely strong predictor of liberal/conservative outcome in 
[contested agency interpretation of statutes] cases,” though it is slightly less explanatory after 
Chevron (Watry 2000, 43).  
Later, Richards et al studied the impact of Chevron on judicial decision making. They use 
jurisprudential regime theory as a foil, arguing that “while the attitudes of the justices do matter, 
Chevron may have nonetheless changed the structure of influences on justices’ decisions in 
administrative law cases (Richards et al 2006, 444).” Using a sample of Supreme Court cases 
between 1969 and 2000, they find that Chevron led to an increase in deference and that justices 
are more likely to defer in a case involving administrative rulemaking than in cases that do not 
involve rulemaking (Richards et al 2006; see also Richards and Kritzer 2002). Most recently and 
echoing insights from both the interpretive and empirical work preceding it, Raso and Eskridge 
find that deference doctrine (and other methodological doctrines) do not hold exclusively as 
stare decisis would suggest (Raso and Eskridge 2010). 
Though these studies begin to investigate the role of Chevron in interbranch politics, the 
extant literature has several weaknesses. First, only three studies examine pre- and post-Chevron 
judicial deference, and their conclusions are dated (Schuck and Elliott 1990, Richards et al 2006, 





short time frame (typically between two and ten years). This is useful for understanding 
contemporary deference practices, but it sheds little light on how judicial deference to agency 
decisions has evolved (or if it has evolved) over time. Second, only two of the political science 
studies take seriously the partisan counterfactual (i.e. that judicial deference to agencies is 
disguising co-partisanship across institutions) (Richards et al 2006, Watry 2000). However, I 
would argue that Richard et al use the wrong measure of partisanship. (I discuss this in chapter 
2.) And more fundamentally, the two studies provide contradictory results: one finds that 
partisanship matters greatly but independently of Chevron (Watry 2000) while the other finds 
that partisanship is highly moderated as a result of Chevron after its passage (Richards et al 
2006).  Only one legal piece offers partisanship as a possibility and only in passing (Kerr 1998). 
The most important shortcoming of the existing literature is the main focus of this 
dissertation: almost all studies of deference doctrine, especially those that find that Chevron does 
not fully explain deferential behavior, note that a large majority of agency appeals are decided in 
favor of the agency. In their 2010 article, Raso and Eskridge evaluate deference rates across 
different doctrines at the Supreme Court level between 1984 and 2006 (i.e. after Chevron). Their 
cross tabulations, provided in Table 1a, show that judicial deference to agency statutory 








Table 1a: Deference Regime and the Decision to Uphold22 
 
 










Uphold agency 60.76% 78.21% 72.13% 88.41% 
Overturn agency 39.24% 21.79% 27.87% 11.59% 
 
To complement this finding and to extrapolate on the finding that Chevron led to deference rates 
that were only slightly higher than when no deference doctrine was applied at all, I collected all 
cases that involved an agency as a party to a lawsuit in the courts of appeals in 1983 and 1985. I 
then identified a random sample of one hundred cases (fifty from 1983 and fifty from 1985) and 
coded for the agency involved, the outcome of the case, and the partisanship of both the judges 
on the panel and the author of the opinion. Every circuit court (including the D.C. and Federal 
Circuit Courts) and twenty-three agencies were represented in the sample. Table 1b provides the 
number of cases won and lost by an agency in the years immediately before and after the 




                                                            
















Agency win 28 56% 26 52% 
Agency loss 8 16% 11 22% 
Mixed outcome 5 10% 3 6% 
Unknown 
outcome 
9 18% 10 20% 
 
These limited data suggest the possibility that Chevron did not have an appreciable effect on 




An explanation more at home in the political science canon suggests that courts will be 
more likely to defer to agencies when they perceive copartisanship across the two institutions. 
There are a number of approaches to understanding judicial decision making as a political act, 
but regardless of the theory one truism overarches them all: judges are not neutral arbiters of law 
(Epstein et al 2007).  
                                                            
23 N = 50 for both years. Random sample was selected via random number generator. 
24 These findings do not assert causality since they simply count cases before and after Chevron, 





There are two strands of judicial decision-making theory emphasizing judicial preference 
that overlap in parts and diverge in others: attitudinalism and strategic theory. Of the two, 
attitudinalism has the most to offer for this dissertation project. The attitudinal model of judicial 
behavior suggests that judges, in essence, vote their political preferences. The history of this 
strand of judicial decision making theorizing begins with Pritchett who argued that judges are 
motivated by their preferences as evidenced by the observed increase in the number of dissenting 
opinions (where dissenting opinions are declarations of policy position in opposition to the 
majority opinion) (Pritchett 1941). Shortly thereafter, Dahl’s seminal 1957 essay on judicial 
review practices at the Supreme Court in the first century and a half of the Court’s history found 
that when the Court votes to declare a law unconstitutional (which is relatively rarely) they do so 
in line with the political regime that appointed them (Dahl 1957).  Presidents, according to 
Peretti, can count on their judicial appointees on the Supreme Court to rule in line with the 
regime’s policy preferences approximately 75% of the time (Peretti 1999). Judicial review, then, 
is primarily used by the “political” branches to shunt potentially controversial “cross-cutting” 
political issues to an unelected judiciary to solve (Graber 1993).  
 At its core, attitudinalism relies on identifying judicial preferences. Individual 
preferences, according to Rohde and Spaeth, are the primary determinants of judicial behavior. 
They break preferences into five characteristics: they are (1) relatively enduring, (2) an 
organization of interrelated beliefs that describe, evaluate, and advocate action regarding an 
object or situation, (3) composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components, (4) 
predispositions that result in a preferential response for the attitude, object, or situation, or 
toward maintenance or preservation of the attitude itself, and (5) social behavior that, at 





regarding the attitude situation (Rohde and Spaeth 1976, as cited in George 1998). Keck 
distinguishes between two varieties of preferences: political preferences (in the Dahlian strain) 
and policy preferences (Keck 2007).  The promotion of policy preferences, initially explicated by 
Segal and Cover and Segal and Spaeth, accepts Dahl’s premises (i.e. that judges will generally 
rule in favor of the regime of which they are a part) but pushes judicial preference one step 
further: in situations where the personal preferences of a judge conflict with the goals of the 
larger regime, then the judge will rule in favor of their own preferences and against the 
preferences of the regime (Dahl 1957, Segal and Cover 1989, Segal and Spaeth 2002; see also 
Keck 2007).  Segal and Spaeth, in their spirited defense of attitudinalism, found that when 
justices are coded for partisanship and placed on a spectrum of both partisanship and the extent 
of partisanship, outcomes in politically charged decisions can be predicted with extraordinary 
accuracy (Segal and Spaeth 2002; see also Martin et al 2005). 
There are two ways that we can measure partisan constraints on deference activity 
borrowing from the two strands of attitudinal theory. The first, borrowing from Dahl, is to 
determine the appointing party for each judge and each administrative law judge and look for 
matches in deference cases and no matches in non-deference cases (Dahl 1957).  The other 
option, from Segal and Spaeth, is to determine the “pro-agency” stance versus the “anti-agency” 
stance and, using the partisanship identified in the first instance, ascertain whether the policy 
stance is the primary reason for ruling for or against an agency. Since the focus of this portion of 
the dissertation is on partisanship rather than ideology, I rely heavily on the Dahlian approach; I 
discuss this further in Chapter 2.   
But the challenge inherent in drawing upon these theories of judicial decision making is 





theories to non-Supreme Court courts and their partisanship is not cut-and-dried for several 
reasons. For one, non-Supreme Court courts generally operate within a panel system wherein a 
rotating set of judges try cases. Further, non-Supreme Court courts do not have discretionary 
dockets; they are responsible for hearing all cases that come before them.  
There are ways to circumvent these challenges. One approach is to only study en banc 
cases, or cases where all of the judges in the circuit hear the case together and where the judges 
vote as a single bloc. These are more likely to be important cases, and they give the opportunity 
to examine judicial coalition building to achieve their preferred results since judges, in en banc 
cases, cannot vote individually (George 1998).  However, this is not to say that we cannot 
examine non-aggregate circuit court decision making. Fischman’s study of circuit court judges 
found that the interaction between judges serving on appellate panels produces collegial pressure 
toward consensus (Fischman 2011). Goldman argues that presidents use lower court 
appointments to reward their party’s faithful and to shore up party cleavages, not to support their 
policy agenda (Goldman 1975).  
Further, non-Supreme Court judges may experience reversal aversion since having a 
higher judge overturn their decision court be potentially damaging to career prospects and 
internal conceptions of their success as an arbiter (Higgins and Rubin 1980). Schanzbach and 
Tiller, in their empirical study of contemporary sentencing statutes, argue that district court 
judges decide cases strategically to avoid reversal through using recommended sentences at the 
lower end of the recommended sentencing guidelines or through utilizing Bickel’s non-decision 
decisions (Schanzbach and Tiller 2008; see also Bickel 1962). Epstein and her co-authors found 
that although Republican and Democratic judges do not decide cases differently, the partisan 





influences their judgments (Epstein et al 2013). Landes and Posner, in their essay on rational 
judicial behavior, found that there is a conformity effect in the courts of appeals: the number of 
judges appointed by Republicans increases relative to the number appointed by Democratic 
presidents; as this occurs, all of the judges in the circuit tend to vote more liberally (with the 
same dynamic present in the opposite scenario). When the proportion of Republican judges to 
Democratic judges is skewed, the judges belonging to the minority party tend to vote in a more 
partisan way (“the fewer the judges appointed by Democratic presidents, the more liberally they 
vote”) (Landes and Posner 2009, 775).  
Drawing from all of the aforementioned strands of the judicial decision making literature, 
I assign partisan codes to each judge in each case in this dissertation’s dataset. I will describe this 
in detail in chapter 2.  
 
Commitment to Interbranch Cooperation 
 
The final explanation eschews explicitly doctrinal and political rationales for deference; it 
instead considers the possibility that courts defer to agencies in an attempt to foster cross-
institutional dialogue and good judicial practice across the political apparatus. It ties together, in 
part, the two existing theories and considers the possibility that courts act with an eye towards 
how their decisions may help guide other institutions in their business-as-usual.  
This theory is primarily drawn from the burgeoning literature on interbranch 
institutionalism. The motivating principle of interbranch institutionalism states that institutions 
may make decisions that are immediately contrary to their interests but ultimately may be better 





institutionalists assume that the “intricate dispersal of power [across institutions] creates a 
complex and shifting web of relations among various centers of power, which varies across issue 
areas and over time” (Barnes 2007, 27). Further, “the dynamic tension built into this fragmented 
system is likely to produce a multiplicity of interinstitutional interactions” that can be traced 
across institutions and over time only if the relationship between the two institutions is taken 
seriously rather than taken for granted (Barnes 2007, 27-8; see also Graber 1993). Only when 
courts are considered as one actor of many can inferences about judicial behavior be made. 
There are a number of ways that courts can be examined vis-a-vis other political actors, 
including through separation-of-power game theory (Epstein et al 2007; Epstein and Walker 
1996; Eskridge 1991; Gely and Spiller 1992; McCubbins et al 1987, 1989) and the regime theory 
explicated above (Dahl 1957, Richards and Kritzer 2002). But my approach to understanding 
deference borrows from the judiciary-focused American political development literature for it 
provides the greatest opportunity to trace how deference activity has changed over time. Barnes 
refers to these approaches as “microinstitutional analyses” wherein “courts operate in a wide 
range of institutional contexts at any given time and thus play different roles in the policy-
making process” (Barnes 2007, 33). Scholars operating within the confines of this subdiscipline 
acknowledge and celebrate the various roles that courts play in a way that other judicial scholars 
often overlook: by focusing on courts in interbranch context on one or a few policy issues, 
patterns can be unearthed as to the dynamics underlying judicial behavior (Barnes 2004, Feeley 
and Rubin 1998, Melnick 1994). Even though this dissertation is not a traditional American 
political development dissertation, the principles remain at the fore. 
In the case of judicial deference to administrative agencies, courts may rule in such a way 





are to consider institutions as individual rational actors, then this action does not make sense: 
political actors acting rationally will always seek to enhance their own power. But what we find 
when we examine the case law, and particularly the text of the case law, is that courts will 
delegate court-adjacent activities (like dispute resolution and statutory interpretation) to 
administrative actors. A natural assumption is that this delegation is due to the aforementioned 
partisan and doctrinal theories. But when we control for those two possibilities, deference still 
occurs.  
So why does this deference occur? Courts defer to ensure good judicial practice in a state 
that decentralizes much of its dispute resolution to non-judicial entities (like administrative 
courts). This might be self-serving – perhaps courts would prefer not to have their dockets filled 
with cases that could be potentially resolved elsewhere (after all, the non-Supreme Court federal 
courts do not have discretionary dockets). But in reality courts do not defer at each opportunity. 
Courts selectively defer and provide instructions to administrative courts so that they can reward 
good governance with deference (which an autonomous bureaucracy would likely cherish) 
(Carpenter 2001, 2010) and discourage insufficient dispute resolution with explicit instructions 
for future action. It is as if courts will only abdicate responsibilities when they believe that the 
institution taking on these responsibilities is up to the challenge. It is selective deference in 
pursuit of good governance in an interbranch system, or at least selective deference so that the 
benefits of abdicating responsibility outweigh the potential that the abdicated power is used 
incorrectly.  
In short, I argue that courts defer to agencies outside of partisan and doctrinal bounds in 
order to promote an ideal form of judicial behavior across institutions. In the same way that 





their policy areas, courts can assert expertise about those actions that are inherently judicial in 
nature. By explicitly communicating their expertise in the text of opinions where an agency is a 
party, courts express their preferences as to how government should function across institutions. 
Deference to agencies, then, serves as an indication that agencies are acting correctly as defined 
by the court; active non-deference to agencies, then, indicates both that agencies are not acting 












Methods and Case Selection 
 
 
In order to test the theories explicated in Chapter 1, I employ a most-likely case study 
approach by examining the deferential relationship between federal courts and administrative 
courts (George and Bennett 2005). But before I reflect on case selection, we must fully 
understand the history and characteristics of administrative courts that make them an ideal 
avenue of study for this dissertation.  
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) aims for improved efficiency and fairness in 
agencies through the separation of the adjudicative (quasi-judicial), rule-making (quasi-
legislative) and enforcement (quasi-executive) operations. The adjudicative aims, according to 
Graham, are “for the agency, through its quasi-judicial function, to decide a dispute as ‘rightly’ 
as possible with agency policy as the basic test” (Graham 1985, 260-1). To achieve these 
adjudicatory goals, many agencies turn to administrative courts. Administrative courts are a 
bureaucratic construction that interpret relevant statutory law and adjudicate disputes that arise 
under those statutes and interpretations. They are staffed by administrative law judges who 






Administrative law judges are selected in a merit-based process that starts at the Office of 
Personnel Management (for initial review of applications and administering a competitive 
examination used to rank applicants) and ends with the agency that houses the administrative 
court making the final hiring decision. Administrative law judges must be a licensed attorney 
with at least seven years of legal experience. They are hired as career appointees who are not 
subject to periodic performance reviews. Administrative law judges almost always leave their 
post voluntarily through retirement or death; a very small minority of administrative law judges 
are removed for misdeeds. The power to sanction administrative law judges lies in 5 U.S.C. 
Section 7521(a): “An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed under 
section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only 
for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record 
after opportunity for hearing before the Board (5 U.S.C. Section 7521(a)).” The “good cause” 
standard, according to Rosenblum, falls between the “efficiency of the service” standard used to 
remove other civil service employees and the “good behavior” standard that Article III judges are 
held to. To quote Rosenblum: “Failure to follow agency directives in decision making provides 
justification for typical removals pursuant to the ‘efficiency of the service’ standard but is 
prohibited from use as ‘good cause’ for removal of administrative law judges” (Rosenblum 1984, 
642; see also Office of Personnel Management 2020). 
This all speaks to the tension inherent in administrative law judges specifically, and 
administrative courts generally, as to their position as both bureaucrat and adjudicator. Lens 
breaks down two complementary models of administrative law judge identity. The administrative 
law judge-as-bureaucrat model recognizes overlap between the agency and the administrative 





The administrative law judge-as-adjudicator model, in comparison, embraces the designated 
adjudicator role to safeguard against inappropriate state action even within the agency the 
administrative law judge occupies (Lens 2012).  The dominant role of the administrative law 
judge as either bureaucrat or adjudicator derives from the type of agency within which the 
administrative law court is housed.  
To attempt to mitigate these dual identities, the APA provides for separation between 
administrative courts and the agency where they reside. To quote the APA as codified in the U.S. 
Code, an administrative law judge may not “be responsible to or subject to the supervision or 
direction of an employee or agency engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for an agency” (5 U.S.C. § 554(d); see also Burrows 2008). The Office of Personnel 
Management has reiterated that the agency that houses the administrative court is responsible for 
maintaining the independence of the administrative court and its judges (5 C.F.R. Section 
930.201(f)(3); see also Burrows 2008).  
Administrative courts generally, and administrative law judges specifically, are 
potentially very powerful. Marquardt and Wheat argue that administrative law judges are a 
“corps of hidden allocators, unknown to the general public, untouched by formal agency or 
[Office of Personnel Management] scrutiny, yet armed with immense discretionary and policy 
power. (Marquardt and Wheat 1981, 302). Administrative law judges exist in a complex state: 
they are employees of an agency, but they are simultaneously divorced from the day-to-day 
operations in the agency due to their quasi-judicial role (Simeone 1992). The development of 
administrative courts in the post-Administrative Procedure Act era has melded the adjudicatory 
strength of administrative law judges with minimal external accountability measures. Marquardt 





an increasingly narrow judicialized setting which is essentially immune from democratic control 
and accountability, become central public policy makers in the regulatory arena…. So the 
judicial procedure of the administrative law judge either means everything in the agency decision 
making process or it may mean nothing. In those few important cases which the agency chooses 
to review, the agency heads have the power to overturn the administrative law judge’s decision 
and substitute their own decision” (Marquardt and Wheat 1981, 303-4).  
The goal, under the APA, is to promote “assurances of neutrality” for administrative 
courts to preserve the administrative process (Simeone 1992, 163). The relatively anonymous 
nature of administrative law judges is in almost every way a benefit for how administrative 
courts function, and attempts at quantifying administrative law judge performance or success is 
anathema to the institution as it was envisioned by the APA, which further isolates 
administrative courts from bureaucratic oversight and further promotes administrative court 
independence (O’Keeffe 1986). There have intermittently been attempts to cull the power of 
administrative courts, though most of these attempts have been unsuccessful in the long term. 
For example, the 95th and 96th Congresses (from 1977 to 1981), for whom regulatory reform 
was a major priority, introduced one hundred and fifty-seven bills that attempted to clarify 
regulatory policy in some way. Some of these bills directly referenced administrative law judges, 
including advocating for term limits (S. 755), instituting periodic reviews by the Administrative 
Conference of the United States (S. 262, H.R. 6768), and introducing information dispute 
resolution processes that would occur outside of the administrative court apparatus (Marquardt 
and Wheat 1981).  
All the while, there is evidence that administrative courts and administrative law judges 





(United States Civil Service Commission, Report of the Commission on the Study of the 
Utilization of Administrative Law Judges 1974, as discussed in Lubbers 1981). One of the most 
common proposed reforms is the formation of a unified corps of administrative law judges 
instead of discrete administrative courts and administrative law judges in agencies across the 
administrative state. Simeone’s arguments in defense effectively sum up the arguments in favor 
of a unified corps. First, Simeone argues that an administrative law judge corps would remove 
the system of judges that are directly associated with the agency that they occasionally are tasked 
with evaluating for missteps. Second, a unified corps of administrative law judges would be 
more efficient for both the management of judges and the management of administrative court 
caseloads. Third and relatedly, a unified corps could shift routine civil cases from the Article III 
judiciary to an administrative court to free up Article III dockets for the cases, often criminal or 
constitutional, that only the federal judiciary can adjudicate. Fourth, a unified corps would 
expand administrative law judges’ breadth of knowledge. Fifth, creating a unified corps would 
recognize that the functions of administrative law judges and Article III judges perform many of 
the same functions to begin with. Finally, a unified corps would naturally lend itself to a uniform 
training scheme for new administrative judges. In short: expanding administrative law judges’ 
breadth of knowledge and experience (acts that would surely judicialize the administrative 
adjudicators) would benefit the administrative state writ large through resolving many of the 




It follows from the features and development of administrative courts that we can expect 





explain to other courts about how to best act like courts. To probe this relationship, I use one 
case study examined in depth. The nature of methodology for American political development-
inspired projects preferences in-depth analysis of one or a few cases in order to thoroughly 
examine the case over time (George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2004, Orren and Skowronek 
2004).   
 In identifying a case for this dissertation, I sought to select an administrative court 
apparatus that best exemplifies, in aggregate, the average features of administrative courts while 
also preferencing features that make the study feasible. I prioritized the following considerations: 
• Size – most administrative courts adjudicate only a handful of cases each year. Of the 
sixty-three potential cases identified and provided in Appendix A, there are three 
administrative court systems that are outliers in the size of the court system, the number 
of cases heard and decided, and the consequent political impact the court has on other 
actors (the BIA, the NLRB, and the Social Security Disability apparatus (SSD)). The case 
study should pay attention to one of these extraordinary cases for the reasons explicated 
in the following bullet points. 
• Longevity – in order to provide a thorough account of twentieth-century administrative 
law, I require cases that have existed in some form for the majority of the century. More 
specifically, the ideal case study has to have been in existence and politically salient in 
three major eras in order to fully examine the effects of extra-bureaucratic shifts on 
administrative court behavior: post-New Deal/pre-Administrative Procedure Act, post-
Administrative Procedure Act/pre-Chevron, and post-Chevron.  
• Intermittent and/or ongoing internal crisis – the ideal case study has undergone or 





litigation across all levels of the judiciary, this criterion generally refers to impossibly 
large docket sizes and the attempts to resolve the problems that result from those dockets.  
• Political salience of issue area – in order to ensure that the chosen administrative court is 
amply relevant in the political system at large, I require a case that involves an issue area 
that is frequently considered and debated by all branches of government.  
• Availability of data – relatedly, the case study chosen must have reasonably accessible 
data to analyze. By reasonably accessible, I mean that most relevant administrative court 
opinions are available online. 
Each of the sixty-three administrative courts identified in Appendix A were evaluated 
based on the five criteria explicated above. After evaluating each potential case, I selected the 
BIA as the focus of this dissertation. There are many reasons why this case is ideal as a focal 
point for the dissertation.  
 
1. The immigration court system is large both in terms of number of constituent parts and the 
number of cases heard. 
The immigration court system consists of geographically-dispersed immigration courts, 
administered by immigration judges that are hired in the same apolitical merit-based way that 
other bureaucrats are hired, and the BIA, the final administrative appellate body appointed by the 
Attorney General (and serving directly under and at the pleasure of the Attorney General). As the 
need for immigration adjudication increased over the last 75 years, the number of immigration 
courts and immigration judges rose in turn. As of this writing, there are fifty-eight immigration 





Review 2019) who completed, in FY 2016, 273,390 cases (Executive Office of Immigration 
Review 2017). By extension, the BIA, as the review body of the immigration court system with 
no discretionary docket, hears thousands of cases annually.   
 
2. The Department of Justice’s immigration apparatus is just one part of a larger administrative 
immigration regime, especially today. 
In the early years of the modern immigration apparatus (i.e. since 1940 when the INS 
moved from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice (DOJ)), the INS was 
responsible for both border security and regulating immigration in their administrative courts. 
(Naturalization, or the process of obtaining citizenship and the benefits pursuant to it, is a 
judicial prerogative that the administrative immigration apparatus simply assists with.) Prior to 
1983 when the Department of Justice reorganized the agency to combine all immigration 
adjudication under one roof at the EOIR, the immigration courts were under the purview of the 
INS while the BIA was directly accountable to the attorney general; with different overseers, the 
two judicial actors could very well have had different goals when deciding cases. The 1983 
reorganization alleviated these concerns by, according to the EOIR itself, “ma[king] the 
immigration courts independent of the INS, the agency charged with enforcement of federal 
immigration laws” (Executive Office of Immigration Review n.d.). 
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, the border 
patrol and immigration enforcement duties were moved from the EOIR to new offices at DHS, 
including the Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services (the closest analog to the original 
INS). Only the immigration courts and the BIA remain under the umbrella of the DOJ. This 





the DHS at the border. This new administrative set up means that sophisticated cross-agency 
cooperation is required for successful day-to-day operations even prior to judicial intervention.  
 
3. The history of immigration courts is well-documented from a number of different vantage 
points. 
Judicial records from both administrative courts and federal courts are easily available 
online. As long as a federal court has issued a written opinion, the opinion will be available on 
LexisNexis, WestLaw, and on the individual court’s website; even unpublished opinions are 
accessible on the aforementioned databases or in tabular form in hard copies of the Federal 
Supplement (for district court cases), the Federal Reporter (for courts of appeals cases), and the 
United States Reporter (for Supreme Court cases) which are easily accessible at law libraries. 
Administrative court cases, in comparison, are more variable in the ease with which they can be 
found. Many administrative courts have at least a sample of their decisions available at the 
aforementioned databases. Some also maintain databases on their own websites. Others still do 
not have their cases published until a party appeals to a federal court. This is the case for the 
administrative court system regulating the Social Security disability apparatus. The courts of the 
Social Security Administration produce by far the most cases per year of any administrative 
court with over 630,000 cases closed by approximately 2000 administrative law judges with a 
year-end backlog of over a million cases in FY 2015 and an average processing time of nearly 
550 days (Social Security Administration n.d.). However, their cases are not published, or even 
transcribed, until required to do so by the geographically appropriate district court in the event of 





the Social Security court system would have been a fascinating case study for this dissertation, it 
falls victim to its own size.  
 
4. The immigration court system is in crisis. 
 
The past twenty-five years have seen a tremendous increase in the docket size of 
immigration courts. To some extent, this tracks with increased docket size in the federal courts: 
though there is likely not an increase in the inherent litigiousness of Americans like Manning 
suggested, there has undoubtedly been a rise in the number of cases that have been brought to 
courts of all kinds in the latter part of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century (Burke 
2002, Galanter 1983, Haltom and McCann 2004, Lieberman 1981, Manning 1977, Olson 1991).  
The same is true for the immigration courts. In 1980 the immigration courts disposed of 
3100 exclusion hearings and 45,034 deportation hearings (INS 1980). By 1996 that number 
ballooned to 33,824 exclusion hearings and 197,678 deportation hearings (EOIR 2001). Pursuant 
to these increases, cases were delayed often for years: in 2002 there was a backlog of more than 
57,000 cases, 38,000 of which were over a year old (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009). These docket 
pressures not only strained the immigration courts’ ability to make decisions effectively, but it 
also affected the relationship between judicial and administrative adjudicators since an increase 
in administrative caseloads led to a subsequent increase in the number of cases that were 
appealed to the federal courts.  
These caseload pressures elicited first a (mostly successful albeit short-lived) series of 
docket-clearing reforms under Attorney General Reno in 1999 (Dorsey and Whitney LLP 2003) 





Ashcroft reforms were comprised of four major parts: replacing three-member review with 
single-member review for the majority of cases, moving from de novo review to a clearly 
erroneous standard of review (i.e. a far less strict standard), implementing a time limit of ninety 
days for single-member adjudications and 180 days for three-member adjudication, and reducing 
the size of the BIA from twenty-three members to eleven members (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009). 
These reforms were largely unsuccessful since they did not decrease docket sizes in either the 
short- or the long-term. Additionally, they introduced a host of due process concerns. For 
example, the Ashcroft reforms led to the use of succinct boilerplate language affirming 
immigration judge decisions without explicated reasoning, making judicial review far more 
challenging; this is a particularly damning shortcoming since the rise of immigration court 
decisions led to a subsequent increase in the number of BIA cases appealed to the federal courts, 
effectively transplanting docket size pressures from one judiciary to another.  
Further, fewer BIA members in conjunction with an excessive number of cases and the 
end of de novo review meant that cases at the BIA were given a cursory examination at best; 
when an appellate body is built into a legal system, it suggests that the possibility of an 
additional level of review promises some sort of reexamination of the case at hand to ensure that 
the correct decision has been reached (Benesch 2007). For a system that affects the lives and 
livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of persons a year to have intrinsic flaws that have not been 
resolved behooves researchers to give significant time to understanding why the system 





5. The Executive Office of Immigration Review publishes their precedent decisions online. 
 
Compared to the other administrative courts (read: most other immigration courts besides 
the NLRB), the EOIR is remarkably open with their precedent decisions both on their personal 
website and on external databases. I discuss this below.  
 
Selecting the Board of Immigration Appeals as the primary case study introduces 
potential generalizability concerns. Since the vast majority of administrative courts are small and 
adjudicate only a handful of cases per year, choosing one of the large administrative courts 
(Board of Immigration Appeals, National Labor Relations Board, or the Social Security 
disability apparatus) may produce results that are not generalizable to administrative courts at 
large. Further, immigration as a policy issue crosscuts the political spectrum in a way that could 
potentially dampen any partisan effects that could explain deferential behavior by Article III 
courts to Article II courts. I accept these critiques as valid but argue that the similarities in 
structure between the immigration judiciary (with its various immigration courts and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals as an appellate body at the top of the hierarchy) and the Article III 
judiciary make the selection of the BIA the best analog to the federal courts of all administrative 
courts examined. I stand by the methodological choice but acknowledge that the results of this 
study cannot be easily generalized to administrative courts at large. Future deference studies 










The insights of this dissertation are as much methodological as they are theoretical. In 
order to provide a novel approach to understanding and identifying deference, I created a new 
coding system through extensive examination of the case study literature in interpretive legal 
scholarship (Hall and Wright 2010). I explain this coding scheme in detail in Appendices C and 
D, but it is important at this point to underscore the new means through which deference can be 
studied for this dissertation and for any studies of deference that follow.  
Studying interbranch institutionalism presents unique methodological challenges. For 
one, identifying communication between branches is rarely clear-cut. Scholars must rely on 
various forms of data that present evidence of communication even if the data individually are 
not smoking gun instances of inter-institutional communication. Interbranch institutional 
scholars rectify this by layering multiple data sources upon each other in order to create a 
narrative that highlights the contributions of each institution in order to make inferences about 
how events occur vis-á-vis institutional interaction.  
Consequently, this dissertation utilizes several different sources of judicial data. The 
judicial data collected and analyzed for this dissertation represent an important advance in the 
study of interbranch institutionalism, especially as it relates to the relationship between courts 
and other political actors. As aforementioned, the administrative court-federal court relationship 
is a cyclical one that oftentimes produces opinion dyads where both courts are compelled to 
adjudicate the same dispute. This dyadic data source has several advantages. By the nature of the 
data many potentially confounding variables are eliminated: since the dispute to be resolved is 
the same across both courts, the only variation is in the court that is doing the resolving. This 





differing institutional constraints on dispute resolution. Further, the direct line of communication 
between administrative courts and agencies through written opinions provides an exciting 
opportunity to understand the decision making processes at work by both judiciaries as a direct 
result of their interactions. 
In order to create these dyads I appealed to several databases, both public and private, 
that archive judicial opinions. LexisNexis and WestLaw, for example, provide a variety of 
administrative court opinions in addition to their extensive collection of federal court opinions. 
However, the number of cases decided by the BIA introduces a problem when attempting to 
collect the universe of cases. The EOIR divides BIA opinions into three categories: precedent 
opinions, non-precedent opinions, and unpublished opinions. Precedent opinions, as determined 
by EOIR leadership, represent the governing interpretation of immigration laws for the DOJ at 
any given point in time. There are approximately five thousand precedent decisions, all of which 
are available directly from the DOJ via legal databases and on the EOIR website. Non-precedent 
decisions do not hold precedential value but the EOIR has determined that they may be useful for 
those in the immigration court system to consider as indications of contemporary administrative 
practice. There are several thousand cases that fit this category annually. They are variably 
available on online databases which makes identifying the universe of cases very difficult. Most 
cases are routine and thus unpublished and unavailable for analysis.  
Using the fully accessible universe of precedent decisions,25 I used the LexisNexis 
Shepardize feature to identify pairs of BIA decisions and the corresponding appeal(s) in the 
                                                            
25 There are generalizability concerns inherent in using only those cases that are deemed 
important enough to declare precedential. However, since the relationship between the courts and 






federal courts. Most of these dyads consist of one BIA case and one case in the geographically 
appropriate court of appeals; a small portion of dyads are comprised of one BIA case and one 
case in the geographically appropriate district court (for habeas requests),26 and a slightly larger 
but still small portion of cases contain more than one federal court case.27 Some dyads were 
inaccurately coded by LexisNexis and were thus excluded from analysis. Appendix E provides 
the cases identified for analysis in this dissertation.  
The empirical thrust of the dissertation attempts to identify and measure deference. The 
existing scholarship tends to assert deference through observing high agency win rates in court. 
But consider the weaknesses inherent in making inferences on deference based solely on whether 
an agency wins or loses in court or even why agency appeals end up in federal courts. There are 
any number of reasons why an agency might prevail in court independent of deference doctrine. 
The data provided in Table 1a on page 31 regarding agency win rates across doctrinal eras 
provide a brief illustration as to why the question of judicial deference to agency action and 
understanding the development of the administrative state is important, but it does not provide 
any indication as to why or how this development occurred. The existing literature does a poor 
job of providing an account of this, in part because it relies heavily on agency win rates without 
contextualizing them in order to understand the greater political environment that those win rates 
inhabit. By using dyadic data, agency win rates are given a natural foil in the form of the 
originating administrative court opinion. In addition, analyzing the text of the opinions 
themselves beyond just the win-lose outcome provides evidence of the calculus employed by 
                                                            
se, the likelihood that the content of the BIA decision is not representative of all of the BIA’ 
decisions is not a disqualifying limitation. 
26 These are excluded since they do not involve a court of appeals. 
27 In these cases (of which there are two instances), I code for two separate dyads: the BIA case 





administrative and federal judges; this is instrumental in understanding the relationship between 
the two judiciaries.  
To ascertain deference rates, I employ a new two-step approach in identifying whether 
deference has occurred. First, I determine whether an agency was the winning party in the case 
under analysis. This is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that deference has occurred. To 
finally conclude that deference has occurred, I determine whether the federal court has explicitly 
stated that it is deferring to the administrative court. 
One of the most promising avenues that this approach to measuring deference can 
provide is the further disaggregation across the deference/non-deference divide to assert 
theoretical significance to both deference and non-deference situations; this is a possibility that 
the existing literature on deference does not explore. There are four, not two, possible outcomes 
when identifying deference. If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is evidence in the text 
of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as 
“active deference.” If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is no evidence in the text of 
the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as 
“passive deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is no evidence in the text of the 
opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as 
“passive non-deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is evidence in the text of the 
opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as 
“active non-deference.” In this schema, even non-deference has theoretical significance. When a 
court provides rationales directly related to the actions of the agency, it is the rationale rather 
than the outcome that matters. When we combine an agency’s outcome in court with active 





judicial intent regarding administrative behavior in a way that is impossible when solely relying 
on win rates. 
A key feature of the dissertation’s empirics relies on the content of the courts’ opinions. 
In order to analyze these judicial data, I created a content analysis schema (explained in 
extensive detail in Appendices C and D). I appealed, in particular, to the legal literature on 
content analysis of judicial opinions; though the majority of legal literature is dedicated to 
interpretive studies of various doctrines and statutes, there is a burgeoning tradition of using 
explicit coding schemes to identify patterns in case law by legal scholars. I found in my review 
of both the legal and political science literatures that legal scholars were more explicit about their 
coding schemes than political scientists. I undertook a meta-analysis of studies cited in Hall and 
Wright’s review of content analysis of judicial opinions in order to create a coding schema that 
accounts for variables of potential interest (Hall and Wright 2010).28  
I first coded for the doctrinal era the case was decided within. This consists of two parts: 
identifying the deference doctrine(s) that the court could apply and determining whether that 
doctrine(s) was actually applied. Eskridge and Baer differentiate between several forms of 
deference, noting that each doctrine can be placed on a continuum on the extent of deference by 
courts to agency interpretations of statutes (Eskridge and Baer 2008).  The literature, as 
aforementioned, places a great deal of emphasis on Chevron as an important codification of 
deference procedure. By coding for the controlling deference doctrine, I am able to extend the 
theoretical and empirical contributions of the existing literature by both expanding the time 
frame under analysis and extending the analysis to consider other non-Chevron forms of 
                                                            





deference. Borrowing from Eskridge and Baer, I code for the deference doctrines provided in 
Table 2a.  
 
Table 2a: Deference Regime and Agency Win Rates in Eskridge and Baer Sample 
 
Deference Regime Form of Deference 
Agency Win Rate in Eskridge 
and Baer sample of Supreme 
Court cases 
Anti-deference 
The Court invokes a 
presumption against the 
agency interpretation in 
criminal cases (the rule of 
lenity) and in some cases in 
which the agency 
interpretation raises serious 
constitutional concerns (the 
canon of constitutional 
avoidance) 
36.2% 
No deference Ad hoc judicial reasoning 66.0% 
Skidmore deference 
Agency interpretation is 
entitled to “respect 
proportional to its power to 
persuade,” with such power 
determined by the 
interpretation’s 
“thoroughness, logic, and 
expertness,” its “fit with prior 
interpretation,” etc. 
73.5% 
Beth Israel deference 
Pre-Chevron test permitting 
reasonable interpretations that 




interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes accepted. If the 








The Court, without invoking 
a named deference regime, 
relies on some input from the 
agency (e.g. amicus briefs, 
interpretive rules or guidance, 
or manuals) and uses that 
input to guide its reasoning 
and decision making process 
80.6% 
Seminole Rock deference 
Strong deference afforded to 
an agency’s interpretations of 
its own regulations 
90.9% 
Curtiss-Wright deference 
Super-strong deference to 
executive interpretations 
involving foreign affairs and 
national security. 
100.0% 
Source: Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1099. Chart is verbatim from source material except for 
excluding one column from the original table (proportion of deference in their sample). 
 
I then coded for several different markers of partisanship. There are several ways to code 
for the ideological and partisan preferences of a judge. The primary means that the judicial 
decision making literature has defined a judge’s preference is through transplanting the party of 
the appointing president as the party of the judge. Per Dahl, this draws on the insight that judges 
and their appointing president are more often than not similar (Dahl 1957).  This method has 
high intercoder reliability which is undoubtedly why this method is used frequently. But there 
are several critiques of this method throughout the literature. First, this method assumes that all 
appointing Republican presidents are equally republican and that all appointing Democratic 
presidents are equally democratic (Giles et al 2001, Songer and Haire 1992).  Pinello, in a meta-
analysis of studies on the extent of the link between judicial ideology and judicial decision 
making, found that though the correlation between political party and judicial ideology across all 





judges and Republican judges are more conservative than Democratic judges (Pinello 2007; see 
also Cross and Tiller 1998, Flemming et al 1998, Gerber and Park 1997). Second, this method 
assumes that all judges are motivated by ideology equally (read: that judges decide exclusively 
as a result of their partisanship) (Epstein et al 2013).  Third, this method assumes that a judges’ 
ideology is stable over time (Epstein et al 2007, Martin and Quinn 2007). Finally, the method 
assumes that the president is in complete control of the nominations process. It neglects to 
consider senatorial courtesy and the influence of special interests outside of the government 
(Giles et al 2001).  
There have been two primary alternatives to this measure that Epstein et al classify as 
exogenous and endogenous measures (Epstein et al 2013).  The most famous exogenous measure 
comes from Segal and Cover’s seminal work on defining judicial political preference (Segal and 
Cover 1989).  They performed a content analysis of newspaper clippings on nominations of 
Supreme Court justices and developed a formula to assign a partisan alignment: the fraction of 
paragraphs coded conservative subtracted from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal. The 
most widely cited endogenous variable comes from Martin and Quinn assessed voting patterns of 
justices each term and placed each justice in each year on a scale from most republican to most 
democratic (Martin and Quinn 2007). This measure has the benefit of recognizing the fluid 
nature of ideology, but it has a serious endogeneity concern: the measure uses votes on cases to 
determine votes on other cases.  
In order to assign a partisan identity to the leadership of federal agencies, I use the party 
of the appointing president in the same way that I do in assigning a partisan identity to federal 
judges. It should follow that in the same way that the president would prefer partisan friendlies 





sympathetic to his or her policy positions. Marisam, in his essay on the president’s agency 
selection powers, concluded that “presidents continually select which agencies act by exercising 
a set of statutory and constitutional powers” (Marisam 2013, 821). This theory recognizes the 
traditional understanding that Congress chooses which agencies should act on which sets of 
policies since the president does not have the power to transfer congressionally granted powers 
between agencies, but also acknowledges that the president has powers over the bureaucracy’s 
landscape independent of those congressional powers (Barron and Kagan 2001, Grundstein 
1944, Miller 1993). Marisam identifies three powers that give the president the ability to shift the 
landscape of the bureaucracy to fit his or her needs. First, the president has the power to 
subdelegate authority to the agency they choose when Congress has expressly delegated that 
authority to the president. Second, the president has the power to delegate constitutional powers 
to an agency and thereby force Congress’ choice of agency on particular regulatory matters. 
Third, the president has the power to reconcile agencies’ overlapping jurisdiction by deciding 
which of the agencies in the shared regulatory space should act (Marisam 2013). 
Though this approach is useful, it requires several caveats. For one, assigning 
partisanship based on the partisanship of the appointer presents a unique difficulty for Board 
members who are appointed by someone other than the president. Where it is relatively easy to 
ascribe partisanship to a presidential appointee to the NLRB, whose members are appointed by 
the president, through the president’s party affiliation, it is less simple to ascribe partisanship to a 
BIA member appointed by the Attorney General. Though it logically follows that an Attorney 
General appointed by a president would have many of the same partisan priorities as the 





appointing copartisans to positions within the agency. I assume that the partisan priorities are 
transferred to bureaucratic appointees, but I do so with caution.  
A further difficulty lies in five interrelated assumptions: (1) that presidents will always 
appoint copartisans, (2) that presidential partisanship is static over time, (3) that presidents of the 
same party are similarly partisan (i.e. that Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter are similarly 
democratic while Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush are similarly Republican), (4) that 
appointees share the same ideological priorities of the president, and (5) that those appointees 
will consistently hold the same ideological priorities of the president that appointed her over 
time. Some of these assumptions are easy to overcome: for example, by disaggregating the data 
by president rather than just by party, we can avoid false equivalency concerns; and if we accept 
Dahl’s conclusions about justices adhering to the regime that appointed them is true, then we can 
circumvent the fifth assumption. However, the first and fourth assumptions are important barriers 
that must be addressed before making conclusions as to the power of a partisan explanation. 
To overcome those assumptions, I take a step back to observe partisanship in the 
aggregate by coding for the policy position of the decision and the overall partisan makeup of the 
circuits at the time of the decision. All told, I have a good sense of how partisanship might affect 
judicial decision making at both the administrative court and the federal court level after 
considering all of these codes in concert. 
Beyond these codes (and the codes discussed in Appendices C and D), I identified 
pertinent deferential language in the text of the opinions. By this, I am referring to passages 
within the opinions where the federal court explicitly mentions the administrative courts and the 
activities that the administrative court undertook while adjudicating the dispute. This is because 





interpreted and applied across the administrative state can be ascertained from the verbiage of 
judges rather than through static codes exclusively. Since non-discretionary dockets severely 
restrict judges’ ability to pick cases that best advance their policy preferences, judges can use 
their decisions to advance their policy agendas rather than electing to not hear cases they would 
rather avoid (Bickel 1962, Cohen 1991, Macey 1994, Sunstein 1990).  By extricating the 
portions of opinions where the author provides a rationale for her decision and considering those 
rationales alongside the political and doctrinal motivations previously identified, I am able to 
make conclusions as to why courts defer.  
By means of example, consider the two following passages from cases in my dataset. In 
Yaldo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
whether INS properly applied evidentiary standards regarding an immigrant accused of pursuing 
a “sham” marriage to avoid deportation. In a per curiam opinion in favor of INS, the court stated,  
“Review of the entire record discloses that both the Special Inquiry 
Officer and the BIA employed the proper standard of ‘clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence’ in making their findings 
below. Review of the record further discloses that the testimony of 
petitioner’s ex-wife, if believed, would, along with the other 
evidence, support the findings below. As stated above, we are not 
permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the Board or the 
Special Inquiry Officer29 with respect to the credibility of this 
testimony or the ultimate findings of fact based thereon. It is 
                                                            





therefore determined that the findings below are supported by 
‘reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence,’ and the decisions 
of the BIA are affirmed” (Yaldo v. INS, 424 F.2d 501 (1970), 503).  
In this text, particularly in the underlined passages, we observe two pro-agency forces working in 
tandem. First, the court acknowledged that the Special Inquiry Officer and the BIA acted 
correctly in applying the clear and convincing evidence standard for the facts presented in this 
case. This is an important statement: the court is arguing that the judicial actors in the 
bureaucracy acted correctly in their activities as adjudicators. Second, the court continues on to 
remind its audience that it is not able to substitute its own interpretations of the evidence for that 
of the two INS actors.30 By not providing their own conclusions after asserting that the 
conclusions drawn by the bureaucratic actors were appropriately found, the court in Yaldo acted 
with a high level of deference. 
By means of comparison, consider Yanez-Jacquez v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. Yanez-Jacquez, a permanent resident, was assaulted on a brief trip to Mexico. He sought 
to get revenge on the assailants and perched by the river where he was previously attacked 
wielding an ice pick. He was found by Border Patrol and charged with possessing a weapon, a 
deportable offense. After the Board ordered his deportation, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed. The crux of the court’s argument hinged upon the meaning of “entry” in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act; the Act requires that a permanent resident not commit a crime 
within five years of the most recent entry, and his initial entry to the United States was eight 
years prior to the Mexico trip. The court found that his trip to Mexico did not constitute an entry 
                                                            





under the INA as defined by Fleuti. Judge Simpson, in the opinion for the court, explicitly 
disapproved of the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided by the Board:  
“This case is necessarily limited to its facts. A different set of facts 
applied to the criteria to be weighted might dictate a different 
result…. Under the facts of this case, we simply conclude that the 
agency determination that the incident of May 6, 1963, was an 
“entry” does not have support in the record (Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 
440 F.2d 701” (1971), 704).  
In the same way that the court in Yaldo was laudatory for the Service’s actions, the court in 
Yanez-Jacquez is opposed to the Service’s interpretations. The court is not only skeptical of the 
decision made by the Board; Simpson explicitly states that there is no factual support for the 
Board’s decision. This is a strong statement against the Board’s interpretive faculties, and it 
constitutes a textbook case of active non-deference.  
 
The Four Deferences 
 
Where the extant literature sees deference as binary (deference or no deference), I place 











Agency Win Agency Loss 
Explicit Deference Claims Active Deference Active Non-Deference 
Absence of Deference Claims Passive Deference Passive Non-Deference 
 
This serves to provide further theoretical leverage in order to better understand how the 
courts and the bureaucracy interact – by interrogating the judicial opinions for deferential intent 
and practice, we can provide a compelling account as to why courts do or do not defer. The 
columns differentiate between a win and a loss; this is the primary means through which the 
existing literature identifies deference (Barnett and Walker 2017, Eskridge and Baer 2008, Hume 
2009, Watry 2000). If the agency wins, I code the case as deference. If the agency loses, I code 
the case as non-deference. But the binary requirement (a win or a loss) is not as clear cut as it 
might appear at first glance. For one, a case may not have a single winner or a single loser; 
instead, a case might have a mixed outcome where both parties win in part and lose in part. To 
identify a win or a loss, then, we must triangulate using several approaches. The first step in 
coding for type of deference is to read the text of the BIA opinion. This is critical for 
understanding the corresponding court of appeals case for a close reading unearths the inherent 
strengths or weaknesses of the decision before the case arrives in the federal judiciary. It also 
often provides an alternative account of the facts of the case that can offer insight on the 
approach both courts take to adjudicate identical disputes. The second step is to read the opinion 
and come to a conclusion as to the successful party at the end of the opinion. This is a good 
approach when the coder has legal expertise, but to ensure accuracy I refer to LexisNexis and 





Additionally, for cases that are not clear cut as to a winner and a loser, I carefully weigh the 
components of each case that constitute winning aspects for each party, concluding from that 
which party was successful at more than 50%.31 
The rows, my addition to the literature, codes for whether there is evidence that the court 
is actually deferring. This is what is missing in the previous attempts at defining deference: there 
are any number of reasons why a party is unsuccessful in court that can be independent of 
deferential behavior, including the comparative strength of the arguments, the governing 
ideology of the judiciary at the time of the decision, the pressures of a full docket, and other 
ineffable phenomena. But when the text of the opinion is scoured for language directly speaking 
to the actions of the BIA in their initial decision, then we can confidently conclude that deference 
has or has not occurred. Of interest for this dissertation, then, are the quadrants in the upper right 
and lower left corners: those cases where (1) an agency won and (2) the deference was active; 
and where (1) an agency lost and (2) the non-deference was active.32 
One hundred and sixteen dyads of BIA and courts of appeals cases, representing one 
hundred and thirteen immigrants (plus one immigration attorney in the United States) from forty-
four countries, were coded for deference and the other myriad codes explicated in Appendices C 
and D. Figure 2a provides a temperature map of the cases in the dataset where larger dots 
represent countries with more immigrants represented in the sample.  
                                                            
31 Fortunately only one case was so ambiguous as to require this weighing procedure. 
32 This is not to say that the other two quadrants (passive (non-)deference) are not worth 
investigating. After all, deference may occur even if there are not explicit discussions of 
deference in the text of the opinions. This is why I still identify agency wins and losses where 
there are no explicit discussions of deference or non-deference as deference, for we cannot 
evaluate whether or not a win or loss constititutes deference or non-deference when the opinion 






Figure 2a: Countries of Origin in BIA/Courts of Appeals Sample of Dyads 
 
 
The plurality of cases feature an immigrant from Mexico (twenty-five appellees). Eight 
come from China (with an additional four from Hong Kong and one from Taiwan), six each 
come from the Philippines and El Salvador, five each from Italy and Canada, and four come 
from the Dominican Republic.  







Table 2c: Deferences in BIA/Courts of Appeals Sample of Dyads 
 
Deference Type Count of Cases 
Active Deference 42 
Active Non-Deference 39 
Passive Deference 29 
Passive Non-Deference 6 
Total 116 
 
Of note is (1) the near equal distribution of active deference and active non-deference 
cases, and (2) the comparative dearth of cases where an agency loses but the court does not 
explain why vis-a-vis the agency’s decision making. It appears, then, that in instances where an 
agency’s decision is reversed by the court it rarely allows this to occur without explanation as to 
why.  
Table 2d breaks down deference type by pre- and post-Chevron eras. 
 












Pre-Chevron 20 14 18 5 57 
Post-Chevron 22 25 11 1 59 






We observe a marked decrease in the number of moderate deference cases and a similar 
increase in active non-deference cases following Chevron. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, the 
high proportion of active to moderate cases post-Chevron is notable since only a portion of these 
cases actively cite and apply Chevron; there appears to be a paradigm shift that is independent of 
active application of the doctrine. Further, the assumption that Chevron led to an increase in 
deferential activity is not supported by these data. In fact, there is an increase in cases of active 
non-deference by 20% (from 24% to 44% of the pre-Chevron sample) compared to a 5% 














Partisanship and Chevron as Explanations for Deferential Behavior 
 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I provided a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship 
between courts and the bureaucracy as it applies to interactions over administrative court 
proceedings and judicial deference to administrative agencies both because of and independent 
of Chevron. I introduced a new paradigm for defining deference that adds judicial intent into the 
process of identifying deferential activity by courts and agencies. With deference accurately 
identified, Chapters 3 and 4 answer why deference occurs. Chapter 4 appeals to the text of the 
opinions to consider deference as explicated by the courts themselves, but before this novel 
approach can be considered, we must examine extant explanations for deferential behavior. In 
this chapter I give thorough treatment to attitudinal and doctrinal rationales as explanations for 







This section tests one main hypothesis: I assess the claim that where there is a partisan 
match between the administrative panel and the judicial panel there is more likely to be 
deference. This explanation is expected from the attitudinal strand of empirical political science, 
but the literature has come to contradictory conclusions (see Chapters 1 and 2 for details). In this 
section I will provide the results of a series of regressions testing the impact of partisanship on 
the likelihood that a court rules for or against an agency controlling for the contextual facts of the 
case.  
But before I provide regression evidence that a partisan explanation is not altogether 
explanatory, I will describe the data as they relate to partisanship. Given the patchwork nature of 
deducing partisanship for administrative law judges and circuit court judges, I delineate multiple 
descriptive measures of partisanship in order to lay the groundwork prior to hypothesis testing.  
Table 3a provides the partisan breakdown for the universe of courts of appeals cases. I 
define a Republican panel as one that includes at least one more Republican-appointed judge 
than Democratic-appointed judges; the opposite is true for Democratic panels. The distribution is 
roughly equal. This is a fortuitous coincidence: we need not control for the number of cases that 








Table 3a: Number of Cases by Panel Partisanship 
 







Tables 3b and 3c discuss unanimity. Unanimity has the potential to concentrate like-
minded sentiment in such a way as to illuminate nascent pro- or anti-agency opinions. A sizable 
portion of the cases (approximately one-third) are decided by unanimous panels (Table 3b). Of 
those unanimous cases, a slight majority are exclusively Republican panels. Table 3c provides a 
breakdown of cases whose panel is exclusively staffed by one party.  
 
Table 3b: Number of Cases by Unanimity Type 
 
Unanimity Type Number of Cases 
Not Unanimous 69 
Unanimous 35 







Table 3c: Number of Cases by Unanimity Type and Panel Partisanship 
 








Unknown Panel 26 
Total 116 
 
The key distinction is not the partisanship per se; instead, we must investigate the impact 
of the partisan match between the Board and the courts. Regressions later in this chapter will 
assert causality, but first I will provide tabular data on partisan match. There are two ways to 
measure partisan match: through matching the deciding panels and through matching the 
partisanship of the courts as a whole at the time the case was decided. Table 3d distinguishes 
between the partisanship of the two panels at the time of the decision. This is calculated using the 
appointing president of the judge as described in Chapter 2. This is a more fine-tuned approach 
to determining whether there is a partisan match, but there is one primary weakness that 
necessitates another more general approach to complement. We cannot determine partisanship 
for the BIA prior to 1978 since the BIA did not indicate the deciding panel in their decisions. 





time, I am uncomfortable making that assumption where there is another means for determining 
a partisan match that, though imperfect, is an adequate supplement. Even after 1978, per curiam 
opinions by the BIA do not indicate the members of the panel deciding that per curiam decision 
in the same way as federal courts do. Thus, there are more null values in this table than in the 
table below. Table 3d, then, shows the partisan match of the two panels post-1978 when the BIA 
began to regularly indicate the composition of the panels.  
 
Table 3d: Partisan Match of the Panels, 1978-2016 
 
Board Partisanship Court of Appeals Partisanship Number of Cases 
Republican Republican 15 
Republican Democratic 14 
Democratic Republican 10 
Democratic Democratic 10 
N/A (partisanship equal) Republican 10 
N/A (partisanship equal) Democratic 4 
 
All matched  25 
All unmatched  24 
 
Table 3e distinguishes between the partisanship of the courts at large. Though this measure is 
less exact, it has the benefit of capturing the entire span of time given the prevalence of per 





Table 3e: Partisan Match of the Courts, 1940-2016 
 
Board Partisanship Court of Appeals Partisanship Number of Cases 
Republican Republican 21 
Republican Democratic 13 
Democratic Republican 38 
Democratic Democratic 38 
N/A (partisanship equal) Republican 1 
N/A (partisanship equal) Democratic 5 
Unknown Unknown 6 
   
All matched  59 
All unmatched  57 
 
Table 3f begins to answer the second question (is the (non-)deference active or passive?). It 
disaggregates the four kinds of deference by panel partisanship. We observe little difference 
between the instances of any of the forms of deference between the two parties. The insight will 




















Republican 21 21 12 2 56 
Democrat 20 18 15 4 57 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 2 
Even 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 42 39 29 6 116 
 
These tables are necessary to provide a grounding for the regression analyses that follow. 
The regression analyses fall into two main categories that correspond with the two steps of 
deference analysis explicated in Chapter 2: first, was the agency successful in court; and second, 
was the deference active or passive?  
<><><><><> 
For each test I utilized multiple logistic regression.33 The regressions should be read with 
the knowledge that a Republican Board/panel/court is coded as 0 and a Democratic 
Board/panel/court is coded as 1. Thus, a unit change in the positive direction suggests a more 
democratic outcome, while a unit change in the negative direction suggests a more republican 
outcome. An agency win is coded as 1 and an agency loss is coded as 0. A case indicating 
deference is coded as 1 and a case indicating non-deference is coded as 0. A case indicating 
                                                            





active (non-)deference is coded as 1 and a case indicating moderate (non-)deference is coded as 
0.  
I ran twelve distinct regressions investigating six independent variables on two dependent 
variables: whether an agency wins or loses, and the existence of passive or active (non-
)deference. The six variables are as such: 
1. Panel match – this indicates whether or not the partisanship of the deciding panels at the 
Board and the Court of Appeals match. A match is coded as 1; a non-match is coded as 0. 
2. Court match – this indicates whether or not the partisanship of the deciding Board and 
Court of Appeals match at large. A match is coded as 1; a non-match is coded as 0.  
3. Board partisanship – this indicates the partisanship of the BIA panel as defined by the 
appointing Attorney General (and, in turn, the Attorney General’s appointing president). 
A majority Democratic Board is coded as 1; a majority Republican Board is coded as 0. 
4. Court of Appeals panel partisanship – this indicates the partisanship of the Court of 
Appeals panel as defined by the appointing president. A Democratic panel is coded as 1; 
a Republican panel is coded as 0.  
5. Per curiam: Board of Immigration Appeals – this indicates whether the case was decided 
per curiam at the BIA. As aforementioned, this was the norm before 1978. A per curiam 
opinion is coded as 1; a non-per curiam opinion is coded as 0. 
6. Per curiam: Court of Appeals – this indicates whether or not the Court of Appeals case 
was decided per curiam. A per curiam opinion is coded as 1; a non-per curiam opinion is 
coded as 0.  
Each independent variable is regressed against two dependent variables with various 





identification process: whether or not the agency was successful in court (“agency win or loss”) 
The second refers to the decision was active or passive (“deference type”). 
Tables 3i and 3j provide the regression data on all one hundred and sixteen dyads. 
 

























                                                            
34 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the partisanship 
of the Court of Appeals panel, and the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals. 
35 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall 
partisanship of the Court of Appeals. 
36 Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General. 





















*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1 
 




















                                                            
38 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
39 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall 
partisanship of the Court of Appeals. 
40 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the partisanship 
of the Court of Appeals panel, and the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals. 
41 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall 
partisanship of the Court of Appeals. 


























*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1 
The majority of regressions do not reach statistical significance as defined by a p-value of 
0.1 and below. There is no statistically significant correlation regarding partisanship. This tracks 
with the literature on Court of Appeals judges and the effect that partisanship has on their 
decision making. That said, it is surprising that we observe no effect of partisanship on deference 
rates; even though the literature on judicial decision making in the courts of appeals, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, suggests that partisan calculations are moderated as compared to Supreme Court 
decision making, the partisan motivation is not completely absent in the courts of appeals.   
Further, we observe that whether a case is decided per curiam by the Board and the Court 
of Appeals is correlative with deference existence and type to a statistically significant degree. 
Per curiam decisions provide judicial panels the opportunity to obscure their identity for any 
number of reasons. In the courts of appeals, according to Hume (2009), per curiam opinions are 
most commonly utilized for “unimportant” cases, those that are considered particularly weak 
                                                            
43 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals. 
44 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
45 Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall 





opinions or cases that may be politically contentious. Nygaard, a circuit court judge, extolled the 
virtues of the per curiam opinion for the day-to-day operation of the court: “According to a 
survey by the American Judicature Society, judges ranked opinion-writing as a significant case 
of delay in the intermediate appellate courts....Without the allure of ‘NYGAARD, Circuit Judge’ 
at the beginning of an opinion, it might well be shorter and more to the point, and have fewer 
bursts of rhetoric. Judge PER CURIAM is statistically less windy than its named colleagues” 
(Nygaard 2005, 47).  It is a combination of these factors that I believe is the phenomenon at play 
here. The per curiam question becomes more prescient in the Chevron regressions, so the 
discussion continues there.  
The data in aggregate do not support the partisan match theory. The panel match 
regressions (the most important regression required to support the theory) garners no significant 
results. This suggests that co-partisanship across decision making bodies does not affect case 
outcomes. This result is not indicated by the extant judicial decision making theories; that said, 
there is no apparent literature on the effect of partisanship on BIA judges. I return to discuss this 




In order to test the effect of Chevron on dyad outcomes, I divided the dyadic data into 
two buckets: cases that occurred in or before 1984 and cases that occurred after 1985. Since the 
Chevron decision is a natural cut-point, this provides substantial leverage on the question of 
whether the Chevron decision made a difference in deferential activity. Like the partisanship-





Tables 3k and 3l provides regression results for the fifty-seven pre-Chevron dyads. 
Immediately following, in Table 3m and 3n, are regression results for the fifty-nine post-
Chevron dyads. The independent and dependent variables are the same as those utilized in the 
partisanship regressions.  
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*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1 
Before Chevron we observe, unlike in the regressions discussed previously, several 
moderate indications that partisanship had an influence on judicial decision making, particularly 
on federal judges. All significance indicated in the pre-Chevron regressions drop away after the 
Chevron decision. In its place, whether a court of appeals case is decided per curiam attains high 
levels of significance across the board. We observe opposite effects of per curiam on court of 
appeals decision making: as the deference/non-deference dummy increases by one (read: 
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indicates deference), the case is more likely to be per curiam; and when the deference type 
dummy increases by one (read: indicates active), the case is less likely to be per curiam. Thus, a 
deferential case and a non-active case are likely to be published per curiam. Operationally, this 
suggests courts anonymize (or decide a case as an institutional unit rather than as individuals) in 
situations where the court is ruling in favor of an agency but not providing positive 
reinforcement for good judicial and administrative behavior by the BIA. But when the court feels 
compelled to comment on the Board’s activity, the court will infrequently decide as one body 
and instead indicate an author.  
Why this shift occurs after the Chevron decision should be investigated. Drawing on the 
extensive literature on Chevron cited in Chapters 1 and 2 in concert with the regressions, 
Chevron was likely a monumental case for judicial procedure independent of the two-step 
process introduced by the decision. Chevron gave judges, I suspect though cannot prove (though 
future scholarship might, see Chapter 5), the means to obscure personal partisan preferences 
under the guise of Chevron procedure and per curiam decisions. That the Chevron-independent 
regressions did not indicate partisan motivations but the pre-Chevron regressions did (albeit 
moderately) suggests that the effects in the post-Chevron era were stronger than those before 
Chevron. (After all, there is no real difference in the number of cases before and after Chevron in 
the dataset, so differences in effect cannot be attributed to sample size. Similarly, the distribution 
of partisanship (defined by presidents and judge partisanship) is roughly equal across samples.)  
It is important to note that the effect of Chevron is not due to Chevron itself; if the 
Chevron doctrine directly impacted deferential behavior as the extant literature suggests, we 





Chevron decision. But in fact there is no large shift. Table 3o summarizes the deference types 
before and after Chevron.  
Table 3o: Deference Rates Before and After Chevron 
 
 Deference Non-Deference 
Before Chevron 38 19 
After Chevron 33 26 
 
In fact, there were more deferential cases before Chevron, not fewer. The effect of Chevron, 
then, is not the doctrine in itself, but instead the unintended consequences of the doctrine that 
shifted deferential behavior after the Chevron decision. 
In short, from these data we observe Chevron did have an impact on judicial deference, 
but not in the way that the literature expects. Before Chevron we observe a moderate partisan 
impact on judicial decision making among court of appeals judges, and after Chevron we 
observe a strong per curiam effect. Before Chevron the partisanship of both the Board correlates 
with deference existence and the partisanship of the courts of appeals correlates with deference 
type to a statistically significant degree. After Chevron the correlations drop away completely. 
This suggests that Chevron, like per curiam opinions, serves as a method to obscure partisan 
motivations behind doctrinal strictures. I investigate deference before and after Chevron in 











Active (Non-)Deference in Action: Opinion Language as Data 
 
 
In Chapter 3 I considered two explanations for deferential behavior as described by the 
extant literature. First, I determined to what extent a match in partisanship between the BIA and 
the courts of appeals can predict the presence of deference. The regression analysis of all dyads 
showed little connection between partisan match and deference existence or type. Instead, there 
was a statistically significant relationship between deference and the presence of per curiam 
decision making. However, when cases are disaggregated into pre- and post-Chevron there are 
partisan variables that are statistically significant prior to Chevron and all but one per curiam 
variables are statistically significant after Chevron, some to a very high degree of significance. 
This suggests that Chevron provided circuit courts the ability to obscure their partisan 
motivations behind the strictures of precedent.  
Given the insights provided by the regression data in Chapter 3, we can fill in the gaps 
with qualitative data on circuit court discussions of BIA behavior. This chapter seeks to answer 
the following question: how do courts of appeals, knowing now that they use the tools at their 





guidance to the BIA on how best to act like courts to promote their deference goals? I argue that, 
in so doing, courts (either implicitly or explicitly) exhibit preferences for how other judiciary-
adjacent institutions should function. I provide evidence that the text of opinions can provide 
insight into the ways the circuit courts provide guidance to the BIA on how to best act as a court. 
I suggest that in order to understand deferential behavior, we must reach beyond partisan and 
doctrinal lenses to determine what courts believe to be ideal judicial behavior by non-judicial 
bodies.  
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, I mined dyads of BIA/courts of appeals cases for 
circuit court language that instructs the BIA how to best act as a court. In order to examine this, 
we must consider what courts do and how they function. Table 4a provides a sampling of court 
functions.  
Table 4a: A Sample of Features and Functions of Courts 
 
Features and Functions of Courts 
Adjudicating disputes 




Interpreting statutes for application in disputes 
Judicial review (at the appellate level) 
Maintaining the rule of law 





   
 To organize this inquiry, I selected three of these functions to investigate: interpreting 
evidence, interpreting statutes, and creating precedent. Using the text of circuit court opinions, I 
determined the extent to which (as interpreted and discussed by the circuit courts) the Board of 
Immigration Appeals acted as a court.  
I organize this chapter into two sections. The first portion investigates the features that 
define courts and how circuit courts provide guidance to Board members. This includes 
discussions of evidentiary procedure, statutory interpretation, commitment to stare decisis, and 
the fact-finding process. The second section returns to Chevron and deference. There I discuss 
Chevron deference in practice with special focus put on congressional intent. In that section I pay 
special attention to the cases decided in the year before and the year after the Chevron decision 
to discern any differences between the pre- and post-Chevron eras.  
But before we consider the qualitative data, by means of introduction and to introduce the 
observable implications I expect to see in cases where the circuit court is speaking explicitly 
about the Board’s court-like prowess, let us consider the case of Kulle v. Immigration and 
Naturalization. Kulle is the prototypical example of the sort of language that I coded for in this 
chapter: the opinion’s author explicitly reflects upon judicial prerogatives as exercised by the 
BIA, coming to the conclusion that the Board was correct in its judicial activities. As I will 
discuss shortly, the rules of evidentiary procedure for administrative courts is less extensive than 
the Federal Rules of Evidence that governs Article III courts. This direct consideration of the 
judicial role of immigration court members as evidentiary interpreters, then, is particularly 
important as it lays the groundwork for the court’s interpretation of the few passages on evidence 





are on judges as to evidentiary procedure in deportation hearings, arguing that since Board 
members are not judges in the constitutional sense they are not subject to those same evidentiary 
requirements. The court does not disagree that the Board is not an Article III court; even so, the 
court finds that the Board “established deportability by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence.’” Though the Board is not restricted by the extensive Federal Rules of Evidence, they 
nonetheless surpassed one of the stricter standards of proof.  
The Board continues on to consider the role of judicial procedure in immigration court 
proceedings: 
“…we believe the hearing was conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of [U.S. Code]. According to the rules governing 
deportation proceedings, the respondent has ‘a reasonable 
opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him, and 
to present evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine 
witnesses presented by the Government” (Kulle, 1194). 
Though the evidentiary standards vary between the deportation proceedings before the 
BIA and adjudication before the circuit courts, all parties arguing in the Board have rights to 
examine and object to evidence used against them to examine and cross-examine witnesses. That 
the government was emphatic as to the evidentiary non-requirements and then the court went on 
to explicate the requirements speaks volumes as to the relationship between the court and the 





In these passages,70 the court has carefully asserted that the Board is court-like. The rest 
of the chapter will proceed in a similar manner.  
 
The BIA as a Court 
 
In providing guidance to the Board in identical disputes, we can consider how the two 
bodies come to their conclusions through excluding potential confounders implicit in examining 
case law. In nearly half of the cases in the dataset, the conclusions garnered by the courts and the 
Board are the same; these are deferential cases. But the other half come to opposite conclusions; 
these are non-deferential cases. One of the more common means for either agreeing or 
disagreeing with the Board is through considering how well the Board acts as a court. This flips 
the Chevron deference principle on its head – where federal courts, at times, defer to agencies 
because of their subject matter expertise, courts can assert their own subject matter expertise on 
acting judicially upon administrative courts. The deference, then, goes in both directions: from 
courts to agencies and from agencies to courts.  
As explained throughout this dissertation, there are any number of reasons why a court 
would rule for or against an agency, and those reasons are likely less difficult (or at least time-
consuming) than instructing another court-like body how to act judicially. The decision to 
provide instructions is a concerted one, and through examining those instructions we can 
understand the reasons through which courts decide to provide those instructions.   
                                                            
70 Of note: the passages quoted in this chapter are a subset of the evidence identified in the 
opinion dyads. They are representative of the features discussed in this chapter, but they are by 
no means the only occurrences of each phenomenon. 29 of 81 (36%) “active” cases are quoted in 





Evidence, Evidentiary Procedure, and Fact-Finding 
 
As stated above, federal courts and administrative courts are not beholden to the same 
rules of evidence and evidentiary procedure. Federal courts are subject to the guidance set out in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules, along with ample Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the subject, amount to an intense and extensive evidentiary procedure canon. 
Stephenson suggests that the size and strength of evidentiary procedure requirements and 
guidance serve many functions, including minimizing decision, error, and information gathering 
costs; extracting information from the more prepared party; and influencing potential incentives 
that the parties might face (Stephenson 2008; see also Hay and Spier 1997, Milgrom and Roberts 
1986, Posner 1973a, Rubinfeld and Sappington 1987, Sanchirico 2001).  
A trend towards loosening evidentiary standards on administrative courts (as compared to 
the evidentiary strictures on Article III courts) began with Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
Baird (1904) and hit its apex with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 
Kidane interprets the few provisions of the APA that refer to evidentiary procedure as a 
compromise between those who advocated for evidentiary rules that were analogous to those 
imposed on Article III courts and those who preferred a more lenient approach (Kidane 2008). 
The more lenient approach, according to Davis, allows the administrative process to continue the 
expediency and efficiency that characterizes it (Davis 1964).   
The BIA exemplifies this move towards a less strict set of evidentiary procedures. The 
guidebook for the EOIR on evidence provides additional guidance beyond the brief passages in 
the Administrative Procedure Act. “Relevant and fundamental fairness,” notes the guidebook’s 
authors, “are the only bars to admissibility of evidence in deportation cases” (Executive Office of 





deportation proceedings: “as long as the evidence is shown to be probative of relevant matters 
and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law” (ibid., 3). 
Even hearsay, one of the prototypical features of evidentiary procedure for Article III courts, is 
allowed in deportation proceedings if the speech is “probative and not fundamentally unfair” 
(ibid., 3). The burden of proof required to establish admissibility in the United States lies with 
the immigrant; this burden never shifts to the government (Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Section 212; Matter of Walsh and Pollard, 20 I&N Dec. 60, 63 (1989)).  
That there are both similarities and differences in how administrative courts and Article 
III courts interpret and apply their respective evidentiary procedures suggests that the 
conversations the courts of appeals have with the BIA in case law will be illustrative in 
understanding how circuit courts view the evidentiary realities of administrative courts. Being 
able to assess and interpret evidence is a particularly important prerogative of courts harkening 
back to Shapiro’s claim that courts consist of disinterested arbiters of disputes; by extension, 
courts must weigh the comparative value of evidence as it relates to the disputes being arbitrated 
(Shapiro 1981). It follows, then, that courts are well-situated to evaluate evidence as it arises.  
The circuit courts, in these data, frequently speak on the demonstrated ability of the 
Board to be able to assess evidence and apply evidentiary standards. At the most basic level, the 
courts use language such as: 
“We think that on the record before us there is a lack of substantial 





This suggests that the Board made a decision that was anathema to the evidence at hand; thus, it 
asserts a lack of ability of the Board to act court-like regarding the use of evidence in this case. 
More specifically, consider the court’s argument in Scythes v. Webb regarding hearsay: 
“We think that the characterization of the Socialist Workers Party 
as an organization advocating violent overthrow of the 
Government on the basis of such passages would be a 
characterization based on what was not said rather than what was 
said” (Scythes, 908). 
The Board, in Scythes, mistakenly interpreted the evidence in such a way as to try to rely 
on the non-existence of a phenomenon.  
Beyond interpreting the use of evidence in Board arguments, the courts also reflect on 
Board usage of the various evidentiary standards of review. This is a frequent topic in court 
opinions, and it is particularly well-tailored to understanding how courts discuss the judicial 
features of administrative courts. In Ah Chiu Pang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
the court states: 
“We agree with the BIA that the testimony of the Investigator as to 
the making, signing, and verifying of the statement by the 
petitioner, together with evidence by the interpreter of his regular 
routine in all cases gave ample authentication to the statement not 
only under the flexible rules regarding the admission of evidence 
before administrative tribunals in deportation proceedings, but 





court. The Government thus having shown that he was an alien, the 
burden shifted to the petitioner to justify his presence in the United 
States. This he failed to do” (Ah Chiu Pang, 639).  
The court here explicitly discusses differences in the application of evidentiary standards 
in the Article III courts and the administrative courts. The Administrative Procedure Act does not 
speak to evidentiary standards. In Director v. Greenwich Collieries (512 U.S. 267 (1994)), the 
Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act does not define a uniform burden of 
proof to all administrative hearings; instead, due to the APA’s goal of “greater uniformity of 
procedure and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose 
customs had departed widely from each other’ (Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 
(1950))”, each agency’s governing statute is tasked with defining the evidentiary standards that 
are imposed upon the administrative court in that agency (Director, 280). The Immigration and 
Nationality Act states that the burden of proof resides with the government to establish 
deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence (Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Section 240).71  Given this, the circuit court here is careful to explicate the evidentiary duties of 
both the Board and the immigrant and concludes that the Board correctly interpreted and applied 
their evidentiary standards correctly.  
More specifically, the circuit courts frequently consider how well the Board fulfills its 
requirement to meet the “clear and convincing evidence” standard. The “clear and convincing” 
standard is a moderately strict hurdle that parties must surpass to successfully prove their case 
                                                            
71 Note that deportability is different from inadmissibility: admissibility questions occur when a 
prospective immigrant is trying to enter the United States; deportability questions occur when an 






with evidence.72 In Laipenieks v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, we observe a typical 
discussion of the Board’s “clear and convincing” requirements: 
“Laipenieks argues that the INS failed to prove deportability on the 
basis of Section 1251(a)(10) by clear, convincing, and unequivocal 
evidence” (Laipenieks, 1428).73 
The Laipenieks opinion continues with a reflection on how immigration courts and the 
BIA have variable applications of the “clear and convincing” standard.  
“This court has observed that in a situation where the hearing 
examiner and the Agency have reached opposite results, the 
appellate court’s reviewing eye may be more searching” 
(Laipenieks, 1430). 
Thus, when there is a discord between the levels of administrative court, the federal 
courts may be more likely to give a more thorough review even if the standard of review does 
not change per se. The same process occurs in the various levels of the Article III judiciary: if a 
district court and a circuit court reach different conclusions even when (and perhaps especially 
                                                            
72 If we consider the three standards of proof in terms of the percent of certainty the evidence 
must provide, “preponderance of the evidence” requires 50.1% certainty, “clear and convincing 
evidence” requires approximately 66.6% certainty, and “beyond a reasonable doubt” requires 
99.9% certainty. Thank you to John Ryan, Esq. for guidance on standards of proof. 
73 The addition of “unequivocal” to the “clear and convincing” standard is unique to immigration 
law. It has also been widely debated in case law to confusing results. Walsh argues that the 
addition of “unequivocal” makes the “clear and convincing” standard more stringent, more akin 
to “beyond a reasonable doubt” though not as absolute. But the case law she cites, she admits, is 
contradictory and unclear (Walsh 2018). For the purposes of this dissertation it is not 
immediately important what the actual standard of proof is in practice; instead, we are primarily 
focused on the consistency of asserting that standard and explicating whether the Board 





when) the courts ostensibly use the same evidentiary standards, the Supreme Court must then 
parse which court more successfully interpreted and applied that standard.  
Before moving on, let us consider the review standards upon which the BIA assesses 
immigration court cases as well as the review standards upon which the federal courts assess 
BIA cases. Before the Ashcroft reforms of 2002 (discussed in Chapter 2), the BIA was granted 
the ability to review both the facts of a case and the legal interpretation in that case de novo, or 
with no reference to how the facts or law were initially interpreted (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009). 
Since 2002 the Board is still entitled to de novo review of law but can no longer interpret a case’s 
facts de novo (DOJ Practice Manual).74  
                                                            
74 To quote Ashcroft and Kobach’s argument against de novo review of facts on appeal: “Most 
immigration cases involve a sparse paper record and very few corroborating witnesses or none at 
all. Often the only live testimony is provided by the alien himself….The most salient evidence of 
a ‘well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion,’ which is the central requirement for the granting of 
asylum, is usually the testimony of the alien himself. Thus, if the system is to render a correct 
judgment, an accurate evaluation of the alien’s credibility is essential. Only the immigration 
judge has the opportunity to look the alien in the eye to assess his or her credibility….By 
engaging in de novo review of factual findings on appeal, the BIA was giving aliens two bites at 
the apple--two opportunities to present their facts (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009, 1993).” The 
Board, and especially the courts of appeals, have regularly supported asylum claims on limited 
physical evidence because, as a result of the conditions that led the immigrant to seek asylum in 
the first place, it is common to not have access to the required documentation to support a claim 
of asylum. Ashcroft and Kobach recognize this but do not give immigration judges the benefit of 
the doubt in communicating an immigrant’s testimony on their asylum eligibility. And there is 
something to be said of their assertion that giving an immigrant “two bites at the apple” will 
compromise the integrity of the immigration apparatus. Their argument is specious, relying on 
procedural formalities to argue against the rights of potential immigrants (especially those 
seeking asylum). Case in point: in a set of reforms ostensibly crafted to respond to a glut of cases 
before immigration judges and the BIA, they propose decreasing the number of immigration 
judges and BIA members. If their focus was truly on easing the burdens of the system, they 





But the federal courts have retained de novo review rights over the BIA throughout recent 
history. This is evident in Diallo, where the court rules against the Board on all fronts except for 
its fact-finding: 
“We see no reason to question the BIA’s factual determinations 
here. Upon de novo review of the BIA’s application of its 
corroboration standard in this case, however, we conclude that its 
decision cannot be sustained because the BIA failed to (1) rule 
explicitly on the credibility of Diallo’s testimony; (2) explain why 
it was reasonable in this case to expect additional corroboration; or 
(3) assess the sufficiency of Diallo’s explanations for the absence 
of corroborating evidence” (Diallo, 287). 
The court distinguishes between two related but nonetheless distinct court functions: fact-
finding and fact-application. The Board in Diallo was fully successful in the finding phase, but 
not in the application phase.  
We observe the court-as-fact-finder/court-as-fact-applier question even when (and 
perhaps most explicitly when) the case is somewhat ambiguous. In Pickering, the circuit court 
eventually rules against the Board on the grounds that:  
“the record used by the BIA to determine that the Canadian court 
acted solely for immigration purposes appear[ed] to be 
incomplete” (Pickering, 267). 
However, the opening lines of the opinion appears to offer positive reinforcement for the 





“Pickering first argues that the BIA’s decision fails as a matter of 
law. However, a review of that decision and the applicable case 
law reveals that the BIA correctly interpreted the law by holding 
that, when a court vacates an alien’s conviction for reasons solely 
related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration hardships, 
rather than on the basis of procedural or substantive defect in the 
underlying criminal proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated 
for immigration purposes” (Pickering, 266). 
 
Interpretation of Statutes and Jurisprudence 
 
Beyond engaging in evidentiary procedure, courts are well-suited to interpret statutory 
law for application to conflicts. Both agencies and courts are experts in statutory interpretation 
but for different reasons. Agencies, per their Weberian characteristics, are highly specialized in 
one or a few policy areas; this specialization comes from a close reading and application of the 
statute that governs the agency. For the immigration apparatus,75 there are two primary 
                                                            
75 This includes the various offices in the Department of Homeland Security that were at home in 
the Department of Justice prior to the origins of Homeland Security in 2002: Customs and 
Border Protection (mission statement: to “protect the American people, safeguard our borders, 
and enhance the nation’s economic prosperity” (Customs and Board Protection n.d.).); 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (mission statement: “ICE stands at the forefront of our 
nation's efforts to strengthen border security and prevent the illegal movement of people, goods, 
and funds into, within, and out of the United States. The agency's broad investigative authorities 
are directly related to our country's ongoing efforts to combat terrorism at home and abroad.” 
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement n.d.).); and Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(mission statement: “[to administer] the nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its 
integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits 
while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values” (Citizenship and 
Immigration Services n.d.).) in addition to the EOIR, the only remaining immigration office in 





governing statutes: the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended most significantly 
by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and the Immigration Act of 1990) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. The various arms of the 
bureaucratic immigration apparatus have interpreted and operationalized the features of these 
statutes. Additionally, the immigration apparatus and all its contemporaries in the bureaucracy 
are tasked with interpreting and applying the APA for the day-to-day functioning of their offices. 
The courts, most famously in Chevron, have protected this statutory interpretation and 
application power for the agencies of the bureaucracy. 
But courts have statutory interpretation powers that are both similarly deep but much 
broader. There is an immeasurably large literature on statutory interpretation by courts reaching 
back nearly a century76 and as such I will not attempt to summarize it here. Suffice it to say, 
courts, especially at the federal level but also at the state and local levels, enjoy the ability to 
parse statutory language, apply that interpretation to the appropriate dispute, and prescribe 
remedies as a result of those interpretations.  
                                                            
76 Diver places the first extended scholarly debate on legislative intent and statutory 
interpretation with the debate between Landis and Radin in the Harvard Law Review in 1930 
(Diver 1985, Landis 1930, Radin 1930). Radin provided the following truism on the nature of 
statutes: “A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. Its effect is therefore neither 
an expression laden with innumerable emotional overtones nor a permanent creation of infallible 
wisdom. It is a statement of a situation, or rather of a group of possible events within a situation, 
and as such is essentially ambiguous. This word is a pejorative expression in the mouths of most 
persons and seems to suggest that an ambiguous sentence can have two contradictory meanings; 
that, for example, it can permit what it seems to forbid. But of course that is not what the word 
‘ambiguous’ ought to suggest. A statement is ambiguous if there are two possible meanings - any 
two - and it can make no difference whether or not they partially contradict each other” (868). 
Landis suggested that the emphasis must lie “upon the honest effort of courts to give effect to the 
legislature's aims, even though their perception be perforce through a glass darkly” (893). This 
debate, over what Diver defines as epistemological and institutional accounts, would continue on 





In weighing these two complementary but divergent institutional prerogatives, Farina 
distinguishes between two early judicial attempts to weigh the bureaucratic and judicial statutory 
interpretation duties. One, with an emphasis on judicial statutory interpretation draws from 
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (322 U.S. 111 (1944)). To quote 
Farina, this “‘independent judgment model’ [finds] the agency’s function...analogized to that of 
an expert witness: its view of the proper meaning becomes a factor in the court’s analysis, to be 
given whatever persuasive effect it appears to merit in the circumstances” (453-4). This view is 
contingent on the court’s interpretation of the agency’s grasp on legislative intent and statutory 
purpose, and the court’s perspective on the credibility of the agency as an expert (fn 8). The 
second model, the “deferential model,” drawing from Packard Motor Car Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board (330 U.S. 485 (1947)), places the interpretive onus on the agency: “the agency’s 
function is to give meaning to the statute: the court determines only whether the interpretation 
the agency has chosen is a ‘rational’ reading, not whether it is the ‘right’ reading” (454). This 
second approach eventually became the governing attitude through the Chevron decision and its 
ubiquity in case law and legal literature.  
Though the Chevron decision put some of these debates to rest (or at least on ice), the 
question of contrasting statutory interpretation prerogatives is a common topic of discussion in 
the courts of appeals jurisprudence examined here.77 The courts take it upon themselves to 
reflect on the ability of the Board to interpret the governing statutes identified above even 
though, as aforementioned, debates over their right to do so are extant and ongoing. Some of 
                                                            





these discussions are very narrow, such as this passage regarding the interpretation of the word 
“entry” in Caudillo-Villalobos: 
“Aside from procedural complaints which we find to be without 
merit, the only question of substance here is the correctness of the 
determination by the BIA that appellant made an ‘entry’ into the 
United States after his conviction of a crime abroad involving 
moral turpitude. We think it clear that such an entry was made 
when the facts are considered in light of the language in [the 
statute]” (Caudillo-Villalobos, 1). 
The court here asserts that the Board should have interpreted “entry,” in light of the facts 
of the case, in the positive (i.e. that an entry was made). The decision, then, should hinge on the 
Board’s interpretation of the term.78  
Further, the Board, in order to act best as a court, must have an advanced ability to 
interpret and apply “legal standards” such as statutory and doctrinal language. 
“Having corrected the BIA’s legal errors, we could now remand 
for application of the identified legal standards” (Canas-Segovia, 
727). 
One of the best examples of this concern is in Diallo. Diallo, a Mauritanian national, 
applied for asylum and a withholding of deportation due to legitimate human rights concerns (the 
systemic shunting of Black Mauritanians by the white-dominated government to internment 
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camps in neighboring Senegal frequently after torture and destruction of property and citizenship 
paperwork). Due to Diallo’s refugee status and the unique hardships he faced in Mauritania, he 
was unable to produce the several pieces of evidence that the Board asked for to determine his 
asylum and deportation claims. Because of the unique human rights questions, the Board was 
required to consider international statutory language (the Handbook of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees) in addition to relevant domestic law. The Board found in favor of 
Diallo and against the Board as a result of many fatal errors in the Board’s reasoning. I will not 
explicate all of the rationales here, but it is worth examining the following passage on the 
Board’s inability to innovate as a result of governing domestic and international law as well as 
due to the intricacies of the case at hand: 
“The BIA only casually acknowledged the UNCHR’s general 
explanation and, more importantly, wholly failed to acknowledge 
Diallo’s own particular explanations for his inability to provide 
further corroboration. The BIA’s failure to address Diallo’s 
explanations violates both the letter and the spirit of its own 
standard, which specifically provides that, even under 
circumstances where corroboration may reasonably be expected, 
petitioners may meet their burden of proof by offering a believable 
and sufficient explanation as to why such corroborating evidence 





By (intentionally or unintentionally) eschewing the considerations required of cases 
involving mitigating human rights concerns, the Board did Diallo a disservice.79 The above 
statement is a particularly damning one, for it not only argues that the Board acted incorrectly as 
a court, but it also acted contrary to its own principles.  
Another important and frequently occurring issue in statutory interpretation appears in 
the Caudillo-Villalobos decision: determining whether a crime of moral turpitude has been 
committed. Crimes of moral turpitude is a category of legal offenses that is primarily related to 
immigration, specifically as it relates to defining a rationale for denying entry or deportation. The 
definition of “crimes involving moral turpitude” is not entrenched in statute; instead, it has been 
explicated through federal case law.80 Citizenship and Immigration Services, in their policy 
manual, points to Medina v. United States (259 F.3d 220 (2001)) as the source of their 
operational definition: “moral turpitude ‘is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct 
that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules 
of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in 
general’” (Medina, 227; Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.). The agency, using this 
definition, suggests four primary categories: crimes against a person (“criminal intent or 
                                                            
79 This is not to say that the courts of appeals, when assessing appeals from the Board, 
universally give human rights claims wide latitude. In Mei Fun Wong v. Holder (633 F.3d 64), 
the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that forceable insertion of an intrauterine device (IUD) 
does not constitute involuntary sterilization and thus is not a legitimate grounds for granting 
asylum. 
80 This is by design: Cabral v. INS (15 F.3d 193 (1994)) cites a passage in the hearings before the 
House Committee on Immigration before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917 where a 
congressman notes, “[y]ou know that a crime involving moral turpitude has not been defined. No 
one can really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude…” and Justice 
Jackson’s commentary in Jordan v. De George (341 U.S. 223 (1951), 233-4) on the statement: 
“despite this notice, Congress did not see fit to state what meaning it attributes to the phrase 





recklessness, or is defined as morally reprehensible by state (may include statutory rape)”), 
crimes against property (“involving fraud against the government or an individual (may include 
theft, forgery, robbery)”), sexual and family crimes (“It is difficult to discern a distinguishing set 
of principles that the courts apply to determine whether a particular offense involving sexual and 
family crimes is a CIMT….Offenses such as spousal or child abuse may rise to the level of 
CIMT, while an offense involving a domestic simple assault generally does not….In general, if 
the person knew or should have known that the victim was a minor, any intentional sexual 
contact with a child involves moral turpitude.”), and crimes against authority of the government 
(“presence of fraud is the main determining factor (may include offering a bribe, 
counterfeiting)”; Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.).  
Since moral turpitude is a foundational concept in immigration case law, it follows that 
extended discussions of whether crimes rise to the level of moral turpitude and, more 
importantly, whether the BIA correctly makes that judgment are common in the case law. 
Consider Goldeshtein, a case involving a German national convicted of intent to defraud: 
“Even if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory definition, 
a crime nevertheless may involve moral turpitude if such intent is 
‘implicit in the nature of the crime’…Matter of Flores, 17 I & N 
Dec. 225, 228 (BIA 1980) (“where fraud is inherent in an offense, 
it is not necessary that the statute prohibiting it include the usual 
phraseology concerning fraud in order for it to involve moral 
turpitude”). The INA asserts that, despite the absence of intent to 





intent is part of its ‘essential nature.’ We disagree” (Goldeshtein, 
648). 
The Board’s misstep here was relying on incorrect analogies to define the crime at issue. 
The court argued that Goldeshtein’s crime was not defined by the sort of fraudulent behavior 
required to be a crime of moral turpitude and thus is not a deportable offense. This exhibits, to 
the court, inadequate statutory action.  
“True, the government is deprived of information, but that is only a 
consequence of conduct that is not of a fraudulent character. We 
conclude that fraud is not inherent in the nature of this offense” 
(Goldeshtein, 649). 
Thus, the Board’s decision incorrectly interpreted the crime as one of moral turpitude.  
A later application of the issue, in Tejwani v. Attorney General of the United States, 
explains how the Board interpreted the crime as one containing moral turpitude and how the 
Board’s interpretation was incorrect: 
“Tejwani argues that the BIA erred in concluding that money 
laundering, evaluated under the categorical approach, met the 
definition of moral turpitude used by the BIA….These elements do 
not meet the criteria the BIA relied on in holding that Tejwani’s 
offense met its definition of moral turpitude. The BIA focused on 
the fact that a money launderer takes ‘affirmative steps to conceal 
or disguise the proceeds of criminal conduct[,] acts in an inherently 





the ability to detect and combat criminal activity.’ The BIA further 
stated that ‘such interference in governmental function is 
inherently dishonest and contrary to accepted moral standards.’ 
Here, however, we have a problem: deception and knowingly or 
recklessly concealing criminal conduct from the government are 
neither elements of money laundering nor inherent characteristics 
of the offense” (Tejwani, 723). 
This decision goes beyond the question of defining moral turpitude; in the final sentence 
of the passage the court alleges that the Board incorrectly interpreted the essential features of the 
crime itself.  
 
Adherence to Precedent 
 
Further, courts are called upon to remain faithful to (and, when necessary, to actively 
eschew) the precedent set by past and present courts.81 This unique feature of courts that the 
other branches of the federal government are not beholden to (at least officially) is an important 
one; in fact, Justice Cardozo argued that “adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather 
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opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: “[t]he rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable 
command’....Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily 
informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency 
of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs 








than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice” 
(1921, in Segal and Spaeth 2002). The question of precedent is inextricably entwined with the 
entrenched debates over what influences justices in their decision making. Those scholars who 
argue that the Supreme Court is beholden exclusively to law when deciding cases (fewer and 
further between in this era) are the strongest proponents of a theory that would find that justices 
are restricted by the strictures of precedent (Gillman 2001). I introduced the judicial decision 
making question earlier in this dissertation while discussing coding for a judge’s political and 
partisan stature and thus will not reintroduce it here.  
But we must reflect on how the question of precedent is dramatically different depending 
on which court we discuss. There are inherent differences in how the Supreme Court and the 
lower federal courts interact with precedent, let alone differences in how the Article III judiciary 
interacts with precedent as compared to the impact of precedent on administrative court decision 
making. Without entering feet-first into a literature that has been entrenched in debate for many 
decades, let us consider the legal forces which the Supreme Court is beholden to. As the highest 
court in the land, the Supreme Court’s decisions are not immediately subject to review by any 
other judicial authority. Their decisions can be overturned over time through new interpretations 
of statutes by future iterations of the Court or through what Caminker defines as “a [lower court] 
judge simply [refusing] to follow a Supreme Court precedent that she considers lawless, aware 
that her decision will face reversal on appeal but nevertheless [committing] to exercising her 
small universe of judicial power in accord with her best legal skills and conscience” (1994, 818-
9). Any non-Supreme Court federal court, in contrast, is accountable to at least one other higher 
court who can review and overturn their decision. Being able to decide a case without immediate 





their decision making behavior. According to Cross in his study of decision making in the courts 
of appeals, legal variables are far more explanatory than partisan ones (Cross 2007); this echoes 
the literature cited in chapters 1 and 2 on circuit court decision making. For the purposes of 
understanding precedential adherence in the courts of appeals, we can conclude (cautiously) that 
the judges on the courts of appeals hold a stronger fidelity to precedent due to their institutional 
stature in the Article III hierarchy. 
The administrative judiciary’s relationship with precedent is, as far as I can discern, 
unexamined in the literature and since I do not have data to support an argument I will not claim 
to have a measured conclusion. But the Board, if it is a court, should be able to follow the rules 
defining how precedent is followed or transcended.  
In cases like Dillingham where the Board does not employ these principles of precedent, 
the circuit court is quick to note this and provide instructions moving forward. 
“The BIA erred when it found that ‘the expungement of 
[Dillingham]’s conviction is akin to a foreign pardon and is 
therefore ineffective for immigration purposes. Ignoring our prior 
equal protection decisions in Garberding, Paredes-Urrestarazu, 
and Lujan-Armendariz, the Board ruled that Dillingham failed to 
satisfy the fourth criterion of Manrique, because he was 
rehabilitated under a foreign (as opposed to a state) statute, and 
because as a general policy matter the Board has never recognized 
foreign pardons of crimes as moral turpitude. By likening foreign 
expungements of simple drug possession offenses to foreign 





which Congress has not enacted a domestic rehabilitation statute 
analogous to the FFOA—the Board improperly skirted the 
constitutional issue of differential treatment in this case. 
Unfortunately, as a result of the Board’s false comparison, we can 
glean little use from its opinion” (Dillingham, 1007). 
We observe the court, who expected the Board to adhere to the precedent set out in the 
four cited opinions, excoriating the Board for not adhering to those doctrines. We observe a 
similar scenario in Robles-Urrea, though the court takes its precedent prescription one step 
further: 
“The BIA’s holding would result in a peculiar rule: even where a 
principal offender has not committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude, a person who conceals that crime—and who thereby 
commits misprision of a felony—might be considered to have done 
so” (Robles-Urrea, 710). 
Here the court does not consider the Board’s adherence to precedent; instead, the court 
discusses how the Board could create precedent. The precedent that would have been created by 
the Robles-Urrea had the decision been upheld by the court would have been very strange; as 
such, the court was quick to overturn the decision. The court continued on to say: 
“We have severe doubts as to the merits of each of the 
government’s arguments as to why the agency could conclude that, 
even if misprision of a felony is not categorically a crime involving 





turpitudinous crime. Nonetheless, we recognize that the BIA is 
entitled to conduct the analysis in the first instance. See Ventura, 
537 U.S. at 16 (“Generally speaking, a court of appeals should 
remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes 
place primarily in agency hands.”) We therefore remand so that it 
may do so….On remand, the BIA may also consider whether 
Robles-Urrea is removable under [U.S. Code] as an alien who ‘has 
been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance,’ and whether 
he may be entitled to any form of relief from removal” (Robles-
Urrea, 712). 
The court, here, provides explicit instructions as to what the Board must reconsider so 
that their decision falls in line with the court’s interpretation. When the two passages from 
Robles-Urrea are taken in concert, the court provides the Board both a prescription of the issue 
and a suggestion for future action to avoid further shortcomings.  
To conclude, let us return to the Gertsenshteyn opinion. While reflecting on 
Gertsenshteyn’s alleged crime, the Board (according to the court) departed from both court and 
Board precedent without providing a sound reason for doing so. 
“In the precedential opinion that the BIA issued in this case, it has 
taken a new approach. But it has done so not by reinterpreting 
[U.S. Code], the provision whose wording let it—and us—to adopt 
the categorical approach in the first place. Rather, it has focused 
entirely on a subpart of Section 1101(a)(43), the provision of the 





interpret that provision, and its interpretation—specifically, its 
sensible reading of the phrase ‘commercial advantage’—may well 
merit deference should the BIA reassert in this case (on remand) or 
in others. But the BIA’s discussion of Section 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii) 
gives us no reason to depart from its, and our own, precedents 
regarding the more fundamental question of what is required of the 
agency—in the interests of both fairness and efficiency—when an 
alien’s removability hinges on the existence of a prior conviction, 
however that conviction is defined….The BIA’s decision in this 
case departs, with insufficient reason, from the legal framework 
that we have long used to decide whether an alien charged with 
removability under [U.S. Code] has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony. And we are not confident of what result it 
would reach under the proper framework” (Gertsenshteyn, 146-
149). 
Even given all of these intra-opinion discussions about judicial activities and how the 
Board does or does not meet the expectations of a court, the courts of appeals generally provide 
the Board the benefit of the doubt regarding its ability to act court-like. In Chun Hua Chen, for 
example, the Board does not explicitly state that they addressed the exhibits provided in the 
affidavit, but the court nonetheless says: 
“Furthermore, while the BIA did not address each of the exhibits 





there is no indication that it did not consider them in rendering its 
decision” (Chun Hua Chen, 653). 
This is direct evidence that, in this case at least, the court has a great deal of trust in the 
Board and its ability to determine how best to provide a satisfactory decision and opinion. The 
same discussion occurred later in Liadov: 
“However, both the BIA and the Attorney General have steadfastly 
maintained that the time limit is mandatory, and the BIA’s  
reference to its self-certification authority in this case was a 
reaction to the unwarranted judicial demand for an exception 
imposed by Oh and Sun rather than a change of agency position. 
Therefore, the refusal to self-certify may not be reviewed on the 
ground that the agency itself treats the appeal time limit as non-
mandatory….Thus, the failure of a courier to make a timely 
delivery is not ‘an extraordinary circumstance that would justify 
intervention by this court into the Board’s exercise of discretion’” 
(Anssari Gharachedaghy v. INS; Liadov, 1011-1012). 
This is suggestive of deference doctrine even though the court does not rely on Chevron 
in this case: the court is allowing the Board to dictate how it functions in the day-to-day without 
interference from the court telling the Board how, in fact, to function in the day-to-day. 
But when the Board is not given the benefit of the doubt, it is typically because the court 
accuses the Board of assuming too much when interpreting facts, statutes, or doctrine. This is 





more powerful when the court, in suggesting that the Board is taking their court-ness too much 
for granted, corrects the Board’s course of action and redirects it towards the correct judicial 
path. Consider Maldonado-Cruz on this point: 
“The BIA based its decision solely on the legal issues considered 
above. The BIA’s refusal to consider credibility leads to the 
presumption that it found the petitioner credible” (Maldonado-
Cruz, 792). 
A similar sentiment is communicated in Canas-Segovia: 
“Although the BIA considered the relevant Handbook provisions, 
it dismissed them as ambiguous and not dispositive. We disagree. 
The Handbook unambiguously supports the Canases’ claims” 
(Canas-Segovia, 724). 
In both cases, the court reminds the Board that there are steps that cannot regularly be 
overlooked when acting judicially. As well as the Board acts like a court, there still needs to be 
semi-regular reminders to stay abreast of the requirements of judicial actors.  
 
Chevron and Deference in Action 
 
It goes without saying that the question of deference, ubiquitous in discussions of 
administrative law, flourishes in primary and secondary source discussions of immigration law 
(“The history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference” 
(Cox 2007, 1671).). Throughout the one hundred and sixteen dyads that comprise this 





and how particular circumstances arise that allow courts to transcend those restrictions, while 
noting that “[the courts’] review[s] of the interpretation of the Board ‘is not a license for [the 
courts] to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices’” (Rivas, 1330). The 
reflections on deference in the case law appear throughout the entire time period under analysis, 
but they find new purchase in the years after the Chevron decision. Further, these deference 
conversations also take place in post-Chevron cases that do not cite the doctrine. Consider this 
lengthy passage from Castillo v. INS, where the court discusses a claim of abuse of discretion by 
the BIA.  
“Petitioner recognizes that there can be no judicial interference 
with the discretionary action of the Board except on a showing of 
abuse of discretion or that discretion was, in fact, not exercised at 
all….He contents, however, that the Board did abuse its discretion 
when it relied upon the fact that he did not enter the United States 
as a bona fide nonimmigrant as a ‘persuasive factor’ in denying his 
application for status as a permanent resident under 
[statute]….Petitioner contends that Congress, by elimination of 
entry as a bona fide nonimmigrant as a statutory requirement of 
status under section 245, also made entry as a bona fide 
nonimmigrant without significance in the exercise of discretion 
under the section. By relying on a factor which Congress could not 
have intended to apply, the Board, petitioner contends, abused its 
discretion in denying his application. We do not agree….Petitioner 





all in this case because his application was denied pursuant to an 
arbitrary policy of the BIA to exclude from the benefits of Section 
245 all aliens who did not enter as bona fide nonimmigrants, and 
that his application was denied solely on that ground. We find no 
merit in this contention” (Castillo, 4). 
The opening statement of this passage recognizes the privileged position the Board occupies 
wherein space is provided for the Board to adjudicate disputes without fear of retaliation unless 
there is a clear abuse of discretion that warrants a sanction. That said, Castillo argues that the 
Board did abuse its discretion and systematically documents each claim against the Board. But 
on each point the court returns with a brief but clear defense of the Board and its latitude to 
decide cases within their purview. This is a clear example of deference discussion independent of 
the Chevron lens.  
These discussions become more explicit and clearer when Chevron is cited and 
interpreted. In Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, for example, the court quickly walks through Chevron’s 
two steps (see Chapter 1). 
“In so holding, we observed, first, that the INA is silent as to 
whether IUD insertion constitutes sterilization. Second, we 
determined that the BIA’s conclusion that involuntary IUD 
insertion did not constitute involuntary sterilization was reasonable 
and, therefore, entitled to deference” (Mei Fun Wong, 71). 
A more robust example comes from Lettman v. Reno, where we observe the court fill in the 





“We find nothing to compel the BIA to conclude that Congress 
intended those convicted of firearm offenses to be treated 
differently than those convicted of aggravated felonies. On the 
contrary, giving the grounds parallel treatment is consistent with 
Congress’ intent to ‘make the [INA] more rational and easier to 
understand.’…We also find nothing in IMMACT to compel the 
BIA to conclude that Congress meant to preserve and ‘merely 
redesignate’ the old version of the aggravated felony ground. 
Congress did not evince intent to make piecemeal changes, but 
rather intended to ‘provide[] for a comprehensive revision of all 
the existing grounds for exclusion and deportation.’ The BIA 
reasonably included the aggravated felony ground among those 
‘comprehensive revisions. Accordingly, we hold that, as with 
firearms offenses under Lopez-Amaro, the BIA reasonably 
concluded that an alien is deportable if convicted of an aggravated 
felony at the time of entry” (Lettman, 1372). 
Here the court claims that it could compel the Board to interpret firearms offenses in one way 
under IMMACT, but it instead argued that the Board’s interpretation of IMMACT to include 
firearms offenses under those “comprehensive revisions” was a perfectly sound interpretation 
under Chevron and thus the Board’s interpretation stood against scrutiny. This is common in the 
post-Chevron era, though it is not unique to the post-Chevron era. As we found in chapter 3, 





after Chevron we are privier to explicit discussions of deference since the courts were given a 
new language to discuss these issues.   
Undergirding judicial discussions of deference are perspectives on Congress and 
congressional statutory intent. King v. Katzenbach is an excellent introduction to this, for its 
summary synthesizes debates over congressional intent and several other means through which a 
court could be given interpretive latitude under Chevron.  
“In summary, the rules of grammar, the administrative 
interpretation, the legislative history, and the leading 
commentators, all without exception, require the affirmance of the 
finding that the petitioner is statutorily ineligible…” (King, 307). 
Complementing the King excerpt, the Git Foo Wong v. INS decision explicitly refers to the 
congressional language and the interpretation of that language that leads to an anti-Board 
decision. 
“We conclude, then, that it effectuates congressional purpose to 
construe the intent exception to section 101(a)(13) as meaning an 
intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully 
interruptive of the alien’s permanent residence” (Git Foo Wong, 
153). 
The combined effect of the King and Wong Chevron discussions is to take Congress seriously in 
the statutory process but not to over-rely on Congress’ decision making posture when 
adjudicating a deference dispute; this is evidenced by the relatively short time spent by courts on 





the expense of Congress and its preferences. According to Kofa’s author, it is objectionable for 
anyone but Congress to extoll the requirements of any given statute.  
“Petitioners urge us to look at the legislative history surrounding, 
and some written even after, the passage of the 1990 amendments 
to Section 1253(h)(2). However, the first place where we must 
look to see if Congress has spoken to the issue with which we are 
concerned and whether Congressional intent in that regard is clear 
is on the face of the statute. Statutory construction must begin with 
the language of the statute….To do otherwise would assume that 
Congress does not express its intent in the words of statutes, but 
only by way of legislative history, an idea that hopefully all will 
find unpalatable” (Kofa, 1088). 
Kofa is an important reminder that statutory interpretation is hardly a judiciary-only 
phenomenon, or, at the very least, that the other branches have similarly important roles to play 
in the statutory interpretation process. Chevron’s strength lies in its status as a doctrine that 
affects all branches of government. Thus, a discussion of Chevron is an opportunity for courts to 
reflect on their status in an interbranch administrative state. Kofa’s assertive defense of Congress 
is one variety of these discussions, but the more common interbranch discussion takes the form 
of this paragraph in Shaar: 
“Perhaps, as the Shaars suggest, the INS and the BIA could 
manipulate the system so as to treat aliens unfairly for arbitrary or 
downright improper reasons. Perhaps those entities could do that 





very timely petition to reopen, while denying extensions of time to 
depart. We, however, have no reason to think that the agencies will 
do so, nor is there the slightest hint that they did so here. If anyone 
has attempted to manipulate the system, it is the Shaars, who 
waited until the eve of their scheduled departure to ask for the 
relief they now seek. We can detect no violation of the 
Constitution” (Shaar, 958-959). 
Here we observe a pointed defense of the immigration system against claims that the system is 
biased against immigrants and their claims, and it is clear evidence of an alliance between courts 
and agencies on immigration issues.  
But just because Chevron could apply does not necessarily mean that Chevron will be 
applied in the agency’s favor; given how ubiquitous and widely cited the doctrine is and given its 
reputation as a doctrine that far more often than not benefits agencies, this is important to 
recognize. As we observed in chapter 3, the presence of the Chevron doctrine does not mean that 
the courts will defer to agencies every time. The dataset includes several cases where Chevron 
analysis begins but does not complete to a satisfactory conclusion for the Board. Consider Blake, 
where the court was ready to apply Chevron but was stymied by the government and its failure to 
argue that an ambiguity exists: 
“If the statutory language is clear, however, ‘that is the end of the 
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ Chevron. The BIA, 
through powers delegated by the Attorney General, enforces and 





reasonable interpretations. The government would stand on firm 
Chevron ground, then, if it could point to an ambiguity in Section 
212(C). But the government has failed to suggest one” (Blake, 
100). 
The Ndayshimiye court at least gets to Step 1 before concluding the Board acted incorrectly. 
“We conclude that the BIA’s interpretation of the ‘one central 
reason’ standard is in error only to the extent that it would require 
an asylum applicant to show that a protected ground for 
persecution was not ‘subordinate’ to any unprotected motivation. 
That particular term is inconsistent with the plain language of the 
statute, cutting off our Chevron analysis at step one….Therefore, 
we hold that once the term ‘subordinate’ is removed, the BIA’s 
interpretation constitutes a reasonable, valid construction of 
Section 208’s ‘one central reason’ standard” (Ndayshimiye, 129). 
What is interesting about the Ndayshimiye opinion, however, comes after the court stops at 
Chevron Step One. The court then provides a solution for the Board so that it can later surpass 
Chevron scrutiny. Here the court asserts its interpretive power over the Board, but also gives the 
Board the power to prevail in similar cases moving forward through identifying exactly what 
needs to be changed.  
Bautista, in contrast, makes it to Chevron Step Two but ultimately rules against the 





“Here, we find that the BIA’s construction with respect to the 
classification of state convictions as aggravated felonies under 
section 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is inconsistent with Congress’ expressed 
intent. ¶ …While we sympathize with this view, not every difficult 
question of statutory construction amounts to a statutory gap for a 
federal agency to fill….To conclude otherwise would be to find 
that every time there is a disagreement about statutory 
construction, we accord deference to agencies. This is not what 
Chevron instructs us to do” (Bautista, 58). 
According to the court here, just because an agency is entitled to deference under Chevron does 
not mean that the agency will win in every case where the decision is borderline. This is a careful 
reminder that Chevron is not a blunt-force tool for ceding interpretive power to agencies; instead, 
it is a deliberate and measured means to calculate the balance of interpretive power across 
institutions. Further, Chevron is not meant to legitimize the content of the agency’s 
interpretations; instead, it is simply acknowledging correct interpretive procedure. We observe 
this distinction in Mei Fun Wong: 
“By deciding that the BIA reasonably resolved this statutory 
ambiguity, we do not suggest that the agency could not have made 
a different choice. We conclude only that the choice it made was 
not unreasonable. One reason courts do not second-guess a 
reasonable executive branch choice about the showing necessary to 
demonstrate persecution under the INA is that the answer 





Supreme Court has cautioned, the "judiciary is not well positioned 
to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and 
importance of [potential]  diplomatic repercussions." (INS v. 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425.) In such a context, we "must 
take appropriate account of the greater immigration-related 
expertise of the Executive Branch, of the serious administrative 
needs and concerns inherent in the necessarily extensive INS 
efforts to enforce this complex statute, and the Nation's need to 
speak with one voice in immigration matters." (Zadvydas v. Davis, 
533 U.S. 678, 700, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001)). Of 
course, if Congress takes a different view, it remains free to amend 
the statute, as it did in 1996, to identify certain conduct as 
categorically persecutive” (Mei Fun Wong, 75). 
Chevron simply requires a reasonable interpretation by the agency, not necessarily the “correct” 
decision, for only an expert in the subject area can speak conclusively as to the “correctness” of 
the decision. According to the court in Mei Fun Wong, those experts are all actors besides the 
court making the decision.  
Before we conclude this section, let us take a closer look at the cases immediately 
preceding and following the Chevron decision. Table 4b lists the cases whose circuit court 






Table 4b: Pre- and Post-Chevron Cases 
 
Pre-Chevron Case Year Decided 
 
Post-Chevron Case Year Decided 
Ruangswang 1978 Laipenieks 1985 
Lee 1978 Kulle 1987 
Von Pervieux 1978 (Name Redacted) 1988 
Wang 1979 Maldonado-Cruz 1989 
McMullen 1981 Canas-Segovia 1990 
Hill 1983   
 
Of the eleven cases, all but two (Wang and Hill) are active deference or active non-deference 
cases. (Note that these two came prior to Chevron.) The six pre-Chevron cases are divided 
evenly on deference and non-deference, and the five post-Chevron cases are coded as active non-
deference except for Kulle (active deference). Three pre-Chevron cases (Ruangswang, Lee, and 
McMullen) are “application of statute” cases; only one (McMullen) is an “application of facts” 
case. In contrast, all six post-Chevron cases are “application of facts” cases.82 This suggests that 
in the immediate term following Chevron the courts were particularly careful to parse the factual 
posture of the cases before them that could utilize Chevron deference. Two of the cases ((Name 
Redacted) and Canas-Segovia) are also coded as “application of statute” cases, which is to be 
expected after the development of a doctrine like Chevron whose goal is a standardized language 
for considering statutory application and interpretation.  
To conclude this discussion of Chevron and this chapter on explicit guidance from courts 
to agencies on best judicial practice, let us dissect the final paragraph in the Blake et al v. 
Carbone opinion. After a decision ruling in favor of the immigrant petitioner, the court clearly 
discusses how the Board was deficient and what actions it can take moving forward to avoid 
                                                            





anti-Board cases like this one in the future. The court leaves no room for interpretation on the 
BIA’s mistakes. 
“The past thirty years have highlighted the difficulties that arise 
when constitutionally problematic legislation is juxtaposed with 
judicial stitchery and administrative attempts at coalescing the two. 
Francis expanded the sweep of § 212(c); Congress's only response 
was to limit and then repeal the statute; and the task of 
reconciliation unfortunately fell on the BIA. While hindsight might 
pin much of this confusion on Francis, we are bound to finish what 
our predecessors started. The BIA is therefore directed to 
determine whether petitioners' underlying aggravated felony 
offenses could form the basis for exclusion under § 212(a) of the 
INA as a crime of moral turpitude. In particular, the BIA must 
consider whether Blake's first degree sexual abuse of a minor 
conviction, Ho Yoon Chong's racketeering conviction, Foster's first 
degree manslaughter conviction, and Singh's second degree murder 
conviction, could each form the basis of exclusion as a crime 
involving moral turpitude. If so, the merits of each petitioner's § 
212(c) applications should be considered. The petitions for review 
are GRANTED; and the cases are REMANDED to the BIA for 










Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation sought to understand deference in the administrative state through a 
close quantitative and qualitative examination of interpretive behavior in administrative courts 
and Article III courts’ responses to those interpretive actions. Further, the dissertation provided a 
new methodological approach to understanding how disparate courts interact to (potentially) 
affect lasting change on the institutions in the process.  
The project proceeded in four steps. The introduction and Chapter 1 explained the 
phenomenon under analysis and situated the project in both legal and political science literatures. 
I discussed the features of courts and agencies that undergird the relationship that lends itself to 
deferential behavior. I redefined deference, a term that has been topic of extensive discussion in 
the last forty years but that was missing a key feature: the intent of the deferrers. I suggested 
three reasons why judges may defer. First, an Article III court might defer to an administrative 
court by the advice of Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council (1984). Chevron was an 
explicit declaration in favor of deferring to agencies on the subject matters of which they are an 
expert. To do so, it introduced a two-step test to determine whether deference should be applied. 
The court must first determine whether the issue at hand has been preempted with congressional 
instructions. If Congress has already spoken to the issue, their prescription is used. But if 
Congress has not spoken to the issue, the court must determine whether the agency’s solution is 





doctrinal explanation would produce results that identify low levels of deference prior to the 
Chevron decision and high levels after Chevron.  
Second, an Article III court might defer to an administrative court when the courts are 
staffed by co-partisans. The operating motivation here is not partisanship per se; instead, it is the 
perception across institutions that decisions made by one institution will find common ground 
with those comprising the companion institution. I reflect on the extensive literature on judicial 
decision making and the ways that partisanship is measured by political scientists; I find that the 
judicial decision making literature, though primarily focused on Supreme Court judicial 
behavior, can offer insights on how to assert a partisan identity on non-Supreme Court judges. A 
partisan explanation would produce results that identify low levels of deference among judges in 
different parties and high levels of deference among judges belonging to the same party.  
Third, an Article III court might defer to an administrative court when the Article III 
court would like to communicate instructions on good judicial practice to administrative law 
judges. Drawing from interbranch institutionalism, this theory suggests that courts might 
abdicate some of their interpretive power to another judicial body to promote the interpretive 
acumen of the administrative state at large. Article III courts, according to the theory, provide 
instructions to agencies in opinions that are directly related to the functions the agency serves. A 
cooperative explanation would produce results that identify low levels of deference in opinions 
that do not feature active language for or against an agency and its actions and high levels of 
deference in opinions that do feature active language for or against an agency.  
To test this novel theory, I utilize a new approach to identifying deference that is 
introduced and explained in chapter 2. Using the universe of precedent decisions at the Board of 





courts of appeals. This created dyads of cases (n = 116) that provide the opportunity to trace a 
dispute through two different judicial institutions. I coded each dyad on several variables 
(described in detail in Appendices C and D) that provided analytical leverage on all three 
theories.  
Upon explicating the research design and case selection featured in this dissertation, I 
introduce the four forms of deference. If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is evidence 
in the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “active deference.” If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is no evidence in 
the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “passive deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is no evidence in the 
text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “passive non-deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is evidence in 
the text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this 
instance as “active non-deference.” In this deference scheme, even non-deference has theoretical 
significance. When a court provides rationales directly related to the actions of the agency, it is 
the rationale rather than the outcome that matters. When we combine an agency’s outcome in 
court with active language either for or against the agency’s actions, we can confidently make 
conclusions about judicial intent regarding administrative behavior in a way that is impossible 
when solely relying on win rates. 
Chapters 3 and 4 use the coded data to test the three theories of judicial deference to 
administrative agencies. Chapter 3 investigates the partisan and doctrinal explanations. Prior to 
providing causal analyses, I introduce the dyadic data in tabular form. Of note: there are 





suggests that any differences between cases due to more deference cases after the Chevron 
decision are unlikely to occur. Utilizing logistic regression, I tested partisan variables for the 
entire time period under analysis (approximately 1940 to 2016). We observe no indications that 
partisanship has a causal effect on win rates or deference type. But when we disaggregate the 
data by pre- and post-Chevron status (read: cases before 1984 and cases after 1985), we observe 
moderate partisan effects prior to Chevron that disappear among cases after Chevron. The key 
observation of these doctrinal regressions is the strong causal relationship between win rates and 
deference type and whether a case is decided per curiam. Drawing on the literature on per 
curiam opinions, I argue that this suggests courts anonymize (or decide a case as an institutional 
unit rather than as individuals) in situations where the court is ruling in favor of an agency but 
not providing positive reinforcement for good judicial and administrative behavior by the BIA. 
But when the court feels compelled to comment on the Board’s activity, the court will 
infrequently decide as one body and instead indicate an author.  
Here it is important to reconsider the potential effect immigration as a policy area could 
have on deference behavior between the federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
Since immigration policy is a cross-cutting political issue that does not always neatly fall along 
partisan lines, partisan match could be less explanatory for the Board than for another 
administrative court that litigates on an issue that is more distinct along partisan lines (such as 
the National Labor Relations Board and labor policy). Further, and as a result of the relative 
ambiguity of immigration policy, deference could serve political ends. Because of this, Chevron 
might be explanatory not because of the doctrine itself, but because it can provide a cover for 
more political reasons for deference. Another case study using an administrative court focused 





After considering the partisan and doctrinal explanations, chapter 4 investigates the 
interbranch theory of deference by courts to agencies. The first section examines three activities 
that are prototypical actions and prerogatives of courts: evidence and evidentiary procedure, 
statutory and jurisprudential interpretation, and adherence to precedent. I identified examples in 
the text of circuit court opinions that feature judicial instructions to the judges of the BIA. In 
each instance, the court of appeals either actively approved of or disapproved of how the Board 
engaged in these three judicial activities. The second section focuses on Chevron deference 
specifically. Echoing the insights garnered from the regression data in Chapter 3, the qualitative 
data suggest that Chevron did not automatically increase the number of cases where the Board 
was successful or where the circuit court spoke explicitly on the Board’s actions. Examples of 
explanations on deferential behavior provided by the courts of appeals are provided throughout.  
The two empirical chapters together provide a comprehensive examination of how 
deference occurs. Importantly, the two chapters suggest that no theory (of the three examined) 
completely explain why courts defer to agencies; instead, deference can be explained in the 
overlapping space between the three. We observe that partisan match does not explain agency 
outcomes in court or the presence/absence of explicit language on deference to a statistically 
significant degree, and we find that whether a circuit court decision is decided per curiam is 
explanatory throughout the universe of cases, but especially in the post-Chevron era for both 
dependent variables. When the qualitative insights from Chapter 4 are layered on top, we identify 
the features of the active deference and active non-deference that we cannot observe simply with 
the quantitative results. Together, then, the quantitative and qualitative chapters (1) consider why 






Avenues for Future Inquiry 
 
This dissertation provides significant theoretical and methodological insight on the 
presence and strength of deference in the years before and after Chevron. It also introduces new 
questions to investigate in subsequent studies.  
 
How can we better measure agency/administrative court partisanship? 
A methodological challenge arose when assigning partisanship to non-Supreme Court 
actors, particularly at the administrative court level. The literature discussed above on assigning 
partisanship to justices has been applied to other judges (Article III as well as state Supreme 
Court justices (Brace et al 2000, Hall 1985, Kang and Shephard 2016)) but the effect of 
partisanship (proxied by appointing president per Dahl) has been shown to be not nearly as 
explanatory at the non-Supreme Court level. I utilized the appointment proxy for court of appeals 
judges out of necessity and with great caution.  
It was with even more reticence that I used the same method for assigning partisanship to 
BIA judges. This relied on a large assumption: presidents will appoint attorneys general who 
share their perspectives on Department of Justice prerogatives (notably immigration). A two-step 
proxy is used in this case: the president’s partisan identity defines the attorney general’s partisan 
identity which, in turn, defines the BIA member’s partisan identity. This is an admittedly tenuous 
link, but it is the best approach given the data available. Future scholarship could probe this 
question deeper to determine (1) a better way to identify administrative law judge partisanship, 
and (2) whether administrative law judges exhibit partisan behavior in the first place. I suspect 
that administrative courts vary in their propensity to make partisan-motivated decisions. (The 





Appeals in the Railroad Retirement Board, for example.) Interviews with past and current 
administrative law judges that discuss the political motivations of decision making in 
administrative courts is the best preliminary approach to study this phenomenon.  
 
Do circuit court decisions impact future administrative court behavior? How did Chevron 
impact judicial behavior? 
 
This study provides evidence that the courts of appeals provide guidance to 
administrative courts on how to act best as judicial actors. But the study does not probe into 
whether administrative court actors actually change as a result of circuit court opinions. It is not 
possible to determine changes in administrative court behavior with the data I utilized for this 
dissertation. Instead, future studies should interview administrative adjudicators to determine 
whether the theories introduced here play a role in their day-to-day operations. Additionally, a 
future study might appeal to agency archives for internal documentation indicating changes in 
agency business-as-usual as a result of judicial opinions with instructions for future 
administrative court activity. Access to these archives, if they exist, will be challenging to gain. 
 
Can a court defer but rule against an agency? 
 
 This study asserts that deference by courts to agencies necessarily requires an agency 
win. But a case could be made that an agency could be unsuccessful in court but still subject to 
deference by courts. Consider, for example, levels of scrutiny. At the lowest level of scrutiny, 
rational basis, courts require that a statute simply be rationally related to a government interest in 





relaxed standard, it is conceivable that an agency could be ruled against in court while the court 
simultaneously supports the agency’s statute under rational basis review. A future analysis could 
consider this possibility, identify instances of the phenomenon, and consider whether the 
conception of deference in this dissertation should be amended. A study investigating deference 
in losing cases could use the same basic method that was introduced in Chapter 2 by using the 










Appendix A: Administrative Courts 
 
Below is a list of administrative courts present in the agencies of the executive branch 
bureaucracy. Administrative courts were identified through a personal survey of administrative 
agencies and complemented with a review of the database compiled pursuant to a joint study 
performed by the Administrative Conference of the United States and Stanford Law. 
Administrative courts were defined by the presence of two characteristics: (1) an adjudicative 
body composed of one or several administrative law judges/commission members who (2) make 
determinations on disputes between at least two parties. Boards that exclusively manage petitions 
for benefits are not considered administrative courts for the purposes of this dissertation since 
they do not resolve disputes. Administrative court websites that include a database of decisions 
constitutes an unnecessary but sufficient condition for defining the office as an administrative 
court; a narrative on the functions that the office provides and the process through which the 
administrative court functions is both necessary and sufficient.  
 
1. Administrative Appeals Office 
a. Home agency: Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland 
Security 
b. Subject area: immigration 
c. Mission statement: “Petitioners and applicants for certain categories of 
immigration benefits may appeal an unfavorable decision to the Administrative 
Appeals Office (AAO). We conduct administrative review of those appeals to 
ensure consistency and accuracy in the interpretation of immigration law and 
policy. We generally issue our appellate decisions as non-precedent decisions, 
which apply existing law and policy to the facts of a given case. After review by 





to adjudicators and the public on the proper interpretation and administration of 
immigration law and policy (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.).” 
 
2. Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: National Transportation Safety Board 
b. Subject area: transportation 
c. Mission statement: “The Administrative Law Judges conduct formal hearings and 
issue initial decisions on appeals by airmen filed with the Safety Board. The 
NTSB serves as the "court of appeals" for any airman, mechanic or mariner 
whenever certificate action is taken by the Federal Aviation Administration or the 
U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, or when civil penalties are assessed by the FAA 
(National Transportation Safety Board n.d.).” 
 
 
3. Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: United States Coast Guard, Department of Defense 
b. Subject area: suspension and revocation of Coast Guard membership 
c. Mission statement: “CG ALJs preside over 600-900 Suspension and Revocation 
cases annually. In a fully-contested case, the ALJ presides over all aspects of the 
hearing including admitting or rejecting evidence, regulating the course of the 
hearing, ruling on motions, and issuing subpoenas for witnesses. The ALJ then 
reviews the evidence and testimony, finds the facts, and prepares a decision that 
applies the facts to the law and states the reasons for the ALJ’s findings. In a non-
contested case (settlement, admission, or default), the ALJ reviews the docket 
record, ensures that due process has been afforded the respondent, and then issues 
an appropriate order (United States Coast Guard n.d.).” 
 
 
4. Administrative Review Board 
a. Home agency: Department of Labor 
b. Subject area: employment disputes 
c. Mission statement: “The Secretary of Labor has granted authority and assigned 
responsibility to the Board to issue final agency decisions after review or on 
appeal of matters arising under a wide range of employee protection laws. The 
jurisdiction of the Board includes, but is not limited to, the following areas of law: 
environmental, transportation, and securities whistleblower protection; temporary 
immigration programs; child labor; employment discrimination; job training; and 
federal construction and service contracts. The Board’s cases generally arise on 





determinations by the Administrator of the Department’s Wage and Hour 
Division. Depending upon the statute at issue, parties may appeal the Board’s 
decisions to federal district or appellate courts and ultimately to the United States 
Supreme Court. The mission of the Board is to do justice under the law by 
rendering legally correct and well-reasoned appellate decisions in a timely and 
efficient manner, treating all those who come before the Board fairly and 
impartially (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).” 
 
5. Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records 
a. Home agency: Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense 
b. Subject area: correcting records of airmen 
c. Mission statement: “The AFBCMR, established under Section 1552, Title 10, 
United States Code, is the highest level of administrative review within the 
Department of the Air Force. As such, applicants must first exhaust available 
administrative avenues of relief before applying to the AFBCMR. Otherwise, the 
Board will deny the case on that basis. The AFBCMR bases its decision on the 
evidence contained in the case file. The case file consists of military records, an 
advisory from the Office of Primary Responsibility and statements, arguments 
and documents provided by the applicant. The burden of proof of either error or 
injustice rests with the applicant. The AFBCMR’s decision is final and conclusive 
(Air Force Personnel Center n.d.).” 
 
 
6. Army Review Boards Agency 
a. Home agency: Department of the Army, Department of Defense 
b. Subject area: various Army personnel issues 
c. Mission statement: “The Army Review Boards Agency, acting on behalf of the 
Secretary of the Army, operating through Civilian and Military professionals, 
adjudicates Soldiers' and Veterans' cases in an impartial manner, ensuring each 
decision is fair, just and equitable, recognizing outcomes affect individual careers, 
livelihood, and public safety. Provide oversight of the Army Corrections system 
(U.S. Army n.d.).” 
 
7. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
a. Home agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
b. Subject area: nuclear industry disputes 
c. Mission statement: “The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) is 
the independent trial-level adjudicatory body of the NRC. Acting on behalf of the 





contested issues that arise in the course of licensing and enforcement proceedings 
regarding nuclear reactors and the civilian use of materials in the United States; 
and (2) uncontested hearings regarding matters such as the construction of 
uranium enrichment facilities. As such, the ASLBP fulfills both the NRC's 
obligation to afford the public and those subject to agency enforcement actions an 
opportunity to challenge proposed licensing and enforcement activities as 
required by Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and its responsibility 
under AEA Sections 189(a) and 193 to conduct a public hearing regarding the 
construction of certain types of facilities, even if there is not a challenge by any 
affected person or entity. These hearings are conducted in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's implementing regulations, 
set forth at 10 CFR Part 2. A unique feature of the ASLBP that distinguishes it 
from similar federal regulatory or administrative tribunals is that each Licensing 
Board ordinarily is comprised of three administrative judges, usually consisting of 
one attorney skilled in the conduct of administrative hearings and two experts in 
scientific or technical areas relevant to the subject matter of the dispute. This 
scientific enhancement of the adjudicatory function is statutorily mandated by 
Section 191 of the AEA (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission n.d.).” 
 
 
8. Benefit Review Board 
a. Home agency: Department of Labor 
b. Subject area: worker’s compensation 
c. Mission statement: “The U.S. Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board was 
created by Congress in 1972 to review appeals of administrative law judges’ 
decisions arising under the Black Lung Benefits Act, Title IV of the Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §901 et seq., and the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq., and its extensions, including 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1331 et seq., the Defense Base 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1651 et seq., and the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities 
Act, 5 U.S.C. §8171 et seq. The Board has authority to resolve appeals under 
these statutes, filed by any party-in-interest, which raise a substantial question of 
law or fact, and it reviews the decisions of administrative law judges in order to 
determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and are in 
accordance with law. The Board’s decisions may be appealed to the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals in the circuit where the injury arose, and from there to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The Board, by statute, consists of five Members appointed by the 
Secretary of Labor, one of whom is designated as Chairman and Chief 
Administrative Appeals Judge (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).” 





a. Home agency: Department of Labor 
b. Subject area: employment visa denial review 
c. Mission statement: “The Secretary of Labor is responsible under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act for administering labor certification and attestation programs 
which are generally designed to ensure that the admission of foreign workers into 
the United States on a permanent or temporary basis will not adversely affect the 
job opportunities, wages, and working conditions of U.S. workers (U.S. 
Department of Labor n.d.).” 
 
10. Board of Contract Appeals 
a. Home agency: United States Postal Service 
b. Subject area: contract disputes with Post Offices 
c. Mission statement: “The Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals has 
jurisdiction to consider and decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting 
officer of the United States Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory Commission 
relative to a contract made by either (United States Postal Service n.d.).” 
 
11. Board for Corrections of Military Records of the Coast Guard 
a. Home agency: Department of the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security 
b. Subject area: correcting records of Coast Guard members 
c. Mission statement: “The Board for Correction of Military Records (BCMR) of the 
Coast Guard is a board of civilians within the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, which has authority under Title 10, Section 1552, of the United States 
Code (10 U.S.C. Â§ 1552) to review and correct the personnel records of current 
and former members of the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. Such records 
include, but are not limited to, records regarding discharges, reenlistment codes, 
disciplinary matters, performance evaluations, selection for promotion, 
advancement, retirement, dates of service, disability ratings, medals, and various 
bonuses and benefits (United States Coast Guard n.d.).”  
 
12. Board for Correction of Naval Records 
a. Home agency: Department of the Navy, Department of Defense 
b. Subject area: correcting records of Naval officers 
c. Mission statement: “The United States Navy's Board for Correction of Naval 
Records (BCNR) is committed to providing current and former Navy and Marine 
Corps members the highest level of administrative review within the Navy to 
correct errors or injustices to their records (Department of the Navy n.d.).” 





a. Home agency: Department of Veterans Affairs 
b. Subject area: veterans’ benefits  
c. Mission statement: “The Board of Veterans’ Appeals is an agency within the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Its mission is to conduct hearings and issue 
timely decisions for Veterans and other appellants in compliance with the law, 38 
United States Code § 7101(a). The Board is responsible for making final 
decisions on behalf of the Secretary regarding appeals for Veterans’ benefits and 
services from all three administrations: Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), 
Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and National Cemetery Administration 
(NCA), as well as the Office of General Counsel (OGC) that are presented to the 
Board for appellate review. The Board’s jurisdiction extends to all questions in a 
matter involving a decision by the Secretary under the law that affects a provision 
of benefits by the Secretary to Veterans, their dependents, or their survivors. Final 
decisions on appeals are made by the Board based on the entire record in the 
proceeding and all applicable provisions of law and regulation (Department of 
Veteran Affairs n.d.).” 
 
 
14. Bureau of Hearings and Appeals 
a. Home agency: Railroad Retirement Board 
b. Subject area: appeals from retirement benefit determinations 
c. Mission statement: “Persons claiming retirement, disability, survivor, 
unemployment, or sickness benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) 
have the right to appeal unfavorable determinations on their claims (U.S. Railroad 
Retirement Board n.d.).” 
 
 
15. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals 
a. Home agency: General Services Administration 
b. Subject area: disputes between government contractors 
c. Mission statement: “The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) is an 
independent tribunal housed within the General Services Administration. The 
CBCA presides over various disputes involving Federal executive branch 
agencies. Its primary responsibility is to resolve contract disputes between 
government contractors and agencies under the Contract Disputes Act. For a full 
discussion of the CBCA and its jurisdiction and history, please see About The 
Board (General Services Administration n.d.).” 
 
 





a. Home agency: Department of Health and Human Services 
b. Subject area: benefits appeals 
c. Mission statement: “The Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) provides impartial, 
independent review of disputed decisions in a wide range of Department 
programs under more than 60 statutory provisions. The DAB generally issues the 
final decision for the Department, which may then be appealed to federal court. 
The DAB may issue a recommended decision for action by another official. The 
DAB has three broad areas of jurisdiction each with its own set of judges and 
staff. The DAB also has a leadership role in implementing Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) across the Department since the DAB Chair is the designated 
Dispute Resolution Specialist under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1996. DAB staff include trained mediators and facilitators. The DAB's ADR 
responsibilities include providing ADR services and training and coordinating and 
facilitating negotiated rulemaking committees. The DAB resolves disputes with 
outside parties such as state agencies, Head Start grantees, universities, nursing 
homes, doctors, and Medicare beneficiaries. In a single year, disputes heard by the 
DAB may involve as much as $1 billion in federal grant funds (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services n.d.).” 
 
 
17. Departmental Cases Hearings Division 
a. Home agency: Department of the Interior 
b. Subject area: resource management 
c. Mission statement: “The Departmental Cases Hearings Division serves as the 
Department's administrative trial court for cases involving lands and resources 
under the Department's jurisdiction. Through formal hearings conducted by 
administrative law judges under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Division 
decides grazing appeals, surface coal mining cases, civil penalty assessments 
under various wildlife and resource protection laws, certain cases involving the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), disputed issues 
of material fact with respect to conditions and prescriptions in hydropower 
licenses, and contests of mining claims, Alaska Native allotment applications, and 
other asserted interests in Federal land. The Division also conducts hearings on 
other matters upon request from a bureau or office, an OHA appeals board, or the 
Director. Examples include adjudications pertaining to oil and gas leases, rights-








18. Division of Enforcement 
a. Home agency: Securities and Exchange Commission 
b. Subject area: investor protection 
c. Mission statement: “The Division of Enforcement was created in August 1972 to 
consolidate enforcement activities that previously had been handled by the 
various operating divisions at the Commission's headquarters in Washington. The 
Commission's enforcement staff conducts investigations into possible violations 
of the federal securities laws, and litigates the Commission's civil enforcement 
proceedings in the federal courts and in administrative proceedings (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission n.d.).” 
 
19. Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 
a. Home agency: Department of Labor 
b. Subject area: worker’s compensation 
c. Mission statement: “The Board's mission is to hear and decide cases on appeal 
from decisions of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) in an 
impartial and expeditious manner. The decisions of the Board are made in 
accordance with its statutory mandate, based on a thorough review of the case 
record as compiled by OWCP. Injured federal workers have the opportunity for a 
full evidentiary hearing with OWCP's Branch of Hearings and Review prior to 
review of the record by the Board (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).”  
 
20. Environmental Appeals Board 
a. Home agency: Environmental Protection Agency 
b. Subject area: environmental sanction disputes 
c. Mission statement: “The Appeals Board, which is located within the Office of 
Administration and Resources Management, is the final Agency decision maker 
on administrative appeals under all major environmental statutes that the Agency 
administers. The EAB hears permit and civil penalty appeals in accordance with 
regulations delegating this authority from the EPA Administrator. Appeals from 
permit decisions made by EPA's Regional Administrators (and in some cases, 
state permitting officials) may be filed either by permittees or other interested 
persons. A substantial additional portion of the EAB's caseload consists of 
petitions for reimbursement of costs incurred in complying with cleanup orders 
issued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The EAB decides these matters pursuant to a 
delegation of authority from the Administrator. The EAB is also authorized to 
hear appeals from various administrative decisions under the Clean Air Act's acid 





operating permits issued pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Part 71. More information about 
the EAB (United States Environmental Protection Agency n.d.).” 
 
 
21. Executive Office of Immigration Review (BIA) 
a. Home agency: Department of Justice 
b. Subject area: immigration 
c. Mission statement: “The primary mission of the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) is to adjudicate immigration cases by fairly, expeditiously, and 
uniformly interpreting and administering the Nation's immigration laws. Under 
delegated authority from the Attorney General, EOIR conducts immigration court 
proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings (United States 
Department of Justice n.d.).” 
 
 
22. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
a. Home agency: Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
b. Subject area: mine and miner safety 
c. Mission statement: “The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission is 
an independent adjudicative agency that provides administrative trial and 
appellate review of legal disputes arising under the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act)....Most cases deal with civil penalties assessed 
against mine operators and address whether the alleged safety and health 
violations occurred as well as the appropriateness of proposed penalties. Other 
types of cases include orders to close a mine, miners' charges of safety related 
discrimination and miners' requests for compensation after the mine is idled by a 
closure order (Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission n.d.).” 
 
 
23. Federal Services Impasses Panel 
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Authority 
b. Subject area: labor disputes within federal government 
c. Mission statement: “The Panel resolves impasses between federal agencies and 
unions representing federal employees arising from negotiations arising under the 
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and the Federal Employees 
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act.  If bargaining between the parties, 
followed by mediation assistance, does not result in a voluntary agreement, then 
either party or the parties jointly may request the Panel's assistance (U.S. Federal 






24. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 
a. Home agency: Department of Justice 
b. Subject area: claims by American citizens against foreign governments 
c. Mission statement: “The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United 
States (FCSC) is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the Department of 
Justice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments, 
under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, pursuant to international claims 
settlement agreements, or at the request of the Secretary of State. Funds for 
payment of the Commission's awards are derived from congressional 
appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in 
the United States by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury (United States 
Department of Justice n.d.).” 
 
25. Foreign Service Grievance Board 
a. Home agency: Department of State 
b. Subject area: disputes arising from foreign service 
c. Mission statement: “On March 26, 1976 Congress amended the Foreign Service 
Act of 1946 to establish a permanent grievance system.  Although it retained 
many of the procedures of the earlier, interim system, the statutory system carried 
additional functions and authority.  In particular, the new Board could order the 
suspension of agency actions pending the Board's decision in cases involving the 
separation or disciplining of an employee if it considered such action warranted.  
Further, the Board's recommendations to an agency head could be rejected only if 
they "would be contrary to law, would adversely affect the foreign policy or 
security of the United States, or would substantially impair the efficiency of the 
service (Department of State n.d.)."  
 
26. Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel 
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Agency 
b. Subject area: collective bargaining for foreign service employees 
c. Mission statement: “Created under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. §§ 
4101-4118, the Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel assists in resolving 
impasses arising in the course of collective bargaining under the Act over 
conditions of employment affecting Foreign Service employees working for the 
U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (formerly the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)), the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. The Act provides that the Chairperson of the 





Chairman – appoints the five Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel members, 
and requires that it be composed of two members of the Foreign Service (who are 
not management officials, confidential employees, or labor organization officials); 
one member of the Federal Service Impasses Panel; one individual employed by 
the U.S. Department of Labor; and one public member who does not hold any 
other office or position in the government (U.S. Federal Labor Relations 
Authority n.d.).” 
 
27. Foreign Service Labor Relations Board 
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Authority 
b. Subject area: labor management for foreign service employees 
c. Mission statement: “Created under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. §§ 
4101-4118, the Foreign Service Labor Relations Board (the FSLRB) administers 
the labor-management relations program for Foreign Service employees working 
for the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (formerly the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)), the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. Federal Labor Relations Authority n.d.).” 
 
 
28. Interior Board of Indian Appeals 
a. Home agency: Department of the Interior 
b. Subject area: disputes arising out of Board of Indian Affairs regulations 
c. Mission statement: “The Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) is an appellate 
review body that exercises the delegated authority of the Secretary of the Interior 
to issue final decisions for the Department of the Interior in appeals involving 
Indian matters. Located within the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals, 
IBIA is separate and independent from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the 
Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs (U.S. Department of the Interior n.d.).” 
 
 
29. Interior Board of Land Appeals 
a. Home agency: Department of the Interior 
b. Subject area: disputes arising out of various Interior regulations 
c. Mission statement: “The Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) is an appellate 
review body that exercises the delegated authority of the Secretary of the Interior 
to issue final decisions for the Department of the Interior. Its administrative 
judges decide appeals from bureau decisions relating to the use and disposition of 
public lands and their resources, mineral resources on the Outer Continental 





Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Located within the Department's Office of 
Hearings and Appeals, IBLA is separate and independent from the Bureaus and 
Offices whose decisions it reviews (U.S. Department of the Interior n.d.).” 
 
30. International Trade Commision 
a. Home agency: United States International Trade Commission 
b. Subject area: trade 
c. Mission statement: “The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC or 
Commission) pursues its mission in three areas of U.S. international trade: 
adjudication, research and analysis, and maintaining the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule. The Commission investigates and makes determinations in proceedings 
involving imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S. 
intellectual property rights; provides independent analysis and information on 
tariffs, trade and competitiveness; and maintains the U.S. tariff schedule (United 
States International Trade Commission n.d.).” 
 
31. Investigations and Hearings Division 
a. Home agency: Federal Communications Commission 
b. Subject area: communications 
c. Mission statement: “The Investigations & Hearings Division is responsible for 
resolution of complaints against broadcast stations and other Title III licensees on 
non-technical matters such as indecency, enhanced underwriting, unauthorized 
transfer of control and misrepresentation. In addition, with regard to wireless 
licensees, the Division is responsible for enforcement of rules regarding auction 
collusion and misrepresentation. The Division also investigates industry 
allegations of violations of Title II of the Communications Act, as amended, and 
FCC rules and policies pertaining to common carriers. In addition, the Division 
conducts, or assists in, various other investigations being conducted by the Bureau 
and serves as trial staff in formal Commission hearings (Federal Communications 
Commission n.d.).” 
 
32. Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board 
a. Home agency: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of 
Health and Human Services 
b. Subject area: rezoning Medicare providers 
c. Mission statement: “The Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board 
("MGCRB" or "Board") makes determinations on geographic reclassification 





payment system ("IPPS") but wish to reclassify to a higher wage area for 
purposes of receiving a higher payment rate.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10) and 
42 C.F.R. § 412.230 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services n.d.).” 
 
33. Merit Systems Protection Board 
a. Home agency: Merit Systems Protection Board 
b. Subject area: government employee rights protection 
c. Mission statement: “The mission of the MSPB is to "Protect the Merit System 
Principles and promote an effective Federal workforce free of Prohibited 
Personnel Practices." MSPB's vision is "A highly qualified, diverse Federal 
workforce that is fairly and effectively managed, providing excellent service to 
the American people." MSPB's organizational values are Excellence, Fairness, 
Timeliness, and Transparency. MSPB carries out its statutory responsibilities and 
authorities primarily by adjudicating individual employee appeals and by 
conducting merit systems studies. In addition, MSPB reviews the significant 
actions of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to assess the degree to 
which those actions may affect merit (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board n.d.).” 
 
34. National Appeals Office 
a. Home agency: National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce 
b. Subject area: fisheries disputes 
c. Mission statement: “NOAA Fisheries National Appeals Office provides 
administrative appeals services, conducts administrative inquiries, and manages 
Freedom of Information Act requests. NOAA Fisheries adjudicates appeals of 
persons affected by initial administrative determinations, including those related 
to the implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration n.d.).” 
 
 
35. National Labor Relations Board 
a. Home agency: National Labor Relations Board 
b. Subject area: labor disputes 
c. Mission statement: “The NLRB is an independent federal agency enforcing the 
National Labor Relations Act, which guarantees the right of most private sector 
employees to organize, to engage in group efforts to improve their wages and 
working conditions, to determine whether to have unions as their bargaining 





activities. It acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices committed by 
private sector employers and unions (National Labor Relations Board n.d.).” 
 
36. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
a. Home agency: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
b. Subject area: disputes over private-sector pensions 
c. Mission statement: “The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protects 
the retirement incomes of over 35 million American workers in private-sector 
defined benefit pension plans. A defined benefit plan provides a specified 
monthly benefit at retirement, often based on a combination of salary and years of 
service. PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 to encourage the continuation and maintenance of private-sector defined 
benefit pension plans, provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension 
benefits, and keep pension insurance premiums at a minimum (Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation n.d.).” 
 
37. Postal Regulatory Commission 
a. Home agency: Postal Regulatory Commission 
b. Subject area: oversight of the U.S. Postal Service 
c. Mission statement: “The Commission is an independent agency that has exercised 
regulatory oversight over the Postal Service since its creation by the Postal 
Reorganization Act of 1970, with expanded responsibilities under the Postal 
Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (Postal Regulatory Commission 
n.d.).” 
 
38. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
a. Home agency: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (with oversight 
provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission) 
b. Subject area: public company audits 
c. Mission statement: “The PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation established by 
Congress to oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect investors 
and the public interest by promoting informative, accurate, and independent audit 
reports. The PCAOB also oversees the audits of brokers and dealers, including 
compliance reports filed pursuant to federal securities laws, to promote investor 







39. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
a. Home agency: Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
b. Subject area: workplace safety 
c. Mission statement: “The mission of the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission is to provide fair and timely adjudication of workplace safety and 
health disputes between the Department of Labor and employers. In doing this, 
the Commission plays a vital role in encouraging safe and healthy workplaces for 
American workers. The cases in which the Review Commission renders decisions 
arise from inspections conducted by a Federal agency separate from the Review 
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which 
is a part of the Department of Labor. OSHRC, or the Review Commission, and 
OSHA were created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, but the 
Act mandated that the Review Commission be an independent agency (i.e., not 
part of another Federal department) to ensure that parties to agency cases receive 
impartial hearings (Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission n.d.).” 
 
 
40. Office of Administrative Adjudication 
a. Home agency: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
b. Subject area: consumer protection   
c. Mission statement: “Administrative adjudication proceedings are formal 
adversarial proceedings conducted by an administrative law judge, who issues a 
recommended decision to the CFPB director. The director issues a final decision, 
either adopting or modifying the administrative law judge’s recommended 
decision. The Bureau initiates an administrative adjudication proceeding by filing 
a Notice of Charges alleging a violation of a consumer protection statute 
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau n.d.).” 
 
41. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice 
b. Subject area: drug enforcement regulation 
c. Mission statement: “The Administrative Law Judges at the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges (LJ) conduct formal hearings in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq) in connection with 
enforcement and regulatory cases brought by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801, et 







42. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Department of Labor 
b. Subject area: general labor concerns 
c. Mission statement: “OALJ’s mission is to provide a neutral forum to resolve 
labor-related administrative disputes before the Department of Labor in a fair, 
transparent and accessible manner, and to promptly issue sound decisions correct 
in law and fact. Department of Labor ALJs adjudicate complaints and claims in a 
wide variety of cases. Cases where individuals seek benefits under the Black 
Lung Benefits Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and 
the Defense Base Act constitute the largest part of the office’s workload. ALJs 
also hear and decide cases arising from over 80 other labor-related statutes, 
Executive Orders, and regulations, including such diverse subjects as: 
whistleblower complaints involving corporate fraud and violations of 
transportation, environmental and food safety statutes; alien labor certifications; 
actions involving the working conditions of migrant farm laborers; grants 
administration relating to preparation of workers and job seekers to attain needed 
skills and training; prohibition of workplace discrimination by government 
contractors; minimum wage disputes; child labor violations; mine safety 
variances; OSHA formal rulemaking proceedings; federal contract disputes; civil 
fraud in federal programs; certain recordkeeping required by ERISA; and 
standards of conduct in union elections (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).” 
 
 
43. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Environmental Protection Agency 
b. Subject area: environmental enforcement 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) is an 
independent office in EPA's Office of Mission Support. The Administrative Law 
Judges conduct hearings and render decisions in proceedings between the EPA 
and persons, businesses, government entities, and other organizations that are, or 
are alleged to be, regulated under environmental laws (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency n.d.).” 
 
44. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Federal Communication Commission 
b. Subject area: communication 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) of the 
Federal Communications Commission is responsible for conducting the hearings 
ordered by the Commission. The hearing function includes acting on interlocutory 





issues, and contested discovery requests (Federal Communications Commission 
n.d.).” 
 
45. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
b. Subject area: energy regulation 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Litigation litigates or otherwise 
resolves cases set for hearing. The lawyers & technical staff in this Office 
represent the public interest and seek to litigate or settle cases in a timely, 
efficient and equitable manner while ensuring the outcomes are consistent with 
Commission policy. Resolve disputes through settlement by: Developing and 
serving on all parties objective settlement positions, or top sheets; Conducting or 
participating in settlement processes with energy industry officials, state 
commissions, customers and other intervening parties; and Assisting the 
settlement judge and parties to ensure agreements are consistent with Commission 
policy (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission n.d.).” 
 
46. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Authority 
b. Subject area: general labor concerns 
c. Mission statement: “FLRA Administrative Law Judges conduct hearings and 
issue recommended decisions on cases involving alleged unfair labor practices.  
Administrative Law Judges also render recommended decisions involving 
applications for attorney fees filed under the Back Pay Act and the Equal Access 
to Justice Act (U.S. Federal Labor Relations Authority n.d.).” 
 
 
47. Office of Administrative Law Judges  
a. Home agency: Federal Maritime Commission 
b. Subject area: shipping disputes 
c. Mission statement: “If a person or company is unable to settle a dispute that 
involves a possible violation of the Shipping Act, that person or company may file 
a complaint. The complaint will be referred to the Office of Administrative Law 
Judges (ALJ) (Federal Maritime Commission n.d.).” 
 
 
48. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: Federal Trade Commission 





c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Law Judges performs the initial 
adjudicative fact-finding in Commission administrative complaint proceedings, 
guided by the FTC Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, relevant case law 
interpreting these statutes, and the FTC's Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. Part 3. The 
administrative law judge assigned to handle each complaint issued by the 
Commission holds pre-hearing conferences; resolves discovery disputes, 
evidentiary disputes and procedural disputes; and conducts the full adversarial 
evidentiary hearing on the record.  The administrative law judge issues an initial 
decision which sets out relevant and material findings of fact with record 
citations, explains the correct legal standard, applies the law to the facts, and, 
where appropriate, issues an order on remedy (Federal Trade Commission n.d.).” 
 
 
49. Office of Administrative Law Judges 
a. Home agency: United States Postal Service 
b. Subject area: disputes arising under postal service legislation and Postmaster 
General regulations 
c. Mission statements: “The Judicial Officer and Office of Administrative Law 
Judges perform quasi-judicial duties as designated by the Postmaster General, 
applicable statutes and regulations. The Judicial Officer is the agency for the 
purposes of chapter 5 of Title 5, to the extent those functions are delegated to him 
by the Postmaster General (United States Postal Service n.d.).” 
 
 
50. Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 
a. Home agency: Department of Justice 
b. Subject area: oversight of immigration judges 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 
(OCAHO) is headed by a Chief Administrative Hearing Officer who is 
responsible for the general supervision and management of Administrative Law 
Judges who preside at hearings which are mandated by provisions of law enacted 
in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA (PDF)) and the 
Immigration Act of 1990 (PDF). These acts, among others, amended the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) (U.S. Department of Justice 
n.d.).” 
 
51. Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
a. Home agency: Social Security Administration 





c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings Operations (OHO) and the Office of 
Analytics, Review, and Oversight (OARO) are responsible for holding hearings, 
issuing decisions, and reviewing post-hearing appeals for claims filed under Titles 
II and XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended. Headquartered in Falls 
Church, Virginia, and Baltimore, Maryland, these components make up one of the 
largest administrative adjudication systems in the world (Social Security 
Administration n.d.).” 
 
52. Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition 
a. Home agency: Federal Aviation Commission, Department of Transportation 
b. Subject area: aviation acquisition 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA) is 
the sole, statutorily designated tribunal for all contract disputes and bid protests 
under the FAA's Acquisition Management System. The ODRA dispute resolution 
process recognizes that it is in the best interests of the FAA and its private sector 
business partners to work collaboratively to avoid and, where possible, voluntarily 
resolve acquisition-related controversies in a timely and fair manner. To that end, 
consistent with its statutory mandate, the ODRA uses a variety of dispute 
avoidance and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques to the maximum 
extent practicable. For those matters that cannot be avoided or resolved through 
the use of ADR, the ODRA provides a flexible and efficient adjudication process 
under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act (United States 
Department of Transportation n.d.).” 
 
 
53. Office of Employment Discrimination Complaint Adjudication 
a. Home agency: Department of Veterans Affairs 
b. Subject area: employment disputes in VA settings 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Employment Discrimination and Complaint 
Adjudication (OEDCA) is an independent Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
adjudicatory authority created by Congress. Established in February 1998, 
OEDCA’s mission is to objectively review the merits of employment 
discrimination claims filed by present and former VA employees and non-agency 
applicants for employment (U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs n.d.).” 
 
54. Office of Financial Institution Adjudication 
a. Home agency: The Federal Reserve System 





c. Mission statement: “ The Office of Financial Institution Adjudication (OFIA) is 
an inter-agency group of administrative law judges (ALJs), established pursuant 
to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 
that presides over administrative enforcement proceedings brought by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), 
or the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and issues recommended 
decisions to the relevant agency head (Office of Financial Institutional 
Adjudication n.d.).” 
 
55. Office of Hearings 
a. Home agency: Department of Transportation 
b. Subject area: various transportation disputes 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings (OH) is comprised of administrative 
law judges (ALJs) and support staff.  Its ALJs conduct official hearings under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.) within the US Department 
of Transportation where formal APA hearings are required, including: air carrier 
citizenship determinations; fairness of airport landing rates and charges. OH ALJs 
also conduct hearings in civil penalty proceedings in cases including: 
discrimination against passengers; violation of travel agent regulations; improper 
shipment of hazardous materials; passenger misconduct on airlines; airlines' and 
motor carriers' failure to comply with regulations concerning inspection, 
maintenance, and hours of service (U.S. Department of Transportation n.d.).”  
 
 
56. Office of Hearings and Appeals 
a. Home agency: Department of Education 
b. Subject area: educational institutions 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings and Appeals hears cases arising 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA). These 
cases include actions initiated by the U.S. Department of Education to terminate 
the eligibility of institutions to participate in the Title IV, HEA programs; actions 
to fine institutions; audit and program review actions to recover allegedly 
misspent funds; emergency actions to immediately suspend funding of such 
institutions; and actions to debar certain individuals from participating in various 







57. Office of Hearings and Appeals 
a. Home agency: Department of Energy 
b. Subject area: all energy disputes except those arising under purview of Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is the quasi-
judicial arm of the Department of Energy that conducts hearings and issues initial 
Departmental decisions with respect to any adjudicative proceedings which the 
Secretary may delegate, except those within the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).  OHA jurisdiction principally includes 
Personnel Security Hearing Officer functions (10 CFR Part 710) and 
"whistleblower" complaints filed under the DOE Contractor Employee Protection 
Program (10 CFR Part 708). The Office also analyzes and decides appeals 
requesting review of determinations reached by officials within the Department 
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary, including initial determinations under the 
Freedom of Information Act, 10 CFR 1004.1, the Privacy Act, 10 CFR 1008, the 
payments-equal-to-taxes (PETT) provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, as amended, and the Alternative Fuels Transportation Program (10 CFR 
Part 490). In addition, OHA is responsible for deciding Applications for 
Exception from generally applicable requirements of a rule, regulation or order of 
the Department, and analyzes Petitions for Special Redress seeking "extraordinary 
relief" apart from or in addition to any other remedy provided in the Department’s 
enabling statutes. Within OHA resides the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office 
whose mission is to promote the use of conflict management and alternative 
dispute resolution techniques at all levels of the DOE complex (Department of 
Energy n.d.).” 
 
58. Office of Hearings and Appeals 
a. Home agency: Small Business Administration 
b. Subject area: disputes arising from SBA programs 
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an 
independent office of the Small Business Administration (SBA) established in 
1983 to provide an independent, quasi-judicial appeal of certain SBA program 
decisions. OHA hears the following appeals: size determinations; contracting 
officer designations of North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
codes on federal contracts; eligibility determinations for Service-Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Small Business Concerns (SDVO SBC); eligibility of Women-
Owned Small Businesses (WOSB); eligibility of Economically Disadvantaged 
WOSB (EDWOSB); and 8(a)BD eligibility determinations, suspensions and 






59. Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals 
a. Home agency: Department of Health and Human Services 
b. Subject area: Medicare claims 
c. Mission statement: “OMHA administers the nationwide Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) hearing program for appeals arising from individual claims for 
Medicare coverage and payment for items and services furnished to beneficiaries 
(or enrollees) under Medicare Parts A, B, C and D.  OMHA also hears appeals 
arising from claims for entitlement to Medicare benefits and disputes of Part B 
and Part D premium surcharges.  OMHA generally conducts the third level of a 
five-level appeals process, and operates separately from the other agencies 
involved in the Medicare claims appeal process (Department of Health and 
Human Services n.d.).” 
 
60. Provider Reimbursement Review Board 
a. Home agency: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of 
Health and Human Services  
b. Subject area: Medicare provider reimbursements 
c. Mission statement: “The Provider Reimbursement Review Board is an 
independent panel to which a certified Medicare provider of services may appeal 
if it is dissatisfied with a final determination by its Medicare contractor or by the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services n.d.).” 
 
61. Reparations Program 
a. Home agency: Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
b. Subject area: trading complaints 
c. Mission statement: “The Reparations Program is designed to provide an 
inexpensive, expeditious, fair, and impartial forum to handle customer 
complaints. The Program aims to resolve disputes between futures customers and 
commodity futures trading professionals. The transactions involved can include 
futures contracts, options on futures contracts or on physical commodities, and 
leverage contracts (Commodity Futures Trading Commission n.d.).” 
 
62. Surface Transportation Board 
a. Home agency: Surface Transportation Board 
b. Subject area: economic regulation of transportation 
c. Mission statement: “The Surface Transportation Board is an independent federal 





transportation, primarily freight rail. The STB exercises its statutory authority and 
resolves disputes in support of an efficient, competitive, and economically viable 
surface transportation network that meets the needs of its users (Surface 
Transportation Board n.d.).” 
 
63. Trademark Trial and Appeals Board 
a. Home agency: Patent and Trademark Office 
b. Subject area: trademark disputes 
c. Mission statement: “The TTAB is an administrative board that hears and decides 
adversary proceedings between two parties, namely, oppositions (party opposes a 
mark after publication in the Official Gazette) and cancellations (party seeks to 
cancel an existing registration). The TTAB also handles interference and 
concurrent use proceedings, as well as appeals of final refusals issued by USPTO 
Trademark Examining Attorneys within the course of the prosecution of 






Appendix B: Meta-Analysis of Content Analysis of Legal Opinions 
 
An analysis of the studies cited in Hall and Wright (2010) was conducted to craft the 
coding instrument used to evaluate the dyads of administrative court/court of appeals cases. I 
indicate whether the study is law-oriented (i.e. interpretive) or social science-oriented (i.e. 
empirical), the topic, the size of the sample (n), and a summary of the coding scheme used.  
 
1. Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and 
Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia (Cornell Law Review, 1998) 
a. Authors: Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, and Broffitt 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: death penalty and prosecutorial discretion 
d. N: 425 cases 
e. Coding details: used court documents (i.e. jury sheets, appellate record, etc.); used 
a coding scheme that addressed all potential reasons why a trial is decided the 
way it is (i.e. aggravating and mitigating factors) 
 
2. An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement (California Law 
Review, 2006) 
a. Author: Beebe 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: multifactor tests re: consumer confusion 
d. N: 331 cases 
e. Coding details: district court cases between 2000-2004; codes for general case 
details, topic within trademark law 
 
3. Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions: Applying the Social Background Model to a 
Celebrated Concern (Ohio State Law Journal, 1999) 
a. Authors: Brudney, Schiaroni, and Merritt 
b. Law/social science: both 
c. Topic: judicial decision making re: unfair labor practices 
d. N: 1224 cases 
e. Coding details: codes each National Labor Relations Act cases between 1986 and 






4. Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on Federal 
Courts of Appeals (Yale Law Journal, 1998) 
a. Authors: Cross and Tiller 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: partisanship and difference 
d. N: approximately 170 cases 
e. Coding details: all D.C. circuit cases citing Chevron between 1991 and 1995; 
coded for deference, upholding agency policy, direction of outcome, partisanship 
 
5.  “There is a Book Out…”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts 
(Harvard Law Review, 1987) 
a. Author: Davis 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: judicial use of facts 
d. N: 193 cases 
e. Coding details: used Lexis/Westlaw to search for cases where applicable theory 
was cited; coded on nine case-level variables 
 
6. Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions (Yale Law Journal, 1991) 
a. Author: Eskridge 
b. Law/social science: both 
c. Topic: override statutes 
d. N: 187 cases 
e. Coding details: identified all override activity using search terms in USCCAN 
between 1967 and 1990; codes case details 
 
7. Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation (American Bar 
Foundation Journal, 1980) 
a. Author: Franklin 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: defamation law 
d. N: 534 cases 
e. Coding details: identified cases with “libel” and “slander” tag in West reporter; 
coded for media parties 
 
8. Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design 
and Interpretation (Stanford Law Review, 2002) 
a. Authors: Grundfest and Pritchard 
b. Law/social science: law 





d. N: 167 cases 
e. Coding details: Lexis/Westlaw search; codes for different levels of adherence to 
doctrine 
 
9. But Do They Have to See It to Know It? The Supreme Court’s Obscenity and 
Pornography Decisions (Western Political Quarterly, 1991) 
a. Author: Hagle 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: judicial decision making re: obscenity and pornography cases in the 
Supreme Court 
d. N: 107 cases 
e. Coding details: Supreme Court Database search for obscenity/pornography cases; 
uses SCDB codes 
 
10. Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts (Columbia Law Review, 2002) 
a. Authors: Hammer and Sage 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: antitrust law and health care 
d. N: 542 cases 
e. Coding details: Lexis keyword search, winnowed out irrelevant cases; refer to 
appendix for extensive and explicit coding scheme 
 
11. Questioning the New Consensus on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Study (Columbia Law Review, 1998) 
a. Author: Hillman 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: promissory estoppel  
d. N: 362 cases  
e. Coding details: codes for general case details 
 
12. The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model 
(University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1996) 
a. Author: Johnston 
b. Law/social science: law  
c. Topic: fraud in business agreements 
d. N: 25 cases 
e. Coding details: codes for evidence of relationship between business partners, 







13. The Evolution of State Supreme Courts (Michigan Law Review, 1978) 
a. Authors: Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, and Wheeler 
b. Law/social science: both 
c. Topic: caseload details re: state high courts 
d. N: 5904 cases 
e. Coding details: stratified random sample of states; code categories: procedural 
history, parties, area of law, outcome, style of decision 
 
14. Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split (Virginia Law Review, 2002) 
a. Author: Kamin 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: death penalty in California Supreme Court and harmless error doctrine 
d. N: 281 cases 
e. Coding details: coded for case details (outcome, jurisprudential details) 
 
15. Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the 
“Right to Counsel” Cases (American Political Science Review, 1957) 
a. Author: Kort 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: right to counsel Supreme Court cases 
d. N: 28 cases 
e. Coding details: codes for pivotal factors in deciding rights to counsel cases (i.e. 
gravity of crime, procedural irregularities, etc.) 
 
16. Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories 
(Virginia Law Review, 2005) 
a. Authors: Krawiec and Zeiler 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: differential disclosures in common law relationships 
d. N: 466 cases 
e. Coding details: coded for type of transaction, undisclosed information to parties, 
behavior of parties 
 
17. The Influence of the Law in the Supreme Court’s Search and Seizure Jurisprudence 
(American Politics Research, 2005) 
a. Authors: Kritzer and Richards 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: judicial decision making re: search and seizure 





e. Coding details: uses Supreme Court Database codes and codes re: search and 
seizure from Segal’s 1986 Journal of Politics essay 
 
18. A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision Making: How Judges Use the Primary Caretaker 
Standard to Make a Custody Determination (William and Mary Journal of Women and 
the Law, 1998) 
a. Author: Mercer 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: maternal preference in custody cases 
d. N: 49 cases 
e. Coding details: codes for differentiation/generality of legal norms, formality of 
decision making, case details 
 
19. Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent (Yale Law Journal, 1992) 
a. Author: Merrill 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: deference doctrine 
d. N: 135 cases 
e. Coding details: all Supreme Court decisions from 1981-1990; superficial case-
level codes 
 
20. Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt 
Collection in Chapter 13 (American Bankruptcy Law Review, 1999) 
a. Author: Norberg 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
d. N: 71 cases 
e. Coding details: used final reports of each case, debtor’s plan for repayment; coded 
for dollar amount, other details about decision 
 
21. The Future of School Desegregation (Northwestern Law Review, 2000) 
a. Author: Parker 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: contemporary school desegregation cases 
d. N: 192 school districts 
e. Coding details: codes each opinion for outcome, time in jurisprudential history 
 
22.  A Theory of Negligence (Journal of Legal Studies, 1972) 
a. Author: Posner 





c. Topic: negligence in torts 
d. N: 1528 cases 
e. Coding details: one-thirtieth of all accident opinions during the defined period in 
appellate courts; coded for doctrinal approaches, facts of the case  
 
23. Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges 
to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit (NYU Law Review, 2001) 
a. Author: Revesz 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: agency cases in the D.C. Circuit 
d. N: 2144 votes 
e. Coding details: all cases decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals between 
1970 and 1996 re: health and safety; codes for case details 
 
24. Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit (Virginia Law Review, 1997) 
a. Author: Revesz 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: role of ideology and judicial decision making in D.C. Circuit 
d. N: approximately 250 cases with between 136 and 201 votes per period 
e. Coding details: coded for panel details, partisanship, nature of objections, nature 
of parties, outcome 
 
25. The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation: Implications for Legislative History Debate (Stanford Law Review, 1998) 
a. Author: Schacter 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: use of legislative history in statutory interpretation cases 
d. N: 45 cases 
e. Coding details: all opinions re: statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court’s 
1996 term; coded for use of legislative history, other resources judges use in 
statutory interpretation cases  
 
26. Jackson’s Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis (American Political 
Science Review, 1965) 
a. Author: Schubert 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: judicial decision making at the Supreme Court (values) 





e. Coding details: classified by type of decision, analyzed for value content; four 
types of variables: content, opinion, voting, chronology 
 
27. The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis (American Political 
Science Review, 1962) 
a. Author: Schubert 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: judicial decision making at the Supreme Court (psychology) 
d. N: 99 cases 
e. Coding details: vote matrix for each case for factor analysis  
 
28. Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology and Report on New Empirical Research 
(Administrative Law Review, 1990 
a. Authors: Schuck and Elliott 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: descriptive statistics on administrative appeals 
d. N: 1676 cases 
e. Coding details: coded on descriptive details of the cases (introducing a larger 
study) 
 
29. Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990 
(Stanford Law Review, 1992) 
a. Authors: Schuck and Wang 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: change in immigration litigation 
d. N: 792 cases 
e. Coding details: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals cases re: immigration in 1979, 1985, 
1989, 1990; coded for types of relief sought, success rates, how courts responded 
to appeal, Chevron 
 
30. Telling Stories About Women at Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the 
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument (Harvard Law 
Review, 1990) 
a. Author: Schultz 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: employment discrimination opinions 
d. N: 54 cases 
e. Coding details: coded appellate cases on rhetorical and outcome (evidence 






31. Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in 
Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation (University of Chicago Law Review, 1992) 
a. Authors: Schultz and Petterson 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: job discrimination cases 
d. N: 117 cases in original dataset; 1247 from American Bar Foundation database 
e. Coding details: codes for superficial case details 
 
32. Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning 
(NYU Law Review, 1998) 
a. Authors: Sisk, Heise, and Morriss 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: judicial decision making 
d. N: 293 judges  
e. Coding details: codes for judge demographics, case details 
 
33. The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law (Journal of Legal Studies, 
2002) 
a. Authors: Smith and Tiller 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: judicial instrument use in judicial decision making 
d. N: 251 cases 
e.  Coding details: Westlaw search in Courts of Appeals from 1981 to 1993; coded 
for case details, partisanship 
 
34. The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in the United States Supreme Court (Journal of 
Politics, 1960) 
a. Author: Ulmer 
b. Law/social science: social science 
c. Topic: relationships between Supreme Court justices 
d. N: 42 cases 
e. Coding details: votes for each case for matrices of voting patterns 
 
35. Is the Federal Court Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance 
(University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2004) 
a. Authors: Wagner and Petherbridge 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: patent cases in federal circuit 





e. Coding details: created a taxonomy of approaches to opinion writing 
 
36. Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2006) 
a. Author: Winkler 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: strict scrutiny 
d. N: 459 cases 
e. Coding details: coded to analyze strict scrutiny at both application and judge-
level; judge-level data includes demographic information 
 
37. Counting Cases About Milk, Our “Most Nearly Perfect” Food, 1860-1940 (Law and 
Society Review, 2002) 
a. Authors: Wright and Huck 
b. Law/social science: law 
c. Topic: health regulation in Progressive era 
d. N: 440 cases 






Appendix C: Coding Instrument 
 
For BIA cases: 
1. Name of case 
2. Citation 
Section 1: General Information 
1. Decision date 
2. Petitioner name 
3. Petitioner type 
a. BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States 
b. Immigrant 
c. Other 
4. Respondent type 
a. Immigrant 
b. Other 
5. Prior appellate activity (if applicable) 
6. Future appellate activity 
Section 2: Case Details 
1. Disposition of case 
a. Significant judgment/verdict for petitioner 
b. Significant judgment/verdict for respondent 
c. Remand with instructions 
d. Dismissed without disposition 
e. Other 
2. Remedy prescribed 
a. Change in party activity 















• If yes, does the case apply Chevron? 
c. Is there any reference to another deference scheme? (see Eskridge and Raso for 
details) 
4. Reason for decision 
a. Violation of statutory requirements 
b. Non-violation of statutory requirements 
c. Adequate factual support for petitioner 
d. Adequate factual support for respondent 
e. Inadequate factual support for petitioner 
f. Inadequate factual support for respondent 
5. Is the case per curiam? 
6. Is there a concurring opinion(s)? 
a. If yes, concurring Board member 
b. If yes, concurring Board member party 
7. Is there a dissenting opinion(s)? 
a. If yes, dissenting Board member 
b. If yes, concurring Board member party 
Section 3: Partisanship 
1. Attorney General  
2. President 
3. Partisanship of Attorney General and President 
4. Name of Board members 
5. Name of Board members’ appointing president 
6. Party of Board members’ appointing president 
7. Direction of opinion 
a. Pro-regulation of immigration  
b. Anti-regulation of immigration 
c. Other/mixed 
8. Overall partisanship of Board (operationalized by appointing Attorney General) 
9. Overall partisanship of contemporary Supreme Court (operationalized by appointing 
President) 
Section 4: Additional Case-Specific Codes 
1. Nation of origin 
2. Type of case 
a. Removal proceedings 
b. Bond redetermination hearings 





d. Withholding-only hearing 
e. Asylum-only hearing 
f. Credible fear review 
g. Claimed status review 
h. In absentia hearing 
i. Other 
3. Any additional notes 
 
For Court of Appeals cases 
1. Name of case 
2. Citation 
Section 1: General Information 
1. Decision date 
2. Circuit 
3. Petitioner name 
4. Respondent name 
5. Petitioner type 
a. BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States 
b. Immigrant 
c. Other 
6. Respondent type 
a. BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States 
b. Immigrant 
c. Other 
7. Prior appellate activity 
8. Future appellate activity (if any) 
Section 2: Case Details 
1. Appellate facts 
a. Appeal by petitioner 
b. Appeal by respondent 
c. Appeal by both parties 
2. Disposition of case 
a. Significant judgment/verdict for petitioner 
b. Significant judgment/verdict for respondent 
c. Remand with instructions 






3. Remedy prescribed 
a. Explicit application of Board’s remedy 




4. Temporal relationship to Chevron 
a. Pre-Chevron 
b. Post-Chevron 
• If yes, does the case apply Chevron? 
c. Is there any reference to another deference scheme? (see Eskridge and Raso for 
details) 
5. Reason for decision regarding the Board opinion 
a. Adequate fact-finding 
b. Inadequate fact-finding 
c. Adequate application of facts 
d. Inadequate application of facts 
e. Adequate application of statute 
f. Inadequate application of statute 
g. Adequate statutory interpretation 
h. Inadequate statutory interpretation 
i. Adequate application of doctrine 
j. Inadequate application of doctrine 
6. Standard of review 
a. De novo 
b. Beyond a reasonable doubt 
c. Clear and convincing evidence 
d. Preponderance of the evidence 
7. Is the decision per curiam? 
8. Is there a concurring opinion(s)? 
a. If yes, concurring judge(s) 
b. If yes, concurring judge(s) party 
9. Is there a dissenting opinion(s)? 
a. If yes, dissenting judge(s) 
b. If yes, concurring judge(s) party 
Section 3: Partisanship 
1. Attorney General  
2. President 





4. Name of judges on panel 
5. Name of judges’ appointing president 
6. Party of judges’ appointing president 
7. Direction of opinion 
a. Pro-regulation of immigration  
b. Anti-regulation of immigration 
c. Other/mixed 
8. Overall partisanship of circuit (operationalized by appointing president) 
9. Overall partisanship of contemporary Supreme Court (operationalized by appointing 
President) 
Section 4: Additional Case-Specific Codes 
1. Nation of origin 
2. Type of case 
a. Removal proceedings 
b. Bond redetermination hearings 
c. Rescission hearing 
d. Withholding-only hearing 
e. Asylum-only hearing 
f. Credible fear review 
g. Claimed status review 
h. In absentia hearing 
i. Other 






Appendix D: Details on and Examples of Codes 
 
Petitioner and Respondent Type 
I distinguish between different types of litigants for both BIA and courts of appeals cases. 
This requires some assumptions, particularly regarding the BIA cases. Most BIA cases take the 
form of In re Immigrant or Matter of Immigrant. Though the traditional Party v. Party form is 
not followed, we can intuit that if the case name followed convention, it would look like Agency 
v. Immigrant; this is because the BIA, in the vast majority of cases, is suing the immigrant for 
some sort of activity that necessitates removal. The majority of BIA cases, then, have 
“BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States” coded as the petitioner and 
“Immigrant” coded as the respondent.  
Court of Appeals cases are invariably more clear on petitioner and respondent. Since the 
majority of cases coming out of the BIA are appeals of an anti-immigrant position, the petitioner 
code is typically “Immigrant” and the corresponding respondent code is “BIA/INS/Attorney 
General/Department of Justice/United States”.  There are no cases in the dataset that do not have 
either code.  
 
Appellate Facts (for Courts of Appeals) 
Here I indicate who appealed the BIA case to the geographically-appropriate court of 
appeals. As aforementioned, the majority of dyads in this dataset include BIA cases where the 
immigrant was unsuccessful in their attempt to receive aid from the BIA and who then appealed 






There are no cases that are “appealed by both parties.” There are no instances where the 
first appeal to the appropriate court of appeals is appealed by the BIA et al; however, there are a 
handful of instances where the government appeals on the second appeal, almost always to the 
Supreme Court. Since I limit the focus of this dissertation to the courts of appeals, there are no 
cases coded as “appealed by BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States. 
 
Disposition 
This code provides a simple indication as to who was most successful in the case. The 
key here is most: I do not require that each case has one sole winner and one sole loser; instead I 
compare the extent to which each party was successful and indicated which party was more 
successful than the other. Fortunately most cases had one clear winner and one clear loser, but I 
indicate where this was not the case in the coding. All cases, then, include a code for “significant 




This is perhaps the most important code for it indicates what the court orders regarding 
what the BIA initially stated in the first case in the dyad. The two codes are “explicit application 
of ALC’s remedy and “explicit non-application of ALC’s remedy.” There is also an “other” 
category where non-explicit prescriptions can be coded. It is here that we are able to discern 
whether the case is an instance of active deference, inactive deference, inactive non-deference, 





code is inadequate for determining whether or not deference has occurred; instead the 
“disposition of case” code and the “remedy prescribed” code must be taken in tandem to 
determine deference.  
 
Example of Explicit Application 
In Barragan-Sanchez v. Rosenberg, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the 
appellant. Barragan-Sanchez, a Mexico native, was disallowed re-entry into the United States 
after she returned to Mexico while on a non-resident visa. She left the United States on two 
occasions and, during each exit, she was warned that her exit would lead to deportation pursuant 
to the rules of her visa. The BIA affirmed that her exits constituted a deportable offense, and the 
court begrudgingly agreed. (“Although we sympathize with petitioner's unfortunate position, we 
are compelled to uphold the decision of the Special Inquiry Officer as affirmed by the Appeals 
Board. Unfortunately for petitioner, we do not act as a court of equity (Barragan-Sanchez, 760.”) 
The majority of the court’s opinion was dedicated to applying the Board’s interpretation of the 
Fleuti doctrine. 
 
Example of Explicit Non-Application 
In Diallo v. INS, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellee. Diallo, a 
native of Mauritania, illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum out of fear of 
racial persecution in his home country. His asylum application was denied and he was thus 
referred to an immigration court to answer to a deportation order for his illegal entry. The Board 





Diallo cited in Mauritania was not dangerous enough to warrant asylum. The court, explicitly 
applying Chevron, ruled the opposite: though the Board’s interpretation of the Mauritania facts 
could be accurate, they do not explain why Diallo’s claims are insufficient. As a result, the court 
explicitly does not accept the Board’s approach to the Diallo situation and rule in favor of Diallo 
with a remand to the Board.   
 
Temporal Relationship to Chevron and Reference to Other Doctrine Schemes 
This code indicates whether or not a case’s opinion cites and/or applies Chevron doctrine. 
At first glance this appears to be a doctrine that only applies for cases decided after 1984; 
however Eskridge and Baer point to seven distinct deference doctrines that were implemented 
both before and after Chevron. The “pre-Chevron” and ”post-Chevron” codes are self-
explanatory and need no explication here, but if the “post-Chevron” code is indicated then I also 
determine whether or not the case applies Chevron, for just because a case occurs after Chevron 
that does not necessarily mean that the doctrine was applied. To code this, I do a text search for 
Chevron. If the text search elicits a Chevron reference, then I determine whether or not the case 
actively applies the doctrine. Those cases coded “Chevron non-application” are cases that are 
decided after 1984 that do not cite and/or apply Chevron.  
 
Example of Chevron Application 
In Nwozuzu v. Holder, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellee. Nwozuzu, 
originally from Nigeria though the parents of American citizens and present in the United States 





briefly leaving the United States to return to Nigeria and, thus, interrupting his presence in the 
United States. The Board claimed that Congress did not speak explicitly to this particularly 
circumstance. The Court disagreed wholeheartedly, citing Chevron and discussing their role 
pursuant to it. They argued that Congress did, in fact, explicitly discuss this issue and, in so 
doing, concluded that individuals like Nwozuzu were eligible for citizenship.  
 
Further, I code for whether the case refers to another non-Chevron deference doctrine as 
defined by Eskridge and Baer: Curtiss-Wright deference, Seminole Rock deference, Beth Israel 
deference, Skidmore deference, consultative deference (Smith v. City of Jackson), or 
antideference (PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin). This is also done through a text search of the opinion. 
Almost every case does not reference another doctrine besides Chevron: only one case cites 
another decision (Skidmore) but it is not applied. 
 
Reason for Decision 
This is by far the most complicated and subjective code and it required an extremely 
close reading of the text of the opinion to discern. In short, I code for why the case was decided 
as it was. This code varies across BIA and courts of appeals cases, and I will disaggregate all 
types here. Almost all cases include at least two codes. 
 
BIA: Violation of Statutory Requirements 
In cases where this was indicated, I (1) determine whether the immigrant was successful 





reason. This generally means that the immigrant was in violation of the INA or IIRIRA, 
oftentimes because of illegal entry or criminal activity that can lead to deportation. Since most 
cases before the BIA have outcomes that rule against the immigrant, there are very few cases 
coded as “non-violation of statutory requirements.” 
 
Example of Violation 
In In Re Gadda, the Board ruled against Gadda. Gadda, an attorney who litigates 
immigration cases, was disbarred for “egregious and repeated acts of professional misconduct” 
by the Supreme Court of California. Even so, he continued to represent clients before the Board, 
arguing that since the Supreme Court of California is a state-level disbarment it has no 
implications on his ability to litigate before administrative courts. The Board disagreed, arguing 
that by Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations the Board has the authority to sanction 
attorneys as a result of disbarment proceedings in state courts. 
 
BIA: (In)adequate Factual Support for Petitioner or for Respondent 
These codes, though imperfect, offer a means for understanding who was the party at 
fault that led to the outcome of the decision. In short: 
 
1. If the agency acted correctly leading to an anti-immigrant decision, then there was 





In In Re Blake, the Board ruled against Blake. Blake, a lawful permanent resident from an 
unnamed country, was convicted of sexual assault of a minor in violation of the New York Penal 
Code. He pleaded guilty and was called before an immigration court for removal to his home 
country. He requested a waiver allowing him to stay in the United States and when his request 
was unsuccessful he appealed to the BIA. In their decision, the Board affirmed the Immigration 
Judge’s decision regarding the waiver, arguing that the waiver Blake requested is only available 
in very narrow situations and that Blake’s context was not included.  
 
2. If the agency acted incorrectly leading to a pro-immigrant decision, then there was 
inadequate factual support for the petitioner. 
In Marino v. INS, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellant. 
Marino, an Italian national, was admitted to the United States as a non-resident visitor and later 
applied for an adjustment of status to permanent resident. His petition was denied due to 
conviction in Italy of “fraudulent destruction of his own property.” On appeal, he argued that his 
crime was not one of moral turpitude and that the BIA ruled incorrectly due to a misapplication 
of the facts of his Italian crime. The court agreed, stating that by not exhausting his appeals in 
Italy the facts of the case have not been fully vetted and verified. Any conclusions drawn from 
the facts by the BIA, then, are not conclusive.  
 
3. If the immigrant acted correctly leading to a pro-immigrant decision, then there was 





In Matter of Hill, the INS appealed a decision in favor of Hill, an English national, who 
was ultimately unsuccessful before the Board. Hill voluntarily admitted to being a “practicing 
homosexual” when he was examined upon arrival in San Francisco. Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, homosexuality was prohibited among immigrants out of concerns for public 
health. The Board found that the Immigration Judge misapplied the facts of the case to allow 
Hill’s entry and sustained the appeal. Though the immigrant was ultimately unsuccessful in this 
case, the Board ruled against the immigration court which constitutes this code.  
 
4. If the immigrant acted incorrectly leading to an anti-immigrant decision, then there was 
inadequate factual support for the respondent. 
In Matter of Gonzalez De Lara, the Board ruled against Gonzalez De Lara, a Mexican 
national convicted of marijuana possession. Gonzalez De Lara argued that his status as a child of 
a United States citizen even though she did not know the exact location of her birth and the fact 
that she did not obtain her citizenship certification until she was in her thirties. The Board picked 
up on some inconsistencies in Gonzalez De Lara’s argument (i.e. that his mother’s marriage 
certificate stated her birth location) that indicated that the claims of his mother’s unknown 
citizenship were facetious and that, as a result, he was an alien who was eligible for deportation 
after his possession charge.  
 
Rationales for Circuit Court Cases 
The Courts of Appeals codes exclusively focus on the facts of the decision as they relate 





the administrative court made their decision in the first case of the dyad. As with the BIA codes, 
most cases have at least two codes indicated.   
 
Court of Appeals (CA): (In)adequate Application of Facts 
The courts of appeals have de novo discretion to review the facts of a case on appeal. 
This code captures whether the BIA correctly or incorrectly used the facts of the case correctly in 
order to draw conclusions regarding the case at hand. When this code is used, two things 
generally occur: the court state this very early in the decision, and the decisions are relatively 
short.  
 
Example of Adequate Application 
In Von Pervieux v. INS, the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellant. 
The Von Pervieux family, originally from Argentina, sought to overstay their travel visa to 
remain permanently in the United States. On appeal from an anti-Von Pervieux decision, the 3rd 
Circuit actively affirmed, under Chevron, that the facts extolled in the Board decision clearly 
indicated that the Von Pervieux family, no matter their claims to the contrary, intended to 









Example of Inadequate Application 
In McMullen v. INS, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellee. 
McMullen, an Irish national and IRA defector, sought refuge in the United States to avoid 
persecution and probable death at the hands of the IRA. When he relayed his story to the BIA, he 
was met with skepticism that his situation was as dire as he suggested. The Board, in particular, 
based their opinion on the fact that McMullen, under extant evidentiary rules, was responsible 
for bearing the burden of proof and fell short of proving his case. The 9th Circuit disagreed with 
this conclusion, stating that just because an immigrant may be tempted to lie to gain permanent 
entry does not mean that an immigrant is necessarily untrustworthy. 
 
CA: (In)adequate Application of Statute 
If this code is indicated, then the decision hinges at least in part on the BIA (1) using the 
correct statutory authority in a particular case, and (2) applying the statute correctly given the 
facts of the case.  
 
Example of Adequate Application 
In Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
found in favor of the appellant. Jolley was born in the United States but defected to Canada to 
avoid compulsory military service. In so doing he renounced his U.S. citizenship. When he 
attempted to marry a U.S. citizen to regain his American citizenship, he was denied entry and 





the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the 5th Circuit actively affirmed that application of the 
statute. 
 
Example of Inadequate Application 
In Blake v. Carbone (the second half of the Blake dyad alluded to above), the 2nd Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellant. Blake, to refresh, pleaded guilty to statutory 
rape and requested a waiver that would allow him to remain in the United States. As 
aforementioned, the Board rejected his request on grounds that the waiver was only applicable in 
a very narrow set of circumstances. The court did not accept this argument: the Board’s focus on 
the grounds for deportation rather than the particular circumstances under which the waiver is 
applicable was misplaced under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
 
CA: (In)adequate Statutory Interpretation 
I borrow Black’s definition of statutory interpretation as “the interpretation of a statute by 
the court, [and] principles developed for legislation interpretation by courts” and apply it using 
the following codes. If one of these codes is indicated, then the BIA has interpreted the statute in 
question correctly or incorrectly. In cases with this code decided after 1984, we often observe 








Example of Adequate Interpretation 
In Leal v. Holder, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellant. Leal, a 
native of Mexico who entered illegally but married a U.S. citizen and had four children with U.S. 
citizenship, was ordered deportable due to his frequent and nearly lethal tendency to drive while 
intoxicated. The Board found, and the court affirmed, that Leal’s actions constituted moral 
turpitude and thus were deportable actions as defined by the Arizona criminal code and the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. The entirety of the opinion is dedicated to explicating the 
reasons why the Board’s conclusions regarding moral turpitude were appropriate. 
 
Example of Inadequate Interpretation 
In Goldeshtein v. INS, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellee. 
Goldeshtein, an Israeli national, was convicted of doctoring financial documents in order to 
avoid currency reports; he was sentenced to an extended period in prison and, upon the 
conclusion of his sentence, he was ordered deportable. The Board argued that his crimes 
necessarily constituted moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act since it 
required malicious intent. The court, in contrast, disagreed: “fraud is not inherent in the nature of 









CA: (In)adequate Application of Doctrine 
I borrow Black’s definition of doctrine as “a rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law” 
and apply it using the following codes. This code is very similar to the “application of statute” 
code but where the aforementioned code refers to statutory law, this code refers to law inscribed 
in court doctrine. This is a very common code in conjunction with the statutory interpretation 
codes.  
 
Example of Adequate Application 
In Diaz-Casteneda v. Holder, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the 
appellant. Diaz-Casteneda and her husband, both Mexican nationals, entered the United States 
illegally, departed for Mexico, and subsequently attempted to re-enter the United States. Under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, individuals who initially enter the United States illegally 
are ineligible for permanent residence; when the pair attempted re-entry, they were necessarily 
deportable. The court’s decision revolved around the Board’s interpretation of In Re Briones, a 
2007 BIA precedent decision that declared that “recidivist immigration violators” are ineligible 
for an adjustment of status (In re Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (2007)). The court argued that the 
Board’s application of Briones was both appropriate and adequate.  
 
Example of Inadequate Application 
In Lok v. INS, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellee. Lok, a 





channels required to become a legal resident of the United States upon marrying a U.S. citizen. 
Shortly following his legal status, he was convicted and pled guilty to distribution of a narcotic 
and was sentenced to five years in prison. He conceded deportability but requested a waiver 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board did not grant the waiver based on its 
long-standing reticence to rule against immigrants who have committed crimes that constitute 
moral turpitude. But the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Lennon v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (which the Board also cited), stated that where an immigrant’s situation is 
ambiguous the courts should rule in favor of the immigrant because “deportation is not, of 
course, a penal sanction. But in severity it surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal 
penalties (Lennon, 193).” 
 
Per curiam and concurring/dissenting opinions 
This dissertation does not use the text of concurring or dissenting opinions to interpret 
deferential intent per se; however, the authorial partisanship of those opinions is used to 
ascertain the partisan motivations of the case at hand. Conversely, indicating whether or not a 
case is per curiam indicates that determining the partisanship of the judicial panel will need to be 
calculated in a different way (i.e. through aggregate partisanship of the court in that year). By 









Judges’ names and partisanship of the panel 
Coding decisions for partisanship presents a challenge. Since all measures are imperfect 
at best, I employ several different means for ascertaining partisanship. The first approach codes 
each judge’s partisanship and aggregates partisanship of the judicial panel. To proxy 
partisanship, I identified each judge’s appointing president and assigned the partisanship of the 
president to that judge. Where a judge was appointed by presidents of two parties, I code the 
judge as having the partisanship of the initial appointing president (though this is only the case in 
x% of cases).  
I ascribe a +1 value for Democratic-appointed judges and a -1 value for Republican-
appointed judges. I add the values for each panel and note the result. For the majority of cases 
each each panel is composed of three judges, and as such the most common values are +3 (three 
Democratic judges), +1 (two Democratic judges and one Republican judge), -1 (one Democratic 
judge and two Republican judges), and -3 (three Republican judges).  
By noting the names of the judges in concert with the aggregate partisanship, I can easily 
indicate the partisanship of the author of the opinion. This provides the opportunity to more 
closely examine cases where the author of the opinion is of a different party than his or her peers 
on the panel. 
 
Direction of Opinion 
The second way I proxy partisanship is through determining whether the decision is “pro-
immigrant” or “anti-immigrant” as defined by Epstein, Landes, and Posner. Again, this is 





examination the Republican party has generally been in favor of restricting immigration 
bureaucratically while the Democratic party has generally been in favor of loosening regulatory 
restrictions on immigration.  
 
Example of Anti-Immigrant: 
In Peignand v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of the appellant. Peignand, a native of the Dominican Republic, was born out of 
wedlock to Dominican parents. The mother formally recognized the child and shortly thereafter 
became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Peignand was then convicted of possession of heroin and was 
sentenced to a prison term and deportation to the Dominican Republic. He argued that due to his 
mother’s citizenship he is precluded from being deported since he is a U.S. citizen by extension. 
The court disagreed, stating that Peignand was never “legitimated” in the Dominican Republic 
due to his birth out of wedlock and thus his mother’s citizenship could not be used as an 
argument for non-deportation. 
 
Example of Pro-Immigrant: 
In Wong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of the appellee. Wong, a Chinese national who entered the United States illegally 
by claiming he was the child of American citizens, successfully resided in the United States 
continuously until a three-hour sight-seeing trip to Mexico. His military service ended one month 
too early to be an avenue towards becoming a legal resident. The Board ruled that his trip to 





the 9th Circuit disagreed, stating that a three-hour trip to Mexico did not constitute a meaningful 
absence in the United States. 
 
Overall Partisanship of the Board/Court of Appeals/Supreme Court 
I contextualize the aforementioned measures of partisanship through indicating the 
overall partisanship of the instant court and the Supreme Court at the time the decision is made. 
This aggregates the judge partisanship measure discussed above and takes into account the date a 
decision is made – using these data I can indicate the partisanship of a court down to the day. 
 
Nation of Origin 
The nation of origin of the immigrant at the center of each case is indicated with this 
code. For the vast majority of cases, this indicates the nationality of the immigrant. In a handful 
of circumstances the nation of origin code refers to the country the immigrant most recently 
came from but does not indicate the initial nationality of the immigrant. This is most common in 
cases involving refugee and Convention Against Torture (CAT) cases where an immigrant has 
left their country of origin out of safety concerns but is emigrating from a secondary country. 
This was also the case in the Marks series of cases where an American emigrated to Cuba to join 








Type of Case 
Here I code for the seven kinds of cases that the BIA are tasked with hearing as 
delineated by the IRIIRA (though they heard a similar set of cases prior to the passage of that 
statute. These cases are removal proceedings, bond redetermination hearings, rescission hearings, 
withholding-only hearing, asylum-only hearing, credible fear review, claimed status review, in 
absentia hearing, and other. With the exception of one case coded as “other” (a disbarment 
claim), all cases are coded as “removal”. Though there are cases that involve asylum claims and 








Appendix E: Dyads Included in the Sample 
 
To identify dyads, I examined each BIA precedent decision as catalogued in the Lexis 
Nexis “Immigration Precedent Decisions: BIA, AAO/AAU” database. Most, but not all, 
precedent decisions are available on the EOIR’s website; all precedent decisions are available on 
Lexis Nexis. This made using the Lexis Nexis source the superior option. I then Shepardized 
each BIA precedent decision. Any precedent decision that had future appellate activity in the 
courts of appeals was identified as a dyad. Before beginning to read and code the decisions in 
earnest, I did an initial review of the dyads to ensure that the Shepardize feature correctly 
identified dyads. There were a handful of dyads (less than 5%) that were incorrectly identified as 
dyads by the Shepardize feature. The remainder of dyads identified constitutes the dataset used 
for this project. 
 
The Circella Dyad 
In re C---- 
5 I&N Dec. 370 (1953) 
United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli 
216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954) 
The Klapholz Dyad 
In re K---- 
9 I&N Dec. 143 (1959) 
Klapholz v. Esperdy 
302 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1962) 
The Title Dyad 
In re T---- 
9 I&N Dec. 127 (1960) 
Title v. INS 
322 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1963) 
The Scythes Dyad 
In re S---- 
9 I&N Dec. 252 (1961) 
Scythes v. Webb 





The Marks Dyad 
In re M---- 
9 I&N Dec. 452 (1961) 
United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy 
315 F.2d 673 (2nd Cir. 1963) 
The Hernandez-Valensuela Dyad 
In re H--- V---- 
9 I&N Dec. 428 (1961) 
Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg 
304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962) 
The Sawkow Dyad 
In re S---- 
9 I&N Dec. 613 (1962) 
Sawkow v. INS 
314 F.2d 34 (3rd Cir. 1963) 
The Amarante Dyad 
In re A---- 
9 I&N Dec. 705 (1962) 
Amarante v. Rosenberg 
326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964) 
The Costello Dyad 
In re C---- 
9 I&N Dec. 524 (1962) 
Costello v. INS 
311 F.2d 343 (2nd Cir. 1962) 
The Garcia-Castillo Dyad 
In re Garcia-Castillo 
10 I&N Dec. 516 (1964) 
Castillo v. INS 
350 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965) 
The Kinj/King Dyad 
In re Kinj 
11 I&N Dec. 42 (1965) 
King v. Katzenbach 
360 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1966) 
The G. Wong Dyad 
In re Wong 
11 I&N Dec. 106 (1965) 
Git Foo Wong v. INS 
358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966) 
The Lavoie Dyad 
In re Lavoie 
11 I&N Dec. 224 (1965) 
Lavoie v. INS 
418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969) 
The Caudillo-Villalobos Dyad 
In re Caudillo-Villalobos 
11 I&N Dec. 259 (1965) 
Caudillo-Villalobos v. INS 





The Pang Dyad 
In re Pang 
11 I&N Dec. 489 (1966) 
Ah Chiu Pang v. INS 
368 F.2d 637 (3rd Cir. 1966) 
The De Lucia Dyad 
In re De Lucia 
11 I&N Dec. 565 (1966) 
De Lucia v. INS 
370 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1967) 
The Talanoa Dyad 
In re Talanoa 
11 I&N Dec. 630 (1966) 
Talanoa v. INS 
397 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1968) 
The Ferrante Dyad 
In re Ferrante 
12 I&N Dec. 166 (1967) 
Ferrante v. INS 
399 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968) 
The Talanoa Dyad 
In re Talanoa 
12 I&N Dec. 187 (1967) 
Talanoa v. INS 
397 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1968) 
The Nason Dyad 
In re Nason 
12 I&N Dec. 452 (1967) 
Nason v. INS 
394 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1968) 
The Castillo-Godoy Dyad 
In re Castillo-Godoy 
12 I&N Dec. 520 (1967) 
Godoy v. Rosenberg 
415 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1969) 
The Ho Dyad 
In re Ho 
12 I&N Dec. 148 (1967) 
Ho Yeh Sze v. INS 
389 F.2d 978 (1968) 
The Riva Dyad 
In re Riva 
12 I&N Dec. 646 (1968) 
Riva v. Mitchell 
460 F.2d 1121 (3rd Cir. 1972) 
The Yam Dyad 
In re Yam 
12 I&N Dec. 676 (1968) 
Yam Sang Kwai v. INS 





The Gonzalez de Lara Dyad 
In re Gonzalez de Lara 
12 I&N Dec. 806 (1968) 
Gonzalez de Lara v. United States 
439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971) 
The Becerra Dyad 
In re Becerra 
13 I&N Dec. 19 (1968) 
Becerra Monje v. INS 
418 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1969) 
The Tsimbidy-Rochu Dyad 
In re Tsimbidy-Rochu 
13 I&N Dec. 56 (1968) 
Tsimbidy-Rochu v. INS 
414 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1969) 
The Lee F.C. Dyad 
In re Lee 
13 I&N Dec. 236 (1969) 
Lee Fook Chuey v. INS 
439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1970) 
The Laqui Dyad 
In re Laqui 
13 I&N Dec. 232 (1969) 
Laqui v. INS 
422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970) 
The Au Dyad 
In re Au 
12 I&N Dec. 294 (1969) 
Au Yi Lau v. INS 
445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
The Yaldo Dyad 
In re Yaldo 
13 I&N Dec. 374 (1969) 
Yaldo v. INS 
424 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1970) 
The Singh Dyad 
In re Singh 
13 I&N Dec. 439 (1969) 
Singh v. INS 
456 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1972) 
The Martinez and Londono Dyad 
In re Martinez 
13 I&N Dec. 483 (1970) 
Londono v. INS 
433 F.2d 635 (2nd Cir. 1970) 
The Marin Dyad 
In re Marin 
13 I&N Dec. 497 (1970) 
Marin v. INS 





The Yanez-Jaquez Dyad 
In re Yanez-Jaquez 
13 I&N Dec. 512 
Yanez-Jaquez v. INS 
440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971) 
The Jolley Dyad 
In re Jolley 
13 I&N Dec. 543 (1970) 
Jolley v. INS 
441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971) 
The Peignand Dyad 
In re Peignand 
13 I&N Dec. 566 (1970) 
Peignand v. INS 
440 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1971) 
The Solis-Davila Dyad 
In re Solis-Davila 
13 I&N Dec. 694 (1971) 
Solis-Davila v. INS 
456 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1972) 
The Barragan Dyad 
In re Barragan 
13 I&N Dec. 759 (1971) 
Barragan-Sanchez v. Rosenberg 
471 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1972) 
The L. Wong Dyad 
In re Wong 
14 I&N Dec. 12 (1972) 
Lai Haw Wong v. INS 
474 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1973) 
The Bark Dyad 
In re Bark 
14 I&N Dec. 237 (1972) 
Bark v. INS 
511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975) 
The Khan Dyad 
In re Khan 
14 I&N Dec. 397 (1973) 
Santiago et al v. INS 
526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) 
The Maldonado-Sandoval Dyad 
In re Maldonado-Sandoval 
14 I&N Dec. 475 (1973) 
Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS 
518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975) 
The Anaya Dyad 
In re Anaya 
14 I&N Dec. 488 (1973) 
Anaya-Perchez v. INS 





The Castro Dyad 
In re Castro 
14 I&N Dec. 492 (1973) 
Castro-Guerrro v. INS 
515 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975) 
The Merced Dyad 
In re Merced 
14 I&N Dec. 644 (1974) 
Merced v. INS 
514 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1975) 
The Quijencio Dyad 
In re Quijencio 
15 I&N Dec. 95 (1974) 
Quijencio v. INS 
535 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1976) 
The Marino Dyad 
In re Marino 
15 I&N Dec. 284 (1975) 
Marino v. INS 
537 F.2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1976) 
The Montemayor/Cacho Dyad 
In re Montemayor 
15 I&N Dec. 353 (1975) 
Cacho v. INS 
547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976) 
The Von Pervieux Dyad 
In re Von Pervieux 
15 I&N Dec. 406 (1975) 
Von Pervieux v. INS 
572 F.2d 114 (3rd Cir. 1978) 
The S.N. Lee Dyad 
In re Shon Ning Lee 
15 I&N Dec. 439 (1975) 
Shon Ning Lee v. INS 
576 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1978) 
The Rehman Dyad 
In re Rehman 
14 I&N Dec. 505 (1975) 
Rehman v. INS 
544 F.2d 71 (2nd Cir. 1976) 
The Lok Dyad 
In re Lok 
15 I&N Dec. 720 (1976) 
Lok v. INS 
548 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1977) 
The Ruangswang Dyad 
In re Ruangswang 
16 I&N Dec. 76 (1976) 
Ruangswang v. INS 





The Wang Dyad 
In re Wang 
16 I&N Dec. 528 (1978) 
Wang v. INS 
602 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) 
The McMullen Dyad 
In re McMullen 
17 I&N Dec. 542 (1980) 
McMullen v. INS 
658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) 
The Hill Dyad 
In re Hill 
18 I&N Dec. 81 (1981) 
Hill v. INS 
714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) 
The Gunaydin Dyad 
In re Gunaydin 
18 I&N Dec. 326 (1982) 
Gunaydin v. INS 
742 F.2d 776 (3rd Cir. 1984) 
The Laipenieks Dyad 
In re Laipenieks 
18 I&N Dec. 433 (1983) 
Laipenieks v. INS 
750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) 
The Kulle Dyad 
In re Kulle 
19 I&N Dec. 318 (1985) 
Kulle v. INS 
825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987) 
The (Name Redacted) Dyad 
In re A-G- 
19 I&N Dec. 502 (1987) 
(Name Redacted) v. INS 
858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988) 
The Maldonado-Cruz Dyad 
In re Maldonado-Cruz 
19 I&N Dec. 509 (1988) 
Maldonado-Cruz v. Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization 
883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989) 
The Canas-Segovia Dyad 
 
In re Canas 
19 I&N Dec. 697 (1988) 
 
Canas-Segovia v. INS 





The Goldeshtein Dyad 
In re Goldeshtein 
20 I&N Dec. 382 (1991) 
Goldeshtein v. INS 
8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993) 
The Kofa Dyad 
In re K- 
20 I&N Dec. 418 (1991) 
Kofa v. INS 
60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995) 
The Garawan Dyad 
In re Garawan 
20 I&N Dec. 938 (1995) 
Garawan v. INS 
91 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1996) 
The Shaar Dyad 
In re Shaar 
21 I&N Dec. 541 (1996) 
Shaar v. INS 
141 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1998) 
The Rivera Dyad 
In re Rivera 
21 I&N Dec. 232 (1996) 
Rivera v. INS 
122 F.3d 1062 (4th Cir. 1997) 
The Lettman Dyad, pt. 1 
In re Lettman 
22 I&N Dec. 365 (1998) 
Lettman v. Reno 
168 F.3d 463 (11th Cir. 1999) 
The Konstantinova Dyad 
In re L-V-K- 
22 I&N Dec. 976 (1999) 
Konstantinova v. INS 
195 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 1999) 
The Diallo Dyad 
In re M-D- 
21 I&N Dec. 1180 (1998) 
Diallo v. INS 
232 F.3d 279 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
The Lettman Dyad, pt. 2 
In re Lettman 
22 I&N Dec. 365 (1998) 
Lettman v. Reno 
207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2000) 
The Dillingham Dyad 
In re Dillingham 
21 I&N Dec. 1001 (1997) 
Dillingham v. INS 





The Gadda Dyad 
In re Gadda 
23 I&N Dec. 645 (2003) 
Gadda v. Ashcroft 
377 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2004) 
The Agyeman Dyad 
In re Agyeman 
1999 BIA LEXIS 52 (1999) 
Agyeman v. Gonzales 
155 Fed. Appx. 961 (9th Cir. 2005) 
The Pickering Dyad 
In re Pickering 
23 I&N Dec. 621 (2003) 
Pickering v. Gonzales 
454 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2006) 
The Vargas-Sarmiento Dyad 
In re Vargas-Sarmiento 
23 I&N Dec. 651 (2004) 
Vargas-Sarmiento v. Department of Justice 
448 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2006) 
The Ahmed Dyad 
In re Ahmed in Removal Proceedings 
2005 BIA LEXIS 25 (2005) 
Ahmed v. Gonzales 
467 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2006) 
The Maya-Cruz Dyad 
In re Maya-Cruz 
2004 BIA LEXIS 20 (2004) 
Maya-Cruz v. Keisler 
252 Fed. Appx. 136 (9th Cir. 2007) 
The Blake Dyad 
In re Blake 
23 I&N Dec. 722 (2005) 
Blake v. Carbone 
489 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2007) 
The Smriko Dyad 
In re Smriko 
23 I&N Dec. 836 (2005) 
Smriko v. Attorney General of the United 
States 
220 Fed. Appx. 103 (3rd Cir. 2007) 
The Negusie Dyad 
 
In re Negusie 
2006 BIA LEXIS 37 (2006) 
 
Negusie v. Gonzales 





The Orozco-Solis Dyad 
In re Orozco-Solis 
2006 BIA LEXIS 34 (2006) 
Orozco-Solis v. Mukasey 
270 Fed. Appx. 689 (9th Cir. 2008) 
The Liadov Dyad 
In re Liadov 
23 I&N Dec. 990 (2006) 
Liadov v. Mukasey 
518 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2008) 
The Gertsenshteyn Dyad 
In re Gertsenshteyn 
24 I&N Dec. 111 (2007) 
Gertsenshteyn v. Department of Justice 
544 F.3d 137 (2nd Cir. 2008) 
The Triumph Dyad 
In re Triumph 
2006 BIA LEXIS 28 (2006) 
Triumph v. Holder 
314 Fed. Appx. 725 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The Tejwani Dyad 
In re Tejwani 
24 I&N Dec. 97 (2007) 
Tejwani v. Attorney General of the United 
States 
349 Fed. Appx. 719 (3rd Cir. 2009) 
The Escobar Dyad 
In re Escobar 
24 I&N Dec. 231 (2007) 
Escobar v. Holder 
567 F.3d 466 (2009) 
The Ndayshimiye Dyad 
In re J-B-N- 
24 I&N Dec. 208 (2007) 
Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of the 
United States 
557 F.3d 124 (3rd Cir. 2009) 
The Lemus-Losa Dyad 
In re Lemus-Losa 
24 I&N Dec. 373 (2007) 
Lemus-Losa v. Holder 
576 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2009) 
The Carachuri-Rosendo Dyad 
In re Carachuri-Rosendo 
24 I&N Dec. 382 (2007) 
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder 





The Chen Dyad 
In re C-C- 
23 I&N Dec. 899 (2006) 
Chun Hua Chen v. Holder 
343 Fed. Appx. 652 (2nd Cir. 2009) 
The Abreu Dyad 
In re Abreu 
24 I&N Dec. 795 (2009) 
Cardenes Abreu v. Holder 
378 Fed. Appx. 59 (2nd Cir. 2010) 
The Soriano-Vino Dyad 
In re Lourdes Soriano-Vino in Removal 
Proceedings 
2003 BIA LEXIS 17 (2003) 
Soriano-Vino v. Holder 
653 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2011) 
The M.F. Wong Dyad 
In re M-F-W- 
24 I&N Dec. 633 (2008) 
Mei Fun Wong v. Holder 
633 F.3d 64 (2nd Cir. 2011) 
The Robles-Urrea Dyad 
In re Robles 
24 I&N Dec. 22 (2006) 
Robles-Urrea v. Holder 
678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012) 
The Monges-Garcia Dyad 
In re Monges 
25 I&N Dec. 246 (2010) 
Monges-Garcia v. Holder 
482 Fed. Appx. 272 (9th Cir. 2012) 
The Almanza-Arenas Dyad, pt. 1 
In re Almanza-Arenas 
24 I&N Dec. 771 (2009) 
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder 
771 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The Almanza-Arenas Dyad, pt. 2 
In re Almanza-Arenas 
24 I&N Dec. 771 (2009) 
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder 
815 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The Diaz-Castaneda Dyad 
In re Diaz and Lopez 
25 I&N Dec. 188 (2010) 
Diaz-Castaneda v. Holder 





The Moody Dyad 
In re Moody 
2012 BIA LEXIS 40 (2012) 
Moody v. Holder 
523 Fed. Appx. 88 (2nd Cir. 2013) 
The Fernandez-Taveras Dyad 
In re Fernandez-Taveras 
25 I&N Dec. 834 (2012) 
Taveras v. Attorney General of the United 
States 
731 F.3d 281 (3rd Cir. 2013) 
The Akram Dyad 
In re Akram 
25 I&N Dec. 874 (2012) 
Akram v. Holder 
721 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2013) 
The Silva-Trevino Dyad 
In re Silva-Trevino 
24 I&N Dec. 687 (2008) 
Silva-Trevino v. Holder 
742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The Bautista Dyad 
In re Bautista 
25 I&N Dec. 616 (2011) 
Bautista v. Attorney General of the United 
States 
744 F.3d 54 (3rd Cir. 2014) 
The Leal Dyad 
In re Leal 
26 I&N Dec. 20 (2012) 
Leal v. Holder 
771 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The Rivas Dyad 
In re Rivas 
26 I&N Dec. 130 (2013) 
Rivas v. United States Attorney General 
765 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2014) 
The Ortega-Lopez Dyad 
In re Ortega-Lopez 
26 I&N Dec. 99 (2013) 
Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch 
834 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The Enkui Li Dyad 
In re [Name Redacted by the Court] 
2013 BIA LEXIS 25 (2013) 
Enkui Li v. Lynch 





The Hernandez Dyad 
In re Hernandez 
26 I&N Dec. 464 (2015) 
Hernandez v. Lynch 
823 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The Esquivel-Quintana Dyad 
In re Esquivel-Quintana 
26 I&N Dec. 469 (2015) 
Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch 
810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The Garay-Reyes Dyad 
In re W-G-R- 
26 I&N Dec. 208 (2014) 
Garay-Reyes v. Lynch 
842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The Obeya Dyad 
In re Obeya 
26 I&N Dec. 856 (2016) 
Obeya v. Sessions 
884 F.3d 442 (2nd Cir. 2018) 
The Richmond Dyad 
In re Richmond 
26 I&N Dec. 779 (2016) 
Richmond v. Sessions 
697 Fed. Appx. 106 (2nd Cir. 2017) 
The M. Hernandez Dyad 
Matter of M-H-Z- 
26 I&N Dec. 757 (2016) 
Hernandez v. Sessions  
884 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 2018) 
The Gomez-Sanchez Dyad 
In re G-G-S- 
26 I&N Dec. 339 (2014) 
Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions 






Appendix F: Proportion of Law Review Citations on Chevron 
 
To ascertain the ubiquity of discussions regarding the Chevron doctrine in the legal 
literature, I identified the number of mentions of Chevron in the text of law review articles 
between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2019. I used Washington and Lee University School 
of Law’s 2018 ranked list of law reviews and examined the twenty-five highest ranked 
publications. To determine the number of Chevron cites, I conducted a LexisNexis search for 
“Chevron” by journal between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2019. To determine the 
number of total cites, I conducted a LexisNexis search for “law” by journal between January 1, 
1985 and December 31, 2019.  
 
Law Review by Rank 
Total Cites since 
1985 
Total Chevron Cites 
Proportion of 
Chevron Cites 
Yale Law Journal 2683 210 7.83% 
Harvard Law Review 4493 356 7.92% 
Stanford Law Review 1506 91 6.04% 
Columbia Law 
Review 




1798 144 8.01% 
Texas Law Review 1820 135 7.42% 
Georgetown Law 
Journal 
1859 136 7.32% 
Fordham Law 
Review 







1771 98 5.53% 
Supreme Court 
Review 
204 33 16.18% 
Iowa Law Review 1515 110 7.26% 
Cornell Law Review 1340 114 8.51% 
Vanderbilt Law 
Review 
1730 122 7.05% 
New York Univ. Law 
Review 
1491 146 9.79% 
Minnesota Law 
Review 
1597 131 8.20% 
Virginia Law Review 592 38 6.42% 
UCLA Law Review 1386 92 6.64% 
Univ. of Chicago 
Law Review 
1851 169 9.13% 
Boston Univ. Law 
Review 
1562 107 6.85% 
Boston College Law 
Review 
1184 99 8.36% 
Michigan Law 
Review 
2620 164 6.26% 
Notre Dame Law 
Review 
1706 154 9.03% 
Duke Law Journal 1333 187 14.03% 
Southern California 
Law Review 
1365 67 4.91% 
William and Mary 
Law Review 
1390 125 8.99% 






Appendix G: χ2 Results 
 
Along with logistic regressions, I ran a series of χ2 tests to ascertain the extent of the 
relationship between agency win/loss and deference type with a series of independent variables. 
The control variables used for each of the regressions were also used for the χ2 tests; details can 
be found in footnotes in Chapter 3.  
 
Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Universe 
Independent Variable χ2 Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Panel Match 2.497 4 0.645 
Court Match 0.749 3 0.862 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
0.902 2 0.637 
Court of Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
2.856 4 0.582 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Per Curiam 
5.381 2 0.068 
Court of Appeals Per 
Curiam 








Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Universe 
Independent Variable χ2 Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Panel Match 1.627 4 0.804 
Court Match 1.058 3 0.787 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
0.267 2 0.875 
Court of Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
8.774 4 0.067 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Per Curiam 
7.901 2 0.019 
Court of Appeals Per 
Curiam 
5.650 3 0.130 
 
Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Pre-Chevron 
Independent Variable χ2 Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Panel Match n/a 
Court Match 11.184 3 0.011 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 





Court of Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
3.591 4 0.464 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Per Curiam 
n/a 
Court of Appeals Per 
Curiam 
12.576 3 0.006 
 
Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Pre-Chevron 
Independent Variable χ2 Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Panel Match n/a 
Court Match 0.201 3 0.977 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Panel Partisanship 
0.823 2 0.663 
Court of Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
6.824 4 0.146 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Per Curiam 
n/a 
Court of Appeals Per 
Curiam 








Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Post-Chevron 
Independent Variable χ2 Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Panel Match 2.457 4 0.652 
Court Match 1.540 3 0.673 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Panel Partisanship 
1.553 2 0.460 
Court of Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 
1.729 3 0.631 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Per Curiam 
4.573 2 0.102 
Court of Appeals Per 
Curiam 
18.217 3 0.000 
 
Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Post-Chevron 
Independent Variable χ2 Degrees of Freedom Significance 
Panel Match 2.994 4 0.559 
Court Match 2.162 3 0.539 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals Panel Partisanship 
0.051 2 0.975 
Court of Appeals Panel 
Partisanship 





Board of Immigration 
Appeals Per Curiam 
2.360 2 0.307 
Court of Appeals Per 
Curiam 
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